Just as a murderer must be killed rather than transgress, so too a betrothed maiden must be killed rather than transgress" — Rashi explained that he does not have the textual reading "she shall be killed," for she is not obligated to give up her life, since she is like the ground of the world [passive]. And with this it is understandable what is asked at the end of chapter Ben Sorer [Sanhedrin 74b]: "But wasn't Esther [forced] in public?" And why doesn't it ask: "But illicit relations require 'being killed rather than transgress' even in private?" According to the reading that does not have "she shall be killed," it works out well, for regarding illicit relations the questioner knew well that being "ground of the world" is effective, but regarding publicness, whose reason is desecration of God's name, it did not occur to him that it is effective. Therefore he asks: "But wasn't Esther in public?" And [the Gemara] answers: For publicness too she was ground of the world and it is effective. And you should know that she, who did not perform an action, need not be killed, for we derive it from murder, and murder itself that requires being killed is because "what makes you think your blood is redder" etc., and this applies where one performs an action. But if one does not perform an action, such as where they want to drop him on a baby to kill it, and if he holds back they will kill him, and in all such cases he need not be killed, for on the contrary, let us say: "What makes you think his blood is redder? Perhaps my blood is redder!" Moreover, the textual comparison regarding murder is written about one who kills with his hands: "as when a man rises against his neighbor and murders him" etc. And Rava who disagrees in chapter Ben Sorer u-Moreh [Sanhedrin 74b] with the answer of "ground of the world" and answers "his own pleasure is different" — meaning when they coerce a person to transgress in something that gives him pleasure, there is no desecration of God's name — disagrees only regarding publicness that "ground of the world" is not effective, but regarding illicit relations he admits that "ground of the world" is effective. Alternatively, even regarding publicness he does not disagree, but adds another reason. And there are those who explain that the reason it does not ask there "But wasn't Esther [guilty of] illicit relations?" is because she did not benefit from the transgression, as he cast impurity into her, as answered regarding Yael in the fourth chapter of Nazir [23b] and in chapter Mitzvat Chalitzah [Yevamot 103b]. When it asks "But doesn't she benefit from the transgression?" it explains thus: Since she benefits, she should be killed for illicit relations. And it answers: The good of the wicked is evil for the righteous. And this is not clear. First, regarding her not being obligated to give up her life, the fact that she did not benefit is not effective, for even without benefit there is still the prohibition of illicit relations, even though we say in chapter ha-Maniach [Bava Kama 32a] "And the souls that do — the doing [requires] benefit for both," nevertheless even without benefit she is liable, such as in an unnatural manner even though it is called affliction. Moreover, it is impossible that she did not benefit somewhat. And furthermore, if she intended to save herself, wherein does Scripture praise her? Didn't she act for her own sake? Moreover, it is obvious he did not wish to kill her, for he was fleeing for his life, and on the contrary, he needed her to hide him so the pursuers would not find him, and she enticed him with words until he came upon her in order to weaken his strength, as is proven from the matter. Rather, one must say it is because we say above it: "Great is a transgression for [God's] sake more than a commandment not for [God's] sake, as it is written: 'Blessed above women in the tent' — who are these? Women in the tent: Sarah, Rebecca, Rachel, and Leah" — meaning the Matriarchs intended to build up from their husbands. And it asks: Why does Scripture praise her more than the women in the tent? But she benefited from the transgression! And it answers: She did not have such benefit, for her distress was greater than her pleasure, for the good of the wicked is evil for the righteous. And even though in chapter Mitzvat Chalitzah [Yevamot 103a] it also asks this way, even though there is no mention of "great is a transgression for [God's] sake" etc., one can say it relies on that passage in Nazir, just as Rashi explained that the reading is "he shall be killed," so too the She'iltot in parashat Va'era reads thus. And the She'iltot asked from what Rava said at the beginning of chapter ha-Ba al Yevimto [Yevamot 53b]: "But coercion regarding illicit relations, since there is no erection except willingly," and if so, is there such a thing as coercion regarding him, who says "even illicit relations — be killed rather than transgress"? But this is not coercion but willingness, since there is no erection except willingly. And [the She'iltot] answered: You find it for healing purposes, like that case at the end of chapter Ben Sorer u-Moreh [Sanhedrin 75a] regarding "a man who set his eyes on a certain woman and his heart brought up mud after her" etc., until "let him die and not have relations with her." And the language "be killed" does not fit the explanation, for it should have said "let him die and not transgress." And Rabbeinu [Yaakov] explained that Rava's case refers to when the gentiles press him against an illicit woman and he cannot extricate himself except if they kill him, and about this it says there is no claim of coercion to say he does not perform an action but others perform action upon him, like ground of the world. And one might think he should transgress and not be killed — it teaches us that since he knows himself that if they press him, it is impossible that he not become erect, the erection that he does is considered as if he performs an action even though it comes to him through coercion. And even though there is one who says "one who has relations with a corpse regarding illicit relations is liable," and even so, when they press him and he has relations with a corpse he is exempt since he is coerced, if so, what difference is there between having relations with a dead organ versus with an erection? One can say Rava holds to his reasoning that he said in the second chapter of Shevuot [18a]: "One who has relations with a corpse is exempt." Moreover, one can say he should have separated with minor pleasure but separated with major pleasure, as it says regarding one who has relations with a pure woman and she said to him "I became impure" in the second chapter of Shevuot [also there], and he separated with a living organ is liable even according to the one who says "one who has relations with a corpse is liable," because he should have separated with minor pleasure but separated with major pleasure. Here too, if they pressed him and he had relations as a corpse, or if he became erect for his wife permissibly and they pressed him, he is exempt. But if they pressed him and subsequently he became erect, he is liable. And now according to what we have explained, the reading is "be killed," or alternatively the reading is "even a betrothed maiden shall be killed" works out well, and we establish it as a case where she performed an action, where they coerce her to bring the illicit act upon herself. And that which is asked in Ketubot [3b] "Let them expound that coercion is permitted even though illicit relations require being killed rather than transgressing" — there too they were ground of the world. And Rabbeinu Tam would explain regarding that passage in Ketubot and regarding Esther that [a woman] is not obligated to give up her life for relations with a gentile, for his relations are not [legally considered] relations, and [a woman] is not liable to death for his relations, for the Merciful One declared the seed of an idolater ownerless, as it is written: "whose flesh is the flesh of donkeys and whose issue is the issue of horses," and it is like mere animal relations. And from this he permitted a Jewish woman who apostatized and married a gentile, and she repented, and the gentile converted — to maintain her [as his wife]. For even though it says "just as she is forbidden to the husband, so she is forbidden to the adulterer," this applies to relations with a Jew, but not a gentile. And this is not acceptable to R"I bar Meir, for since she becomes forbidden to her husband through relations with a gentile, as it says in Ketubot [there] "there are promiscuous women" etc., and similarly in the second chapter of Ketubot [26b] "a woman who was imprisoned by gentiles for a capital offense is forbidden to her husband," and similarly regarding Esther "and when I perish, I perish" — this shows that to forbid her to her husband it is not considered like animal relations, so too there is reason to forbid her to the adulterer, and similarly to disqualify an unmarried woman who had relations with a gentile from the priesthood, even though one who had relations with an animal is fit for the priesthood in chapter ha-Ba al Yevimto [Yevamot 59b] — this shows it is not considered like an animal. And specifically regarding a child it says in chapter Nose'in [there 98a] that the Merciful One declared the seed of an idolater ownerless. And in chapter Arusah [Sotah 26b] we say that [a gentile] acquires [a woman] through a gentile and disqualifies from terumah, and it asks: Isn't it obvious? "And she hid herself and she became impure," the Merciful One said regarding both the husband and the adulterer and terumah. You might think: When we say "and she hid herself and she became impure," this refers specifically to where through this relations she is forbidden to him — it teaches us [otherwise]. This shows that even regarding a gentile the term "she became impure" applies to forbid to the husband, and the same applies to the adulterer. And one cannot infer the opposite from there, from the fact that it says one might think since without these relations she is forbidden to him, she is not forbidden to him through the husband — by inference, the gentile himself does not require a verse to forbid her through those relations, and if so, a convert is permitted [to her] through relations that he had while he was a gentile, for if he were forbidden, the verse would work out well even regarding a gentile, and she would be forbidden to him through these relations when he converts, for without these relations she would not be forbidden to him — that is, while he was a gentile, for she is forbidden to have relations with a gentile. And it is difficult: Since there is a prohibition of death for relations with a gentile, why did Mordechai not divorce Esther when she came for the salvation of all Israel? And one can say he was afraid lest the matter become known to the king and it would be publicized through the bill of divorce that she was his wife. For if you do not say so, why did he not divorce her so she would not be forbidden to him through her relations and remarry her afterward, for [regarding] remarrying his divorcee, she is not forbidden through adulterous relations, as proven in Sotah chapter Hayah Mevi [Sotah 18b], for he did not stipulate with her since she would be divorced. And if you ask: That which it says in tractate Avodah Zarah chapter Rabbi Yishmael [Avodah Zarah 54a] regarding "worshiped under coercion" that it is forbidden, and it explains: such as where gentiles coerced him and he bowed to his own animal, and it asks about it: "But coercion — the Merciful One exempted, as it is written: 'and to the maiden do nothing.'" And what is the difficulty? But this verse specifically refers to ground of the world, but one who performs an action is obligated to give up himself, and one who bows to idolatry performs an action, for when gentiles force him [to bow] before idolatry, we cannot establish it [that he did nothing], for if so, he did nothing and this is not bowing, and even appearing like one bowing, like one who stoops and picks up his coins before idolatry — it is not [prohibited]. Moreover, if so, there is no person here forbidding something that is his, but rather the gentiles who force his posture are the ones forbidding his animal to idolatry if it were to be forbidden by this. And one can say the explanation is thus: Coercion — the Merciful One exempted from death, and since He exempted from death of the court, even though he is obligated to give up himself, it is not considered "worshiped" to be forbidden through this worship. And one may properly derive from this verse that he is exempt from death under coercion even when performing an action, even though the maiden did not do anything, for it is compared in this verse — the betrothed maiden to murder: Just as murder — be killed rather than transgress when performing an action, so the maiden — the adulterer be killed or she be killed when performing an action. And about this the verse says "and to the maiden" who performed an action after the fact due to coercion "do nothing." And the same applies to one who bows to idolatry so they will not kill him — one may derive from it to exempt him after the fact even when performing an action. And Rabbi Zeira holds: Since after the fact the worshiper is exempt, what was worshiped is not forbidden through this worship. Even though not under coercion of death he would be liable according to Abaye even though he did not accept it as a god, and according to Rabbah who [holds he is only liable if] he accepted it as a god — that he bowed explicitly for the sake of accepting divinity even though his mouth and heart are not aligned, for with his mouth he states he worships for the sake of divinity but his heart is to his Father in Heaven. And Rava responds to Rabbi Zeira that it is properly considered "worshiped" even though exempt from death. Moreover, one can say it seems to him regarding death of the court that there is no distinction between performing an action and not performing an action, for a woman willingly is liable even though she is ground of the world. And when it exempts there coercion from death of the court, as it is written "and to the maiden do nothing," there is no difference whether one performs an action or does not perform an action.