Yoḥanan b. Nuri states, “Cow-wheat is also subject to a dough-offering when made into dough.” Ishmael b. R Yosé, speaking in his father’s name asks, “What is a ḥalut-dumpling?” He then elaborates, “It is dough made by one who adds flour to hot water.”

The discourse continues with a discussion on a me‘isah-dumpling, “This is made by adding hot water to flour.” The sages, however, argue that the ruling is the same for both types of dumpling: any batch made in a stewpot or boiling-pot is exempt from dough-offering, while any made in an oven is subject to one.

The conversation turns to the matter of ownership. “If the bakery is an Israelite property, even if gentile employees work in it, the leaven is subject to a dough-offering. Nevertheless, if the bakery is owned by gentiles, even if Israelite employees work in it, the leaven is exempt from a dough-offering.”

The commentary goes on to stipulate, “One who makes dough to sell to the public is liable for a dough-offering. Similarly, one who makes dough intending to eat it while it is still raw dough is also liable. Parched flour which one kneads and turns into dough is also subject to a dough-offering, as is dough intended for payment of a tax, since one retains accountability for it until the point of handover.”

The focus then shifts to specific cases, “In Jerusalem, dough made from second tithe grain is subject to a dough-offering. According to R. Meir, dough made from grain that might have been mixed with a heave-offering is also liable for a dough-offering.” However, R. Yosé refutes this, exempting dough made from such grain. Conversely, the sages argue that dough made from a mixture of unconsecrated grain and a heave-offering is exempt from a dough-offering, but dough made from grain that might have been combined with a heave-offering is only eaten by priests due to the potential heave-offering that may be in the blend. It is still subject to a dough-offering.

R. Ilai recounts a conversation he had with R. Joshua about the status of loaves of thank-offering and wafers of a Nazirite. R. Joshua told him they were exempt. However, R. Eliezer maintains that if one made them for personal use, they are free from a dough-offering, but if one made them to sell in the market, they are liable. When R. Ilai asked R. Eleazar b. Azariah about these issues, he confirmed, “[By] the covenant! These words [i.e., Eliezer’s,] were spoken at Mount Horeb.”

R. Judah asserts that dough prepared for dogs is distinguishable by its appearance. If transformed into loaves (fit for human consumption), it requires a dough-offering. Yet, if crafted into strips, it is exempt. A priest or a woman who leaves some flour unmixed in the process of making dough ends up, along with the crumbs and leaven, having five-fourths of a qab, the requisite volume imposing liability for a dough-offering, rendering their dough unauthorized for use until a dough-offering is separated from it. R. Judah also explains why a householder must separate one-twenty-fourth of his dough as a dough-offering because of his generosity with his dough, whereas a baker must separate only one-forty-eighth, due to his stinginess with his dough. However, the sages disagree, arguing that the size of the dough, not the character of the baker, dictates the portion of the dough-offering.

The discussion extends to the purchase of bread, “One who buys bakery bread or bread from a lady selling it in the market must separate a dough-offering due to doubt about whether or not dough-offering already had been separated. On the other hand, if one purchases bread from a householder or from his lodgers, there is no need to separate a dough-offering due to that doubt.” Dough-offering separated due to doubt, the sages say, should constitute one-forty-eighth. R. Simeon, however, argues that even if one manages to separate only one-sixtieth, it fulfills the obligation.

The subject changes to preparation, “One who can't prepare his dough cleanly should prepare it in one-qab portions, thereby exempting it from dough-offering, rather than preparing it in unclean conditions.” But R. Aqiba counters, “He can make his dough under unclean circumstances, rather than preparing it in one-qab portions. The same way he can designate dough-offering for a clean dough, he can also designate dough-offering for an unclean dough, as he designates each separately by the same name. However, one-qab portions have no part large enough to be designated ‘dough-offering’.” An objection is raised to R. Aqiba’s assertion, “We do not instruct someone to go ahead with sinning for the eventual purpose of gaining merit; nor to spoil a situation so that it will eventually be set right.”

R. Eliezer expresses his opinion, “Dough-offering may be removed from a clean batch on behalf of an unclean one.” When this teaching is presented before R. Ishmael, who opposes Eliezer's view, he exclaims, “[By] the holy garments worn by our forefathers! I’ll make an example of anyone who gives such instructions without the backing of tradition!” But when they remind him that the argument was made in the name of R. Eliezer, he retracts, acknowledging the teaching has authority to rely on.

The conversation transitions to specific scenarios. “A woman who abandons her dough or sells it, or gifts it, before she rolls it out (in the case of wheat dough) or forms it into a solid mass (for barley dough), is not liable for a dough-offering unless the grain reaches the requisite amount for a dough-offering. However, if she forsakes, sells, or gifts the dough after she has rolled it out or formed it into a solid mass, even if she divides the dough into smaller batches, each of which comprises only an olive's bulk in volume, she is liable for a dough-offering, since the dough reached the volume subject to dough-offering when the liability took effect. If the uncertainty of the dough having been tainted occurs before it is rolled out, it can be handled as unclean. But if this doubt comes up after rolling out, it must be treated as clean. However, the status of her dough-offering is left in suspension. This rule only applies to a substance that could potentially render the dough-offering unclean. Similarly, if doubt about the purity of produce arises before the completion of its processing, it should be treated as unclean. But if the potential impurity occurs after processing, it should be treated as clean. The resulting heave-offering is also held in suspense. This regulation applies only to a substance that could potentially contaminate the heave-offering.”

The final topic of discussion involves a convert. “A convert who was in possession of prepared dough at the time of conversion is subject to a dough-offering if conversion occurred before the crust formed on the dough. If the conversion happened after the crust formed, the dough is exempt,” according to R. Aqiba. R. Yoḥanan b. Nuri disagrees. He says if the conversion happened before she rolls the dough or forms it into a mass, it is subject to a dough-offering. If it took place after, the dough is exempt. It is claimed in the name of R. Judah b. Betera that the dough only becomes subject to dough-offering when she makes it into separate portions, for example, loaves or rolls.