If a court issued [an erroneous] ruling and one of them knew that they erred or that one of them from the distinguished students who sit before them and are fit to issue rulings—like Shimon ben Azzai—[knew that the court erred] and he went and acted according [to their ruling], he is liable because he did not rely on the court.

If a court issued [an erroneous] ruling and the whole congregation or most of it acted according to [their ruling], in a time that its ruling is the ruling of the court, they are exempt and the ones who acted in accordance with it bring a bull. If the ruling is not a ruling of the court, they bring a bull and the ones who acted in reliance on it bring a female lamb or a she-goat. If a court issued [an erroneous] ruling and two or three of the tribes or the majority [of the members] of them acted in accordance with [the ruling], in a time when their ruling is the ruling of the court, they are exempt and the ones who acted in accordance [with the decision] bring a bull; [in a time when] their ruling is not the ruling of the court, they are liable and the ones who acted in accordance [with the ruling] bring a female lamb or a she-ass. If they made their decision themselves, they are exempt; the decision of the anointed priest, they are liable. If a court issued [an erroneous] decision and one of them was not there, they are exempt. Rabbi said, I say until the most distinguished of [the judges] is present.

There is a stringency in erroneous rulings that there is not in capital cases, and [a stringency] in capital cases that there is not in erroneous rulings: [As to the former, a judge is not liable for] an erroneous ruling until all [the judges] issue the ruling as one (see Hor. 1:4), but in capital cases we follow the majority. [As to the latter, a judge is not liable for] an erroneous ruling unless the ruling is issued by the beit din presiding in the Chamber of Hewn Stone (i.e., the Sanhedrin), but in capital cases, [a judgment may be] issued in any place. An individual who issues (i.e., executes) an erroneous ruling by his own order, behold he is liable, as it is said (Num. 15:30), "But the person who acts high-handedly ... [shall be cut off from among his people]."

One who eats a sheketz (a detestable thing), he is an apostate. How so? An apostate [is one who] eats neveilot (carrion flesh) or tereifot (flesh of an animal with a mortal injury or defect), sheketzim or untithed produce, one who eats pig flesh or drinks wine of [an idolatrous] libation, or who desecrates the Sabbath (see Sanh. 8:2), or one who pours [wine of libation] (see Bava Kamma 117a:5). Rabbi Yosei son of Rabbi Yehudah says, even one who wears kilayim (i.e., garments of wool and linen). Rabbi Shimon son of Eliezer says, even one who does something that his inclination does not desire [i.e., even if the above acts were done without an evil intent].

[If] a beit din ruled at the conclusion of the Sabbath [that the sun had set, thus permitting labor], and then later the sun was seen shining [as may occur, e.g., on a cloudy day], this is not an erroneous ruling but merely a mistake (Yeb. 92a:2). [If] a beit din ruled to uproot an entire principle, [such as if] they said, "There is no blood (i.e., laws concerning the blood of a sacrificial animal) in the Torah," "There is no fat (i.e., laws concerning the fats of a sacrificial animal) in the Torah," "There is no piggul (Lev. 7:18) in the Torah," behold, they are exempt (Hor. 1:3). [If] they ruled to nullify part and uphold part, behold, they are liable. How so? [If] they said, "There is blood [in the Torah] but there is no obligation, except as to the blood of a peace offering." [Or if they said,] "There is fat in the Torah but there is no obligation except as to the blood of a peach offering." [Or if they said,] "There is piggul in the Torah but there is no obligation except as to piggul of a peace offering." Behold, [in these cases,] they are liable, as it is said elsewhere (Deut. 17:8, see below), "matter." What does "matter" mean? As is said elsewhere (see Midrash Tehillim 105:1), of part of it, but not all of it. You say, a "matter" is part of it, but not all of it, or is it only all of it? The Torah teaches (Deut. 17:8), "[When any matter is too baffling for you, in justice,] between blood and blood," and not "all the blood" -- "between judgment and judgment," and not "every judgment" -- "between plague and plague," and not "every plague" -- thus, there is no need to say [in accordance] with the first version, but rather [in accordance] with the last version. [Just] as it says here, "matter," and it says elsewhere, "matter," what is "matter," so too it says elsewhere "part of it," but not "all of it." Rabbi Shimon ben Eliezer says in the name of Rabbi Meir, "If six sinned and they are the majority, or seven, even if they are not the majority, behold, they are liable."

If a court of one of the tribes issues [an erroneous] ruling and that same tribe acts in accordance with [the decision], the same tribe is liable and the rest of the tribes are exempt. Rabbi Yitzhaq son of Rabbi Yehuda says, the decision of the court with each and every tribe is like the decision of the court of the public, as the court and the anointed [priest] are liable only for absence [of awareness of] the matter with unwitting [performance] of the act or absence [of awareness of] the matter by the court and unwitting [performance of] the act by the congregation. If they act on their ruling for themselves, they are exempt. On the ruling of the anointed priest, they are liable. They are only liable for a matter whose intentional [violation renders one liable to receive] karet and [whose] unintentional [violation renders one liable to bring] a sin offering. And for the anointed priest, in cases of idol worship only with regard to a matter whose intentional [violation renders one liable to receive] karet and [whose] unintentional [violation renders one liable to bring] a sin offering. An anointed [priest] in a [ruling related] to idol worship is liable for the unwitting [performance] of the action according to Rabbi Meir but the Sages say, it is like the rest of the mitzvot where [one with] absence [of awareness of] the matter with unwitting [performance] of the act brings an asham talui.

[The court] is not liable [to bring a bull as an unwitting sin-offering for issuing a ruling regarding] a positive commandment or a negative commandment that [is related to the defiling of] the Temple, and one does not bring a provisional guilt-offering for a positive commandment or for a negative commandment [related to the defiling of] the Temple (Hor. 2:4). But [the court] is liable to bring a provisional guilt offering for a positive commandment or for a negative commandment regarding a niddah, said Rabbi Shimon. Why does liability that incurs [for a ruling regarding] a positive commandment involving a niddah? Because there is within it a negative commandment. Moreover, Rabbi Yehuda would say over a general rule regarding them: When an individual must bring a provisional guilt offering, the nasi (leader or prince) must do so as well, and the anointed [priest] and the court are exempt (Hor. 9a:10). [But when it comes to] a definite guilt offering, the nasi and the anointed [priest] are liable, and the court is exempt (ibid.).

For hearing a voice, and for an utterance of the lips, and for defiling the Temple or its consecrated [foods], the court is exempt, and the individual, the nasi, and the anointed [priest] are liable (Hor. 2:7, Hor. 9a:11). But the nasi is not liable for hearing a voice, and not for defiling the Temple or its consecrated [foods]. When it [requires] a variable rate sacrifice, the nasi, and similarly the anointed [priest] and the court are exempt. When it [requires] a fixed rate sacrifice, the individual and the nasi and the anointed [priest] bring a female lamb, and the court [brings] a bull and a female lamb as a burnt offering, and a male lamb as a sin offering (Hor. 2:6).