והוא עד או ראה או ידע, “and he is a witness, either having seen or having definitive knowledge.” The Torah does not speak of three different scenarios here, for it is impossible for someone to be a witness to something that he has neither seen nor otherwise has definitive knowledge of. It must deal therefore with the case of someone beseeching his friend or acquaintance to testify on his behalf to a matter which he has definitive knowledge of by having been an eye witness of it, or having ironclad knowledge of when the matter is not subject to eyesight, such as testifying to words spoken. He may have heard a party admit owing money to another party, for instance. The presence of such a party when money changed hands, would be “seeing” something, the hearing of an admission, would be “knowing” something without the benefit of having seen it. It is also possible to explain the words והוא עד, to mean that this refers to knowledge which includes both having seen what happens and having understood its impact, such as having been present when the loan was handed over and receipt was confirmed by the recipient. The subsequent או ידע would then mean that although the party had been fully aware of the loan having been transacted, the recipient having acknowledged it, he had not seen the money change hands. The Torah, in this case, does not write: ונעלם ממנו, “it was concealed from him,” as it did in the next three verses, seeing that the refusal to testify is not an inadvertent sin but a deliberately committed one. If, at the time when requested to render an oath, the witness had indeed forgotten what he had known at the time, he does not need to render such an oath.

ונעלם ממנו והוא טמא, “but it was concealed from him,” the same applies when the party asked to swear had forgotten the occurrence which he was now asked to swear about Nachmanides writes that actually, the Torah abbreviated, meaning to tell us that the sin occurred due to the party having forgotten something of relevance. There was no need to spell out the nature of the sin, seeing it was well known (except to the party who had committed it) He would only become guilty of the “sin” of being ritually unclean if he were to enter the precincts of the Holy Temple, or he would attempt to eat sacrificial meat, before either being alerted to it, or undergoing ritual purification in order to be on the safe side. Forgetting an undertaking by an oath is culpable only if in addition to having forgotten about it he had violated the terms of the oath.

והתודה אשר חטא עליה, “and he shall confess what he had sinned.” Nachmanides writes that the Torah does not report the correct sequence of the procedure involved here. The leaning on the animal prior to it being slaughtered has been omitted here. It was omitted as previously it has been made plain that before any sin offering is slaughtered the owner must lean his hands on the sacrificial animal and confess his sin. On the other hand, in the verses where the leaning is mentioned, no mention was made of the confession that accompanied this part of the procedure. According to the plain meaning of the text, the reason why the confession is made a part of the procedure here is because in both instances involving the oath the sin to be expiated had been committed deliberately, as opposed to the other instances when the sin offering is offered on account of inadvertently committed sins. According to this approach no confession accompanies the bringing of ordinary sin offerings. However, our sages claim that the word והתודה concerns all the examples of sin offerings mentioned up until now including entering holy precincts in a state of ritual impurity when it occurred unintentionally. The same applies to all other sin offerings, each one requiring a confession immediately prior to the animal being slaughtered. The reason why the confession was mentioned especially in this verse, is that the news is that the sin mentioned does not carry the karet penalty, as do the other sins for which a sin offering if they were committed only inadvertently. How much more so would a confession be required when the sin concerned would require a definitive sin offering when committed unintentionally!

ואם לא תגיע ידו, ”and if he cannot afford it, etc.” There are some sages who believe that the reason why the Torah showed a degree of leniency to financially strapped sinners by allowing them to bring an inexpensive guilt offering consisting of a bunt offering of one bird and a sin offering of another bird, is that in all of the examples concerned the sinner did not derive any meaningful personal advantage from the sin he had committed. On the other hand, someone eating chelev or eating ordinary food on the Day of Atonement, or someone performing work on the Sabbath, and a host of similar examples of sins, did derive personal satisfaction or financial benefit from them, not to mention people indulging in forbidden sexual relations, or people who have misappropriated property belonging to someone else, such sinners most certainly have to bring an offering that sets them back financially. Some of these have committed a twofold transgression, seeing that it occurred in holy precincts that were out of bounds to them. These offerings cost at least a shekel. As to the guilt offering designed to ward off punishment for transgressions of an indeterminate nature, the אשם תלוי, the conditional guilt offering, this must also be one that costs at least one shekel. It is relatively expensive, as people who are not sure they have committed a transgression are in the habit of giving themselves the benefit of the doubt. They must not think that they can do so with relative impunity. Nachmanides writes that the reason why the guilt offering for transgressions related to oaths is relatively inexpensive for people with restricted means, is that the transgressions in respect of which his offering is brought do not carry a type of death penalty such as karet even if they had been committed deliberately. The reason that this is so in ritual impurity related transgressions, is that the transgression itself was committed in the course of fulfilling a commandment. When reflecting on his words one has difficulty in reconciling them to a situation where a father was supposed to circumcise his son after the Sabbath, and he had forgotten the correct date, i.e. the 8th day, and circumcised his son on the Sabbath instead, who is guilty, and must bring the expensive sin offering according to the opinions of all our scholars. The reason might be that seeing that the performance of the commandment was not performed at the right time, and the father had not involved himself in as many preparations prior to fulfilling this commandments, he is not entitled to the leniency shown by the Torah in the other examples.

שתי תורים, “two turtledoves;” the reason this person has to offer two sacrifices (two birds) is that between them the two birds correspond in some manner to the parallel offering brought by a wealthy person guilty of the same transgression, namely offerings which contain parts that are burned up on the altar, and meat consumed by the priests. In the case of the offerings consisting of the two turtledoves, the one that is called עולה, burnt offering, is all dedicated to heaven, whereas the one known as חטאת, sin offering, this is consumed by the priests. If only a burnt offering had been sacrificed, the priest performing the procedure would not have been compensated at all. On the other hand, if only a sin offering had been presented, the altar would not have received anything as no eymurim of birds are burnt up on the altar.

והביא את אשמו לה', “and he is to present his guilt offering to Hashem.” Nachmanides explains that the reason why this offering is called אשם, “guilt,” although it is not of the same type of animal (rather a female of the species of sheep or goats and only worth one shekel, or even less for the poor who bring birds) as the ones mentioned in our verse and worth at least 2 shekel, is that it is not the same as the sin-offering of which the Torah spoke in verse 6 and it is offered as expiation of guilt. The offering mentioned in verse 6 is actually a sin offering, and the word אשמו used by the Torah there does not refer to the name of the offering, but describes the reason, i.e. the guilt of the party who presents this offering. In trying to understand why one of these types of offerings is called חטאת whereas the other is called אשם, seeing that both are designed to atone for sins committed, Nachmanides speculates that the word אשם implies a major guilt, whereas the word חטאת, related as it is to the causative החטיא, suggests that the guilty party aimed at what he should have aimed at, but he missed the target through lack of concentration or through not taking proper aim. This would explain why a more expensive offering, without allowance for sinners who are in financial distress being made is required, whereas when the basic offering is described by the Torah as a חטאת, this involves a transgression which G’d views more leniently. Misappropriating Temple property, even when using it, does not diminish its value, disregarding laws of ritual purity involving either sacred locations or sanctified food is certainly not a simple carelessness, seeing that the nature of the sites or meats demand especial care. Nachmanides continues examining all the examples of a קרבן עולה ויורד, a sin offering in which the Torah makes allowance for the economic condition of the party required to offer it, using the yardstick of the degree of negligence that is involved in the transgression. The offerings brought by a person cured from the skin disorder known as tzoraat are both referred to as אשם and חטאת, seeing that the afflicted person was considered as if dead, being completely ostracized from human society. The first offering sort of acts as protective shield against retribution that would have awaited him, the second as a sin-offering expiating, and paving the way for re-admission to society. The latter is to be worth at least two “regular” shekels. This is why it is called אשם instead. [I have restated some of the foregoing after comparing text in our editions of Nachmanides. Ed.]