"All the images, etc." — In our Mishnah, Rabbi Meir and the Sages disagree. Rabbi Meir holds that since a certain image was worshiped in one place, we decree other places because of it. But the Sages do not make such a decree unless the image has in it's hand a sword, etc., as written here in the Shulchan Aruch. Nevertheless, it seems that even if the image has a sword, this does not suffice to prohibit it unless it is a type of image that we know is actually worshiped—similar to Rabbi Meir's prohibition, which is based on a decree. Therefore, there is no distinction between whether the image is of a person or of some other form. And in the Tur, it is written later in this same section: "a human form standing, etc., and holding a staff, etc." And the Beit Yosef (B.Y.) comments here that the implication from his words is that the prohibition applies specifically to a human form, but not to other kinds of images. His intention seems to be that, in the case of a human form, the reason is it is known that people worship it—unlike other forms. However, if it were clearly known that people do worship other forms as well, then the same law would apply to them too. For that reason, the Rambam wrote—and the Shulchan Aruch copied here—"and the image has in its hand..." without mentioning that it must be a human form, for the reason we stated above. It seems that what is said in the Gemara: "Rav Yehuda said in the name of Shmuel: [This refers to] the statue (Andarti) of kings"—there too, he is teaching about this when it is known that the image is worshiped, as Rashi explains. And my father-in-law, of blessed memory, wrote that what the Shulchan Aruch ruled—that it simply mentions "an image"—is incorrect. But this is difficult: is it really his own (original) opinion? For it is the Rambam's ruling in Chapter 7 of Hilchot Avodat Kochavim (Laws of Idolatry), and the intention is as we have explained....

That by default they are assumed to me made for idolatry.... The Tur writes about this that since it is a case of possible idol worship, it is forbidden, because by default, etc... But this is difficult to understand: since it is assumed to be so (i.e., for idol worship), why does he need to categorize it as a doubt and rule stringently? And further, it is difficult what he says afterward, regarding large cities, that it is certainly made for ornamentation, why should this be considered definite? For it is also possible that it was made for idol worship! And it seems that even though in cases of doubt regarding idol worship we are stringent, nevertheless, whenever there is a reason to permit and also a reason to forbid, it is fitting to permit — for we hold in all places that we do not presume something is forbidden out of doubt. And we are stringent in cases of doubt only where a prohibition had previously been established. Therefore, since there is a reason to say that the object was made for ornamentation, we do not presume this [other] reason to establish it definitively [as made for idol worship], since there is supporting logic from the principle that we do not assume something is forbidden. However, in villages, where it is not the usual practice to make such items for ornamentation, if so the assumption that it was made for idol worship is equal to the argument for permissibility — for both have weaknesses: the prohibition has a weakness that we do not assume prohibition out of doubt, and the permissiveness has a weakness that it is not the normal way to make such things for ornamentation. Thus, the two sides are equal, and since it remains a doubt, we rule stringently in a case involving idol worship. And my father-in-law (the Bach), of blessed memory, wrote that the understanding of the Tur is not to consider it a double doubt — a doubt whether it was made for idol worship, and if it was, perhaps it was nullified, that this is difficult, because there is no nullification in this case; even dragging it would not be considered nullification as long as its form has not been diminished. And here, we are speaking of intact items. For if they were broken, then indeed it would be nullified, as is written later.

"Like four faces." One should not ask: "Doesn't it say afterwards that even a single human form is prohibited?" The Ran answers: here it’s worse (it's not a complete human), because he combined other forms with the human form, and you might have thought it was permitted, since it’s not a pure human form. And likewise with the ministering angels, since they have wings, (you might have thought it doesn’t count as a human form), Therefore it teaches us (that even these are prohibited). But it's difficult, if so, if one were to make a human form with only one or two of the four faces, would that then be permitted because it’s not a full human form and not a full four-faced form? That doesn't seem reasonable to permit, because such a novel idea surely would not have been left unsaid by the halachic authorities, they would have told us it’s allowed. Rather, it seems there's a distinction: one because of “Eti” (with me), that this refers to ministers above, eg the four faces together, and one because of "Oti" (of me- God), that this is the form of man alone. If it were only based on “Oti” (the human form alone), one might have thought that after erasing or damaging the human part, it’s now permitted to keep the object, since the prohibition was only due to the human image. Therefore, it comes to teach us through the “Eti” derasha that there is a separate prohibition from the presence of the four faces. And if so, all the faces are prohibited, and it doesn’t help to remove just the human face, because the rest still fall under prohibition. Therefore, one would have to erase all the forms to fix the issue—this is the correct approach. Then I saw in the Semak (Sefer Mitzvot Katan) siman 160, and this is what he writes: "The author asks: why don't we learn out the prohibition from the human form alone? The answer: this is only needed when a human form already exists, and one completes it by adding the other three faces (which are otherwise permitted to make alone)." But one cannot answer that there is no prohibition of a human form unless it’s in full bodily form with all limbs, as the Shulchan Aruch says in section 7, and therefore if it’s only the face it should be allowed; however, when it comes to the four faces, there is a prohibition even if it’s just the four faces alone [without bodies], because if so the question doesn’t make sense, why would it ask, "Then just the face of a man should be permitted," if in fact the face of a man is permitted [as you claim]? Rather, it must be that all four faces are depicted in their complete form, with full bodies, as seen in the Divine Chariot.

"It is permitted to make them." — This implies that all the prohibited forms mentioned above are permitted to make when they are sunken. However, the Tur later brings in the name of the Ramban, who wrote that anything prohibited by the Torah due to the verse “You shall not make with Me” — that is, the four faces from the dwelling of the divine presence, images of angels from the upper realm, and the forms of the sun, moon, stars, and constellations from the lower realm, and the form of a human being because it says “You shall not make Me,” which means: in the likeness through which I reveal Myself to the prophets — all of these are forbidden whether they are sunken or raised. However, for other forms, there is also a prohibition against making them, but it is rabbinic. In those cases, there is a difference between sunken and raised forms. Consequently, even regarding those which are biblically prohibited to make — but their possession is rabbinically prohibited due to suspicion — there is still a distinction between sunken and raised. This opinion is brought by the Ran in the name of earlier authorities, and he writes that this is the primary opinion, and he proves it from the Talmud. If so, it is surprising that the Shulchan Aruch did not bring the Ramban’s opinion. As for practical halacha, certainly one should not be lenient in opposition to the view of the Ramban, and this is indeed the conclusion of the Tur, as well as the Ran. And my father-in-law, of blessed memory, wrote that according to the Ramban, in cases where the Torah prohibits making the image, but possessing it is prohibited rabbinically, even possessing such an image in sunken form is forbidden. However, in the Ran’s own words — which he attributes to the Ramban’s opinion — it is explicitly written that possessing them is permitted if they are sunken. And regarding what seems implied in the Ramban’s words, that even other forms are prohibited to make rabbinically — the Ran explains that this refers to forms that were commonly used by idolaters in worship. But if there is no such custom to worship them, then making them is permitted, as stated in the Shulchan Aruch, section 6.