MISHNAH: If somebody brings a bill of divorce from overseas and says, “it was written before me,” but not “it was signed before me,” or “it was signed before me” but not “it was written before me”, “it was written before me but signed only partially before me”, “it was partially written before me but signed completely before me”, it is invalid¹. If one said “it was written before me” and another “it was signed before me”, it is invalid; if two people say, “it was written before us” but only one² says, “it was signed before me,” it is invalid; but Rebbi Jehudah declares it valid³. If one says, “it was written before me” but two say, “it was signed before us,” it is valid⁴.

footnotes: ¹ The rule of Mishnah 1:1 is not followed. ² A third person. ³ R. Jehudah declares a bill of divorce valid if one witness testifies to the writing and one to the signing; he does not require that both be the same person. ⁴ Any document is valid which is witnessed by two persons whose signatures are validated by two witnesses.

HALAKHAH: “If somebody brings a bill of divorce from overseas,” etc. One understands “it was written before me” but not “it was signed before me”, but “it was signed before me” but not “it was written before me”? Is not a bill of divorce validated by its signatures? That must follow Rebbi Jehudah, for Rebbi Jehudah invalidates forms⁵. 24:1) can only be fulfilled if the bill was written specifically for that wife from the first letter to the last.. Following Rebbi Jehudah outside the Land as for one who divorces in the Land of Israel⁶. Are there forms of bills of divorce outside the Land for divorces outside the Land? It is necessary for him to know that it is a bill of divorce⁷ and that he be appointed as an agent; he would not know that it was a bill of divorce unless it was written completely before him. Rebbi Ḥanin stated: It is permitted that he enter and leave⁸ is accepted in the Babli, 6a..

footnotes: ⁵ In Mishnah 3:2, the anonymous majority permit the routine production of forms of bills of divorce where everything is written in advance and only the names of husband and wife, the date, and the statement of divorce are then inserted for the particular couple involved in the divorce; but R. Jehudah holds that the requirement that “he write for her” (Deut ⁶ In Halakhah 3:2, practice is declared as following R. Jehudah. ⁷ Since the agent is to be interviewed about the writing of the bill, it is obvious that he could not answer if the bill was a form in which only the names of husband and wife and the time were inserted. Even the anonymous majority of Mishnah 3:2 must agree that forms are possible only in the Land. ⁸ In all matters of supervision, it is possible for the supervisor to leave the place occasionally as long as he can return at any moment and the person to be supervised, in this case the scribe, does not know in advance when the supervisor will return. The same baraita

Rebbi Yose asked: If he said, “it was written and signed before me, but it was in the sole possession of the husband between writing and signing”⁹? Let us hear from the following: “If one said ‘it was written before me’ and another ‘it was signed before me’, it is invalid.” That is, because one said, “it was written before me” and another, “it was signed before me”; this implies¹⁰ that if one said, “it was written and signed before me, but it was in the sole possession of the husband between writing and signing”, it is valid. Rav Ḥisda asked: half of an institution and half as biblical decree¹¹? If he said, “it was written and signed before me, but it was in the sole possession of the husband between writing and signing”? Let us hear from the following: “If one said ‘it was written before me’ and another ‘it was signed before me’, it is invalid.” That is, because one said “it was written before me” and another “it was signed before me”; this implies that if one said, “it was written and signed before me, but it was in the sole possession of the husband for an hour,” it is valid.

footnotes: ⁹ In the meantime, the husband could have substituted an invalid document for the valid one which was written in the presence of the agent. ¹⁰ The fact that the case is not mentioned in the Mishnah; neither here nor in Mishnah 1:1 is there any mention that the document has to be seen by the agent between writing and signing. ¹¹ The requirement that the bill be written specifically for that wife is biblical, the requirement that the agent be present at writing and signing is purely rabbinical. It was stated in Halakhah 1:1 (Note 14) that the husband is not suspected of doing anything which would make the divorce recognized by the court when it is invalid in the eyes of Heaven (since then he would commit a sin without hurting his ex-wife). Therefore, the answer given to R. Yose’s question is reasonable.

Rebbi Eleazar said, Rebbi Abun asked: If he said “it was written and one witness signed before me,” and two¹² testify about the signature of the second witness. Rebbi Immi the Babylonian said, nothing can be more valid than this. Rebbi Abba did not say¹³ so but: If he said “it was written and one witness signed before me, and I am the second witness.” He is like a party interested in his testimony¹⁴.

footnotes: ¹² Two other witnesses. ¹³ R. Abin’s question was trivial. ¹⁴ He becomes party and can no longer be a witness. In the Babli, 15b, the reason is given that a bill of divorce can be validated either as a document, by the independent testimony about the signature of the witnesses, or by the special rule of divorces which allows an agent to declare that it was written and signed before him, but not by a combination of both because then the witness would validate himself.

If there were four signatures and he said, “it was written and signed by two witnesses before me; I do not know anything about the other two.” That is the disagreement of Rebbi Joḥanan and Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish, who disagreed: If he said to ten people, sign the bill of divorce, and some signed on that day and some the next day. Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish said, it is valid, for the remainder are only because of the condition¹⁵. Rebbi Joḥanan said it is invalid unless all sign on the same day¹⁶.

footnotes: ¹⁵ The first two witnesses validate the document as a bill of divorce The others only sign because he made a condition that the bill be valid only with ten signatures, to make a public statement that he would no longer be responsible for his wife’s debts. ¹⁶ One cannot split the conditions; all ten signatures are needed to validate and, therefore, must be affixed on the date specified in the document. Otherwise the document would be invalid as predated.In the Babli, 18b, the attributions are switched. This means that the Babli, which always prefers R. Joḥanan to R. Simeon ben Laqish, follows what is declared here to be R. Simeon ben Laqish’s opinion. The Yerushalmi does not decide between the opinions.

Rebbi Immi said, where do they disagree? If the document is presented by him personally. But if it is presented by another person, even the rabbis will agree that it is valid¹⁷. Rebbi Ḥananiah agrees with Rebbi Immi. Rebbi Ze‘ira said, where do they disagree? If the document is presented by another person. But if it is presented by him personally, even Rebbi Jehudah will agree that it is invalid¹⁸. Rebbi Ze‘ira objected to Rebbi Immi: If the document is presented by him personally, does Rebbi Jehudah declare it valid even in the first case¹⁹? Rebbi Immi brought his father-in-law Rebbi Jonah who stated for him: If one said “it was written before me” and another “it was signed before me”, it is invalid, but Rebbi Jehudah declares it valid²⁰ shows that R. Jehudah accepts the bill if different people testify to writing and signing, showing that R. Ze‘ira’s objection is unjustified.. Rebbi Abin said, the formulation of a baraita supports Rebbi Ze‘ira: In that case, Rebbi Jehudah declares it valid²¹. But it is difficult following Rebbi Ze‘ira: If the document is presented by another person, that is when they do not treat the messenger as two. When do they treat him as two? When he testifies to both writing and signing²².

footnotes: ¹⁷ This refers to the clause in the Mishnah where two people say that the bill was written in their presence and a third person testifies that it was signed in his presence. R. Immi holds that the rabbis declare the bill invalid if it is presented by the single person who saw the signing, whose testimony is incomplete, whereas R. Jehudah accepts the bill as valid if two people testify to any state of the writing of the bill. But if the bill was delivered by one of the witnesses to the writing, then he and the witness to the signing are two and the rabbis will agree that two messengers who bring a bill of divorce do not have to declare that it was written and signed before them. ¹⁸ According to R. Ze‘ira, R. Jehudah agrees that the bill is invalid if writing and signing are attested to by different persons. In the Babli, 17a, both opinions are recorded in the name of R. Immi, held at different times. ¹⁹ In the Mishnah, the bill is unanimously declared invalid if writing and signing are attested to by different persons. One has to assume that R. Jehudah agrees. ²⁰ A baraita ²¹ Tosephta 2:2; only in one case does R. Jehudah accept the bill as genuine. ²² Since in that case, any later protest by the husband is disregarded (Chapter 1, Note 9), it must be that the messenger who testifies to both writing and signing of the bill has the status of two witnesses whose testimony cannot be attacked.

Rebbi Yasa said in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan: If it is presented by him personally²³. Rebbi Ze‘ira was looking at him²⁴. He asked, why are you looking at me? Even if it is presented by another person²⁵. It meansthat Rebbi Yasa before he changed his mind followed Rebbi Immi²⁶. Rebbi Mana said, even after he changed his mind it can be explained following him. There is a difference between two witnesses to the writing and two witnesses to the signing. Signing before two [witnesses] is empowered²⁷, writing before two is not empowered²⁸.

footnotes: ²³ This refers to the last clause of the Mishnah, where one witness has seen the writing and two the signing. The singular implies that the person presenting the bill of divorce is alone; he is the person attesting to the writing. ²⁴ Disapprovingly. ²⁵ He changed his mind and accepts that two witnesses to the signature make any other witnesses superfluous. ²⁶ In the preceding paragraph. ²⁷ Any document is confirmed by two signatures if the latter can be notarized in court. ²⁸ Except for bills of divorce, the circumstances of writing a document are irrelevant.

MISHNAH: If it was written during daytime and signed during daytime, in the night and signed in the night, in the night and signed during daytime, it is valid²⁹. During daytime and signed in the night it is invalid³⁰. Rebbi Simeon declares it valid since Rebbi Simeon says that all documents which were written during daytime and signed at night are invalid except for women’s bills of divorce³¹ and to return the dowry to his wife starts with the date of delivery of the bill..

footnotes: ²⁹ Since the Jewish calendar day starts at nightfall, all these documents are signed on the day indicated as date in it. ³⁰ Since every night belongs to the next day in the calendar, the document is predated. ³¹ He holds that the date of the writing of a divorce document has no monetary consequences; the duty of the husband to pay the ketubah

HALAKHAH: “If it was written during daytime and signed during daytime,” etc. Rebbi Joḥanan said, it is invalid because of the usufruct³² 1, 6d, Note 26.. Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish told him, then you should also be suspicious of the bills of divorce brought from overseas; maybe they were written during daytime and signed in the night³³! He answered him, there the forgery is intrinsic³⁴, here it is extrinsic³⁵.

footnotes: ³² He holds that the husband’s right to the yield of his wife’s property ends with the signing of the bill of divorce, not with its delivery. A predated bill of divorce is a predated document about money and, therefore, invalid automatically.The Babylonian theory, given in Halakhah 4:3, requires a date as a matter of criminal law. In the Babli, 17a/b, both opinions are attributed either to R. Joḥanan or to R. Simeon ben Laqish; cf. Sefer Haʻiṭṭur ³³ The messenger has to testify that he was present at the writing and signing of the bill, so he can be asked whether the document was written and signed specifically for the woman to be divorced. Why does he not have to testify that it was signed on the date of writing? ³⁴ If the bill was not written specifically for the woman for whom it is intended, it is worthless. ³⁵ If the writing and the signing are done for the correct purpose, the document is executed correctly. It becomes unenforceable by an outside circumstance.

Rebbi Joḥanan said, Rebbi Simeon stated this only for the night; but on the next day even Rebbi Simeon will agree³⁶. But Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish said, there is no difference, whether night, or the next day, or after many days³⁷. What is the next day? Rebbi Ḥanania and Rebbi Mana, one said the next day, the other said the day after the next³⁸. The statement of Rebbi Joḥanan about Rebbi Simeon (ben Laqish)³⁹ 7c, Note 62. is difficult! ⁴⁰ So says Rebbi Abba in the name of Rebbi Ze‘ira: It turns out that Rebbi Simeon (ben Laqish)³⁹ 7c, Note 62. agrees with Rebbi Eleazar. Just as Rebbi Eleazar said, even if there are no witnesses signed on it, it is valid, so Rebbi Simeon said, even if there are no witnesses signed on it, it is valid. Rebbi Samuel, the brother of Rebbi Berekhiah, said: Here, if he wants the document to be signed, there if she does not want the document to be signed. If he said to ten people, sign the bill of divorce, and some signed today and some the next day. Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish said, it is valid for the remainder [are signing] only because of the condition¹⁵. Rebbi Joḥanan said it is invalid unless all sign on the same day¹⁶. Rebbi Jacob bar Idi in the name of Rebbi Joshua ben Levi: There was a case that one said to ten people, sign the bill of divorce, and some signed on that day and some the next day. The case came before the rabbis who reluctantly declared it valid¹⁴³. This supports Rebbi Joḥanan from the position of the rabbis⁴⁴ and disagrees with Rebbi Simeon. This supports Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish from the position of Rebbi Simeon and disagrees with the rabbis.

footnotes: ³⁶ Since R. Simeon accepts documents from a Gentile court (Mishnah 1:5), he must accept Gentile dating for which the night follows the day. But the next day is a different date even in the Gentile calendar. ³⁷ He holds that for R. Simeon the date of a bill of divorce is irrelevant. ³⁸ This opinion is difficult to understand. ³⁹ Clearly, “ben Laqish” is a copyist’s error since the reference is to the Tanna, ben Ioḥai. Cf. Sefer Haʻiṭṭur ⁴⁰ This is a quote from Chapter 1:5, Note 132. ³⁹ Clearly, “ben Laqish” is a copyist’s error since the reference is to the Tanna, ben Ioḥai. Cf. Sefer Haʻiṭṭur ¹⁵ The first two witnesses validate the document as a bill of divorce The others only sign because he made a condition that the bill be valid only with ten signatures, to make a public statement that he would no longer be responsible for his wife’s debts. ¹⁶ One cannot split the conditions; all ten signatures are needed to validate and, therefore, must be affixed on the date specified in the document. Otherwise the document would be invalid as predated.In the Babli, 18b, the attributions are switched. This means that the Babli, which always prefers R. Joḥanan to R. Simeon ben Laqish, follows what is declared here to be R. Simeon ben Laqish’s opinion. The Yerushalmi does not decide between the opinions. ¹ The case is mentioned in the Babli, 18b, as coming before R. Joshua ben Levi's court where the latter declared that "R. Simeon is important enough that one may follow him in an emergency"; the husband had disappeared and it was impossible to obtain a replacement bill from him. ⁴³ From here on there exists a Geniza fragment whose readings are given by ג ⁴⁴ Since they permitted a bill signed on two different dates only in order to save the wife from being married to a husband who had disappeared, they agree with him that his rule represents the normal case.

MISHNAH: One writes with anything, with ink, with vermilion, with gum, and with copper sulfate⁴⁴, and anything that leaves a record. One does not write with drinks, or fruit juice, or anything not permanent. One writes on anything, on a leaf of the olive tree, on a cow’s horn if one delivers the cow to her⁴⁵ 12:5 (13d 1. 29); the readings from there are noted ש., on a slave’s hand if one delivers the slave to her. Rebbi Yose the Galilean says, one does not write on anything living nor on food.

footnotes: ⁴⁴ Since they permitted a bill signed on two different dates only in order to save the wife from being married to a husband who had disappeared, they agree with him that his rule represents the normal case. ⁴⁵ This paragraph is paralleled in Šabbat

HALAKHAH: “One writes with anything,” etc. ⁴⁵ 12:5 (13d 1. 29); the readings from there are noted ש.“He shall write⁴⁶. 24:1: “He shall write her a scroll of divorce and deliver it into her hand.””, not engrave. “He shall write”, not dropping points. “He shall write”, not pouring. “He shall write”, not engrave; some Tannaïm state, he even may engrave. Rav Ḥisda⁴⁷ said, he who says not to engrave, if the writing stands out as on a denar. He who says even to engrave, as on a writing tablet⁴⁸. “He shall write”, not dropping points; Rebbi Yudan bar Shalom and Rebbi Mattaniah: One said, if he did not connect the points; the other said, even if he connected the points⁴⁹. “He shall write”, not pouring. Rebbi Ḥiyya bar Abba said, those Orientals are very sophisticated. If one of them wants to write a secret⁵⁰ letter to another, he writes with juice of gall-nuts⁵¹. The recipient pours ink without gall over it, which is absorbed at the place of the writing⁵². If one did that⁵³ on the Sabbath, what? There, we have stated⁵⁴ 12:5.: “Writing on top of writing is not prosecutable.” Rebbi Joḥanan and Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish both said, only if he wrote ink on ink or vermilion on vermilion⁵⁵. But if he wrote ink on vermilion or vermilion on ink, he is guilty. Rebbi Isaac bar Mesharshia in the name of the rabbis from there: He is doubly guilty, once for erasing and once for writing⁵⁶.

footnotes: ⁴⁵ This paragraph is paralleled in Šabbat ⁴⁶ Deut ⁴⁷ In the Babli, 20a, this statement of the Babylonian Rav Ḥisda is in the name of the Galilean R. Eleazar. ⁴⁸ On a wax-covered writing tablet (πίναξ), one writes by engraving. The same is true for writing cuneiform on clay tablets. Therefore, engraving can be called “writing”. ⁴⁹ Even though one can produce letters that look as if written, they are not written. ⁵⁰ Greek μυστήριον “mystery or secret rite”. In the parallel sources the word is more appropriately the adjective μυστηρικός “of or for mysteries”. ⁵¹ This is the meaning of the expression in the Babli, 19a. But the word might also mean “apple juice, fruit juice”, from Greek μῆλον “apple, or other fruit”. ⁵² If the ink is washed off the paper, the writing becomes visible. ⁵³ Is pouring a fluid over a paper to make invisible writing visible an act of writing, which is forbidden on the Sabbath? ⁵⁴ Mishnah Šabbat ⁵⁵ In that case, the writing has no visible effect. ⁵⁶ In the Babli, 19a, this is quoted as the common opinion of R. Joḥanan and R. Simeon ben Laqish.

If the witnesses do not know how to sign. Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish said, one sketches for them in ink and they sign with vermilion, or with vermilion and they sign in ink. Rebbi Joḥanan told him, because we are occupied⁵⁷. The reading of the two texts in Giṭṭin, “because they are not occupied”, does not make sense. The meaning is also confirmed by the parallel in the Babli, 19a. with the rules of the Sabbath, should we permit a married woman⁵⁸? But he brings an blank sheet of paper and cuts it before them⁵⁹. Would it not have been the first person’s handwriting⁶⁰? One has to widen the cuts. Rebbi Mana said, why do we not say that one sketches for them with water? If he would come and protest, his protest would be accepted⁶¹. If somebody tears into skin⁶² in the form of writing it is valid. If somebody sketches on skin⁶³ deals with the laws of Sabbath and characterizes the first writing as incurring guilt, because permanent, and the second as not prosecutable, because not permanent. In the Tosephta, Giṭṭin 2:4, Šabbat11:8, the terms “valid, invalid” and “guilty, not prosecutable” are switched. in the form of writing it is invalid.

footnotes: ⁵⁷ Following the reading in Šabbat ⁵⁸ Because writing with ink on vermilion is a desecration of the Sabbath, it does not follow that if illiterate witnesses draw their signatures in ink over vermilion letters that this is valid testimony. As the sentence after the next points out, the witnesses in that case paint the first writer’s letters; they do not sign in a way that could be notarized. ⁵⁹ They draw with a pen along the lines cut into the paper. In the Babli, 19a, this method is attributed to Rav. ⁶⁰ The objection raised against R. Simeon ben Laqish can also be raised against R. Joḥanan. But for his method, the objection can be overcome by not cutting lines into the paper but cutting out small strips where the witness has some leeway where to draw his lines which spell his name. ⁶¹ If the witnesses just wrote over the letters, irrespective of how these were drawn, the signatures could not be notarized and the husband could claim that there are no signatures. The method indicated by R. Joḥanan is the only acceptable one. ⁶² Before it was turned into leather which was used as writing material in those times. Since it is permitted to write with a stylus, a permanent inscription can be made on hide and this is valid. ⁶³ Writing on untanned skin can simply be wiped off; this is not permanent writing and therefore is invalid as stated in the Mishnah. The parallel in Šabbat

“This is your bill of divorce on condition that you give it to me,” is invalid⁶⁴. 24:1 requires that the bill of divorce be “given into her hand”, i. e., be legally in her power.. “On condition that you return it to me,” is valid. Is that not the prior case? Rebbi Yose said, after you went to court⁶⁵. Rebbi Yose ben Rebbi Abun said, “after you have acquired all the rights for which it was made, return it to me.⁶⁶. 24:1.” Similar to that: Etrogim⁶⁷ (a word of Indian origin) designates all citrus fruits. It was used for citrus medica, rabbinic Hebrew etrôg, which was identified as the “fruit of the tree of splendor” mentioned in Lev. 23:40 together with palm branches, brook willows, and a branch of the thick-leaf tree (traditionally the myrtle). were scarce over there. Rav Naḥman bar Jacob gave an etrog to his son and said to him, if you have acquired it and fulfilled its obligation, return it to me⁶⁸. 23:40 reads: “You shall take for yourselves on the first day palm branches …”. The prescribed ritual can only be fulfilled if the four kinds mentioned are the personal property of the celebrant. Therefore, if a person gives his “four kinds” to another person for the celebration, it cannot be a loan but must be “a transfer of ownership on condition that it be returned.” In Babylonian sources (Sukkah 41b, Tosephta Sukkah 2:11) the conditional transfer of ownership is a tannaïtic institution..

footnotes: ⁶⁴ If the bill of divorce has to be returned immediately, there is no divorce. Deut ⁶⁵ Once the document has served its purpose, it may be returned without invalidating the divorce. In the Babli, 20b, the formulation is: “ ‘This is your bill of divorce but I remain the owner of the paper’ is invalid; ‘this is your bill of divorce on condition that you return the paper to me’ is valid.” Here also it is understood that the paper will be returned only when it is no longer needed.The Geniza text reads: “after you acquired it.” The Leiden text is preferable since for the Geniza text the explanation which follows is unnecessary. ⁶⁶ He agrees with R. Yose; he only gives the legal formula for what the Babli calls “a transfer of ownership on condition that it be returned.” This is everywhere considered a valid transfer of ownership and, therefore, satisfies Deut ⁶⁷ Persian turungān ⁶⁸ Lev

Rebbi Jeremiah asked: If he wrote it on a golden cup and said, the writing is yours but the space between the lines belongs to me? Is that writing⁶⁹? Torn leather is valid, if it was torn it is invalid. If it was not torn by the tear of a court, but if it was torn by the tear of a court⁷⁰. What is the tear of a court? Between the text and the witnesses.⁷¹ was paid under the supervision of the court, the court will tear the bill of divorce to make sure that the divorcee cannot use the bill to collect the ketubah a second time in the jurisdiction of another court. Since the witnesses have to sign immediately after the text, to avoid the fraudulent insertion of additional text, a document in which the signatures are separated from the text is automatically invalid.

footnotes: ⁶⁹ In the Geniza text: “Does the text fly?” There is no text if there is no space between the letters. In Babylonian sources (Babli 20b, Tosephta 2:5) the formulation is: If he retains ownership of the paper, the bill is invalid. ⁷⁰ This text clearly is defective. In the Tosephta, 7:11, the text reads:נקרע כשר נתקרע פסול נקרע בו קרע של בית דין פסול “torn is valid, if it was torn it is invalid; if the tear is that of a court it is invalid.” The Geniza text is similar. In the opinion of most commentators, the meaning is that a bill of divorce written on a piece of leather that has a tear is valid but if it was torn after the document was written and signed but before it was delivered, it is invalid. In the opinion of S. Lieberman, נתקרע means that the piece of leather had many tears before it was used. ⁷¹ If the ketubah

“On a leaf of the olive tree.” Is that not like torn⁷²? Rebbi Ze‘ira said, Bina bar Shila⁷³ stated: Even if he only wrote: “I X am divorcing my wife,⁷⁴” it is valid. This follows what Rebbi Ila said, if he detailed it is invalid⁷⁵, if he did not detail⁷⁶ it is valid.

footnotes: ⁷² The leaf is much to small for the text of the bill, even if written in miniature letters. ⁷³ Text of the Geniza ms. and the Constantinople print. ⁷⁴ The name of the wife must be mentioned, the fact that she is his wife then need not be mentioned; the fact of the divorce must be mentioned. ⁷⁵ If the full text is written it must comply with all rules to be valid. ⁷⁶ If he only wrote his and her names and the fact of the divorce.

“On a cow’s horn.” The Mishnah⁷⁷ in case he says to her, here is your bill of divorce. But if he says to her, here is your bill of divorce and the remainder is for your ketubah, her bill of divorce and the payment of her ketubah were received together⁷⁸. There is a small problem here which is not mentioned in either Talmud: A bill of divorce can be given to a wife against her will but the ketubah can be delivered in merchandise, instead of coin, only with her consent. Since transfer of property of an animal always requires an act of acquisition, the husband who writes the bill of divorce on the horns of a cow gives up his right to unilateral divorce.. If he said to her, here is your bill of divorce and the payment of your ketubah together⁷⁹ was a consequence of the delivery of the bill of divorce. As it is explained at the end of the paragraph, one may interpret the verse as meaning that the bill of divorce has to come into the wife’s hand unconditionally, not as part of an acquisition of anything else. In this opinion, the requirement that the payment of the ketubah be simultaneous with the divorce, not a consequence of the divorce, invalidates the proceedings. In the Babli, 20b, the example is a bill of divorce engraved on a plate of gold and Rav Naḥman states that the simultaneous delivery of divorce document and ketubah is valid, in contrast to the conclusion of the Yerushalmi.? Rebbi Ezra⁸⁰ asked before Rebbi Mana: If he delivered the halter to her, what⁸¹? In commercial law, the buy is acquired, do you say so here⁷⁹ was a consequence of the delivery of the bill of divorce. As it is explained at the end of the paragraph, one may interpret the verse as meaning that the bill of divorce has to come into the wife’s hand unconditionally, not as part of an acquisition of anything else. In this opinion, the requirement that the payment of the ketubah be simultaneous with the divorce, not a consequence of the divorce, invalidates the proceedings. In the Babli, 20b, the example is a bill of divorce engraved on a plate of gold and Rav Naḥman states that the simultaneous delivery of divorce document and ketubah is valid, in contrast to the conclusion of the Yerushalmi.? Or is it a difference since it is written: “he shall deliver into her hand,” until it is completely in her hand⁸²!

footnotes: ⁷⁷ Which requires that the cow be delivered to the wife as bill of divorce. ⁷⁸ The moment she accepts the horns carrying the bill of divorce, she acquires the animal as part payment of the ketubah ⁷⁹ In the first case, the payment of the ketubah ⁸⁰ Reading of the Geniza. The reading of the Leiden ms., R. Ze‘ira, cannot refer to R. Ze‘ira, the head of the Academy of Tiberias, who lived in the second generation after R. Mana I and two generations before R. Mana II. A R. זְעוּרָה, student of R. Mana I, is quoted a few times in other places in the Yerushalmi. ⁸¹ A bridled animal can be acquired by the buyer by taking the halter in his hand and causing the animal to walk one step at his command. ⁷⁹ In the first case, the payment of the ketubah ⁸² The bill of divorce has to come into the wife’s hand by being delivered by the husband, not by an active act of acquisition on her part. The formulation of this paragraph implies that this delivery of a bill of divorce is classified as invalid.

What is Rebbi Yose the Galilean’s reason? “Scroll.” Since a scroll is special in not being a living being, so no living being. Since a scroll is not food, so no food⁸³. What is the rabbis’ reason? “Scroll.” Since a scroll is detached, so everything detached⁸⁴. Are stalks of food in Rebbi Yose the Galilean’s opinion like food⁸⁵. The question is whether R. Yose the Galilean will forbid these inedible stalks as materials for bills of divorce since they are subject to the impurities of foodstuffs.? Let us hear from the following: If he wrote it on a deer’s antlers⁸⁶ must be attributed to R. Yose the Galilean since for the rabbis the entire deer could have been given to the wife. The antlers are inedible bony structures attached to the living deer just as stalks are inedible wooden structures attached to fruits., shaved it off, had it signed, and gave it to him⁸⁷, it is valid. Because he shaved it off before he had it signed. Therefore, not if he had it signed and afterwards shaved it off⁸⁸. 24:1: “he writes and hands over to her” that no necessary action may intervene between signing and delivery of the document.. Rebbi Abba⁸⁹ in the name of Rebbi Miasha: Only if he wrote on the male horn⁹⁰. But if he wrote on the sheath⁹¹ 5:2, Note 67. it is as if separated⁹² and is valid. Rebbi Jonah asked: Is that the same for preparation of produce⁹³ 2:3, Note 136–141.? If he desired that it should rain on an animal and [the rain] dropped from the animal on food⁹⁴ reads: Any fluid which at the start is desired, even if at the end it is not desired, or if at the end is desired, even if at the start it was not desired, fulfills the condition “that it be given” (i.e., it prepares for impurity by the terms of Lev. 11:38: “If water be given on seeds … it shall be impure for you”.) For the anonymous rabbis it is obvious that drops from water which was desired for the animal will prepare food for impurity by this Mishnah. But R. Yose the Galilean, who disqualifies animals as writing materials for bills of divorce, might equate animals to things connected to the soil which are disqualified for bills of divorce in Mishnah 4, and for objects of desire which act in impurity as explained in the following.. There, Rebbi Yose said “a scroll”, since a scroll is special in not being a living being, so no living being; and here, does he say so⁹⁵? There is a difference since it is written⁹⁶. 11:34., “any drinkable drink in any vessel shall be impure”. Then also if it rained into cisterns, ditches and caves? There is a difference here, for it is written: “a vessel”⁹⁷ 8(2): “I could think also [if it rained] into cisterns, ditches and caves? It is written: ‘a vessel’; since one of the characteristics of a vessel is that it is separated from the ground, so only things separated from the ground.” Everybody agrees that water collected in cisterns, etc., does not prepare for impurity; the reason for this has nothing to do with the controversy over writing materials..

footnotes: ⁸³ The same argument in the Babli, 21a. The interpretation of the rabbis’ position is quite different in the Babli. ⁸⁴ This refers to Mishnah 4 where it is stated that a bill of divorce cannot be written on anything connected to the ground. The bill of divorce cannot be written on the walls of a house and the house given to the wife. ⁸⁵ The stalks of fruits which usually are harvested together with the fruits have the status of fruits in the laws of impurity; this is the theme of Tractate Uqeṣin ⁸⁶ This baraita ⁸⁷ This should be “her”, correctly in the Geniza text. As explained in the next Halakhah, “signing” covers not only the signatures of the witnesses but also the insertion of the necessary data into the formulaic text; cf. Note 100. ⁸⁸ This proves that the antler is an integral part of the deer for R. Yose the Galilean. It is reasonable to assume that a stalk for him is an integral part of the fruit.This rule also follows the rabbis of Mishnah 4 whose position is explained in the Babli (21b) from Deut ⁸⁹ In the Geniza text: Aḥa. While it is known that R. Aḥa was a student of R. Miasha’s, the reading of the Leiden ms. cannot be rejected out of hand since Rabbis Abba and Aḥa were contemporaries. ⁹⁰ This refers to horns of cattle and goats rather than deer. These horns consist of a horny sheath (the female horn) over a bony spur (the male). ⁹¹ Greek νάρθηξ; cf. Berakhot ⁹² The rabbis of Mishnah 4 would certainly object and require that the entire animal be handed over to the wife; cf. Note 88. ⁹³ While food is under rules of impurity that are much stricter than those for vessels, etc., harvesting alone does not transform produce into food for these rules; only intentional moistening will have that effect, cf. Demay ⁹⁴ In this case, the moistening was desired by him for the animal but not for the food. Mishnah Makhširin ⁹⁵ Does he exclude animals from the category of objects which prepare for impurity if watered? There seems to be no reason why this should be so. ⁹⁶ Lev ⁹⁷ A similar text is in Sifra Šemini Parašah

MISHNAH: One does not write on anything connected to the ground. If he wrote on anything connected, detached it, signed,⁹⁸ and delivered it, it is valid, but Rebbi Jehudah declares it invalid unless both writing and signing took place when it was detached. Rebbi Jehudah ben Bathyra says, one writes neither on erased papyrus nor on διφθέρα⁹⁹ 2:6, Note 151. The hide does not absorb the ink which can be wiped off without leaving a trace. because these can be falsified but the Sages declare valid.

footnotes: ⁹⁸ Not only affixed the signatures of the witnesses but also inserted the essential data of the document; cf. Note 100. ⁹⁹ In Mishnaic usage, hide incompletely tanned; cf. Soṭah

HALAKHAH: “One does not write on anything connected to the ground,” etc. This does not disagree with Rebbi Joḥanan, since Rebbi Joḥanan said, writing the essential text with the formula is valid¹¹⁰¹. Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish said, writing the essential text with the formula is invalid. Samuel bar Abba asked: If he wrote and signed it when detached, then he connected it again, detached it, and delivered it to her; what does Rebbi Jehudah say¹⁰²? Rebbi Eleazar said, Rebbi Abin asked: If he wrote and signed it when detached, then he connected again, signed, and detached it, and delivered it to her; what do the rabbis say¹⁰³ I 26a, quotes an identical text for both questions, one addressed to R. Jehudah and one to the rabbis. Rashba (Novellae ad 21b, end) reads in the question addressed to the rabbis: If he wrote it when detached, attached, signed, detached, and delivered it, what do the rabbis say? In this case the obvious answer is: invalid. The text as it stands can be interpreted to mean that the bill was written when detached, including date, both names, and the statement that it was a divorce document which freed the wife to marry any man, but that the witnesses signed when it was attached to the ground. Then it would be invalid for R. Meïr and valid for R. Eleazar the Tanna.?

footnotes: ¹ This refers to Mishnah 3:2, in which permission is given to scribes to prepare the formulaic text of divorce documents, so that only the names of husband and wife and the date have to be inserted, without violating the commandment that the document be written specifically for the woman concerned. It is not mentioned in the Mishnah whether the text which turns the document into one of divorce, "this is your bill of divorce and you are permitted to every man" is part of the formulaic text or has to be written with that particular woman in mind. R. Johanan permits this sentence to be written as a formula, R. Simeon ben Laqish prohibits. (In the Babli, 21b, the attributions are switched, probably because the Babli insists that practice follow R. Johanan.) In the interpretation of the Babli, the divorce formula may be prepared in advance for R. Eleazar, for whom only the witnesses to the delivery of the text are important, but not for R. Mei'r, for whom the witnesses signing the document are those who validate the divorce. It is impossible to know whether the Yerushalmi would agree to this interpretation. ¹⁰¹ The Geniza text has a longer sentence: "R. Ze'ira said, they disagree in this, R. Johanan said, writing the essential text with the formula is valid, R. Simeon ben Laqish said..." This text adds no new information. ¹⁰² Since the bill was written according to the rules, does a later unnecessary action invalidate the document? No answer is given; it is difficult to see why the answer should be “valid”. ¹⁰³ This text seems to be self-contradictory since “signing” is mentioned twice. It is difficult to amend the text against the concurrent testimony of the ms. sources available. Sefer haʻIṭṭur

¹⁰⁴ 26d (Note 52); the variant readings are given byע . While medieval authors cannot be expected always to quote exactly, the text is quoted as support for the Geniza readings. Rebbi Eleazar¹⁰⁵ said, where do they disagree? About bills of divorce. But for contracts even Rebbi Jehudah will agree¹⁰⁶. He explains it if the document is on a smooth surface and the witnesses on the erasure¹⁰⁷. Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish said, it makes no difference; they disagree both about bills of divorce and contracts¹⁰⁸. He explains it if the document is on a smooth surface and the witnesses on the erasure. It is difficult for Rebbi Eleazar: If the witnesses [sign] on the erasure, do the Sages declare it valid¹⁰⁹? Rebbi Ze‘ira⁸⁰ said before Rebbi Mana: The Sages follow the argument of Rebbi Eleazar¹¹⁰, for he explains that the document is on the erasure and the witnesses on a smooth surface¹¹¹. Samuel said, everything is on the erasure¹¹² 163a) in the name of Rav.. Does not Rebbi Jehudah say it correctly? Rebbi Abba said, it is recognizable whether there was an erasure once or twice¹¹³ 164a..

footnotes: ¹⁰⁴ This paragraph is also in Sefer haʻIṭṭur ¹⁰⁵ The Amora. ¹⁰⁶ In the Babli, 22b, R. Eleazar says that the Sages agree with R. Jehudah that contracts may not be written as palimpsests or on erasable leather. ¹⁰⁷ Then the document cannot be forged and one hopes that the signatures can be verified either by the signers or by comparing the signatures with those on other known documents. ¹⁰⁸ In the Babli, 22b, this is attributed to R. Joḥanan. ¹⁰⁹ It is difficult to agree that the signatures cannot be forged. ⁸⁰ Reading of the Geniza. The reading of the Leiden ms., R. Ze‘ira, cannot refer to R. Ze‘ira, the head of the Academy of Tiberias, who lived in the second generation after R. Mana I and two generations before R. Mana II. A R. זְעוּרָה, student of R. Mana I, is quoted a few times in other places in the Yerushalmi. ¹¹⁰ The Tanna who dismisses the signatures on the bill of divorce as irrelevant and requires delivery of the bill in the presence of witnesses to the delivery. This is the explanation of the Babli in the name of the Amora R. Eleazar. ¹¹¹ The witnesses to the delivery must read the document before delivery to verify that it is what it is declared to be. They would detect a forgery. ¹¹² The entire document is a palimpsest. This explanation is implied by the language of the Mishnah; such a document is declared valid in the Babli (Baba batra ¹¹³ The editors of the Babli agree, Baba batra

MISHNAH: Everybody is acceptable to write the bill of divorce, even an insane, a deaf-and-dumb, or a minor¹¹⁴. The wife may write her bill of divorce¹¹⁵ and a man his receipt¹¹⁶, for the certification of the bill of divorce is only effected by its signatures. Everybody is acceptable to bring the bill of divorce except an insane, a deaf-and-dumb, a minor, a blind person¹¹⁷, or a Gentile.¹¹⁸

footnotes: ¹¹⁴ As explained in the Halakha, they may write only the formulaic text which does not have to be written specifically for the divorcing couple. This justifies the inclusion of the deaf-and-dumb. ¹¹⁵ She has to hand the completed bill to her husband who must have it signed by the witnesses and return it to her in front of witnesses. ¹¹⁶ The debtor who pays his debt may present the creditor with a receipt which the latter signs. The text of the receipt does not have to be in the creditor's hand. ¹¹⁷ It is explained in the Babli that the blind person is disqualified only for bills of divorce transported across the border since he cannot affirm that he saw its writing and signing. ¹¹⁸ Since the rules of divorce are biblical, they can be fulfilled only by a person subject to the biblical rules.

HALAKHAH: “Everybody is acceptable to write the bill of divorce,” etc. Rav Huna said, only if a sane person watches over them¹¹⁹. Rebbi Joḥanan asked¹²⁰ (27b).: But is it not written: “He shall write for her,” in her name⁵. 24:1) can only be fulfilled if the bill was written specifically for that wife from the first letter to the last.? Samuel said, it is necessary that one reserve the essential text for him¹²¹. This follows what Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish said, writing the essential text with the formula is invalid¹⁰⁰.

footnotes: ¹¹⁹ If an incompetent person (insane, deaf-and-dumb, or minor) writes the text, they must be directed by a person who knows for what they write. The same statement is in the Babli, 22b/23a. ¹²⁰ The translation follows the Geniza text and Sefer ha‘Iṭṭur ⁵ In Mishnah 3:2, the anonymous majority permit the routine production of forms of bills of divorce where everything is written in advance and only the names of husband and wife, the date, and the statement of divorce are then inserted for the particular couple involved in the divorce; but R. Jehudah holds that the requirement that “he write for her” (Deut ¹²¹ The essential text must be written by a responsible person under the husband’s direction. The Babli agrees, 23a. ¹⁰⁰ This refers to Mishnah 3:2, in which permission is given to scribes to prepare the formulaic text of divorce documents, so that only the names of husband and wife and the date have to be inserted, without violating the commandment that the document be written specifically for the woman concerned. It is not mentioned in the Mishnah whether the text which turns the document into one of divorce, “this is your bill of divorce and you are permitted to every man” is part of the formulaic text or has to be written with that particular woman in mind. R. Joḥanan permits this sentence to be written as a formula, R. Simeon ben Laqish prohibits. (In the Babli, 21b, the attributions are switched, probably because the Babli insists that practice follow R. Joḥanan.) In the interpretation of the Babli, the divorce formula may be prepared in advance for R. Eleazar, for whom only the witnesses to the delivery of the text are important, but not for R. Meïr, for whom the witnesses signing the document are those who validate the divorce. It is impossible to know whether the Yerushalmi would agree to this interpretation.

MISHNAH: If the minor received it and became an adult, the deaf-and-dumb and started talking, the blind and became seeing, the insane and became sane, the Gentile and converted, it remains invalid¹²². 24:1 requires that the husband hand the divorce document over to his wife, he can be represented in this transaction only by a duly appointed representative. But since an incompetent person cannot be a representative, nor a Gentile be an agent in a Jewish religious transaction, any such delivery could not be considered as the husband’s.. But if a hearing person became deaf-and-dumb, then regained his hearing, a seeing person became blind, then regained his vision, a sane person became insane, then regained his sanity, it is valid. This is the principle: Whenever the beginning and the end was in full competence, it is valid¹²³.

footnotes: ¹²² Since Deut ¹²³ Even if there was an interval in which delivery could not be made, on condition that the responsible person remember his appointment as the husband’s representative.

HALAKHAH: “If the minor received it and became an adult,” etc. There came a case before Rebbi Immi that a slave brought a bill of divorce; [he declared it] valid¹²⁴. Rebbi Abba said to him, did not Rebbi Ḥiyya¹²⁵ state that if a slave brought a bill of divorce, it would be invalid? Rebbi Assi¹²⁶ said, if not for Rebbi Abba, we would have permitted a married woman¹²⁷! Even if you say that Rebbi Assi did not accept what Rebbi Ḥiyya stated, did he not accept what the rabbis said? Let us hear from the following which Rebbi Ze‘ira, Rebbi Ḥiyya¹²⁸ said in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan: It is reasonable that a slave could accept a bill of manumission [for delivery]¹²⁹ but he should not accept [a bill of divorce] as we do¹³⁰ 1:3, 60a 1. 50. Since a slave cannot legally marry, he cannot divorce and like a Gentile is barred from acting in a divorce proceeding. R. Immi, who initially accepted the bill of divorce, must have held with R. Meïr that the slave’s hand is his master’s hand (Qiddušin 1:3, 60a 1. 49).. They thought, he formulated “he should not accept,” therefore, if he transgressed and accepted, it would be valid¹³¹. Rebbi Jacob bar Aḥa in the name of Rav Hoshaiah: It happened that she was a Cohen’s wife¹³². 21:7), in all cases in which there may be the slightest doubt about the validity of a divorce given by a Cohen, the court will force the husband to give a second, unquestionably valid divorce. and they were not afraid of a hint of invalidity¹³³.

footnotes: ¹²⁴ In the Babli, 23a, this was a theoretical question and R. Assi was the opponent. ¹²⁵ R. Ḥiyya the Elder. ¹²⁶ This is the Babylonian name of R. Yasa, the constant companion of R. Immi. The version of the Geniza ms. which reads “R. Immi” for all occurrences of “R. Assi” is preferable. ¹²⁷ A woman who receives an invalid bill of divorce remains married to her husband. ¹²⁸ R. Ḥiyya bar Abba, student of R. Joḥanan and teacher of R. Ze‘ira. In the Babli, 23b, this is quoted by Rav Samuel bar Jehudah in the name of R. Joḥanan. ¹²⁹ He can bring another slave’s bill of manumission since he himself may be manumitted. In the Babli this is restricted to another owner’s slave. ¹³⁰ Translation of the Geniza text, supported by the Leiden ms. in Qiddušin ¹³¹ It is not formulated as an absolute impossibility. ¹³² Since a Cohen may not be married to a divorcee (Lev ¹³³ They declared the bill of divorce in the hand of the slave as non-existent and permitted the wife to stay married to her Cohen husband.

MISHNAH: Even women who cannot be believed if they say that [a woman’s] husband died are trustworthy to bring her bill of divorce: Her mother-in-law, her mother-in-law’s daughter, her co-wife, her sister-in-law, and her husband’s daughter¹³⁴ 15:4; it is assumed that they would not mind tricking her into adultery.. What is the difference between divorce and death? The writing is the proof. A woman may herself bring her own bill of divorce, but she still is required to say that it was written and signed before her.

footnotes: ¹³⁴ These are presumed to hate her, Mishnah Yebamot

HALAKHAH: “Also those women who cannot be believed if they say that [a woman’s] husband died,” etc. ¹³⁵ 15:4, explained there in Notes 91–94. The variants are denoted by י. Would you believe her if it was written but not signed [in her presence]? If she did not say ‘it was written in my presence, it was signed in my presence’, would you permit her to remarry¹³⁶? Rebbi Yose ben Rebbi Abun said, that parallels what Rebbi Abun said, he is not suspect to damage her before Heaven. Before the court he is suspect to damage her. But since he knows that if he comes and protests, his protest is void, he will choose qualified witnesses to sign¹³⁷, is missing here to the effect that if one of these women would recant her testimony she also would not be believed..

footnotes: ¹³⁵ This paragraph is also in Yebamot ¹³⁶ Therefore, it is not the text which allows the wife to remarry but the other woman’s testimony. ¹³⁷ An additional sentence, extant in Yebamot

Think of it, if she stayed in Rome ten years and remarried¹³⁸ was paid to her in full.! Rebbi Joḥanan said, the Mishnah if he said to her, you shall only be divorced [by this document] at place X¹³⁹.

footnotes: ¹³⁸ Since the woman is divorced once the bill is delivered into her hands, does the Mishnah mean that a woman married for the second time has to keep her bill of divorce and show it to the local court any time she moves to a new location? This is impossible since the bill is torn up by the court once the ketubah ¹³⁹ She is divorced as soon as she declares at her place of destination that the bill was written and signed in her presence. The Babli, 24a, agrees after a lengthy and tortuous discussion.