MISHNAH: If a woman inherited property before she became preliminarily married, the Houses of Shammai and Hillel agree that if she sells or gives it away it is valid¹. If she inherited after she became preliminarily married, the House of Shammai say she may sell², the House of Hillel say she should not sell, but both of them agree that if she sold or gave it away it is valid. Rebbi Jehudah said: They said before Rabban Gamliel: If he obtained the right to the woman³, should he not also acquire the right to the property? He said to them, are we not ashamed about the new [properties]⁴ and you want to burden us with the old ones⁵?

footnotes: ¹ If she is an unmarried adult, she is fully capable of acting and does not need any male guardian or representative. “Properties” without further qualifications are real estate. ² Up to the time of the definitive marriage. At the definitive marriage the husband becomes the administrator of the properties and receives their yield; he has no say in the matter before that date. Everybody agrees that after the definitive marriage the wife can sell only through her husband (unless a separation of property was stipulated before the definitive marriage. Since these are money matters, they are all subject to modification by the contracting parties.) ³ Since the preliminary marriage makes the bride a married woman in all aspects of criminal law, should the husband not also have acquired a say in her properties. ⁴ Properties she inherits after the final wedding ceremony, of which Mishnah 2 decrees that the husband can veto her sale. It seems not reasonable that the secondary interest of the husband in the yield of the properties should override the primary property rights of the wife in her inheritance. ⁵ The properties inherited before the final wedding date

HALAKHAH: “If a woman inherited property,” etc. So is the Mishnah: Before she was preliminarily married⁶ and n-reflexive niph‘al. J. N. Epstein (loc. cit. Chapter 5, Note 33, p. 474) sees in this sentence only the introduction to the following question since in all quotes of the Mishnah in other parts of the Yerushalmi the formulation of the Mishnah is used.. What is the difference between before she was preliminarily married and after she was preliminarily married? Before she was preliminarily married, it fell to her; after she was preliminarily married it fell to her and him⁷ an interest..

footnotes: ⁶ There seems to be no difference in meaning between t-reflexive hit pa‘el ⁷ The Babli, 78a, has a slightly more careful formulation, that after the preliminary marriage the husband might have

⁸ 6:2, explained there in Notes 45–55 (variants פ). Rebbi Phineas asked before Rebbi Yose, why did we not state it with the leniencies of the House of Shammai and the stringencies of the House of Hillel? He said to him, the Mishnaiot apply only to circumstances that are either stringent on both sides or lenient on both sides. But here it is a stringency on one side and a leniency on the other side. But did we not state: “The House of Shammai say, property abandoned to the poor [is abandoned]?” Is this not lenient for the poor and stringent for the householder, and it was stated! He said to him, it is lenient for the poor and not stringent for the householder, since he intentionally abandoned it. He said to him, did we not state: “If the sheaf that was near a closure, a stack, cattle, or vessels was forgotten,” is this not lenient for the householder and stringent for the poor, and it was stated! He said to him, it is lenient for the householder but not stringent for the poor, because they did not acquire it yet. You may also say here, it is lenient for the woman and not stringent for the husband since he did not yet acquire property rights to it. He said to him, since he became betrothed to her, the inheritance fell to both of them.

footnotes: ⁸ From here to the end of the Halakhah, the text is from Peak

Rebbi Jehudah said, they argued before Rabban Gamliel: Because preliminarily married she is his wife and definitively married she is his wife; just as the sale by the latter is void, the sale by the former also should be void. He said to them, we are ashamed of the new ones, now you want to roll the new on over the old ones! The new ones, after the definitive marriage; the old ones before the definitive marriage, when she was married in the second ceremony.

MISHNAH: If she inherited property⁹ after she was definitively married, both agree¹⁰ that if she sold or gave away the husband retrieves from the hand of the buyers¹¹. [If she interited] before she was definitively married¹² 7, Note 1). and [sold] after she was definitively married, Rabban Gamliel said if she sold or gave away it is valid¹³. Rebbi Ḥanina ben Aqiba¹⁴ said, they said before Rabban Gamliel: If he obtained the right to the woman, did he not also acquire the right to the property¹⁵? He said to them, are we not ashamed about the new [properties]⁴, and you want to burden us with the old ones⁵?

footnotes: ⁹ This word is in the text of the Mishnah, not in the quote in the Halakhah nor in any other known Mishnah or Talmud ms. This supports S. Lieberman’s opinion that the copyist of the Leiden ms. took the Mishnah text from a ms. different from the Talmud ms. before him. ¹⁰ The Houses of Shammai and Hillel. ¹¹ In the absence of a contract to the contrary, the husband has the administration of the wife’s paraphernalia and receives their yield. This means that at the moment the wife acquires title to the property, the husband acquires title to its yield. Therefore, he can go to court and invalidate the real estate transaction which was done without his concurrence. ¹² Even after she was preliminarily married; therefore this property does not become part of her dowry proper (mortmain) but remains the wife’s separate property as paraphernalia (Yebamot ¹³ Since she could have sold before the final marriage, as staled in Mishnah 1, the husband has no acquired rights in the property. ¹⁴ This name appears also in the Munich ms. and the Soncino print of the Babli. In most other sources: Aqabia. ¹⁵ Since with the act of definitive marriage he acquires his wife’s mortmain properties, why are his rights over her paraphernalia properties not likewise absolute? ⁴ Properties she inherits after the final wedding ceremony, of which Mishnah 2 decrees that the husband can veto her sale. It seems not reasonable that the secondary interest of the husband in the yield of the properties should override the primary property rights of the wife in her inheritance. ⁵ The properties inherited before the final wedding date

HALAKHAH: “If she inherited after she was definitively married,” etc. We did state: She¹⁶ may sell or give away and it is valid. Rebbi Ḥiyya stated: She should not sell or give away, but if she sold or gave away it is valid. ¹⁷”Rebbi Ḥanina ben Aqiba said, that is not what Rabban Gamliel gave as answer, but the following was his argument: No, if you have an argument about a preliminarily married one, where he has rights neither to what she finds, nor to her handiwork, nor to dissolve her vows¹⁸ 10:1. He has no rights to dissolve the vows of his adult preliminarily married wife., what can you say about a definitively married one where he has rights to what she finds, to her handiwork, and to dissolve her vows? Let the proof be the case of one who [inherited] before the definitive marriage and then was definitively married, in which case he has rights to what she finds, to her handiwork, and to dissolve her vows, and you admit to us that she should not sell or give away. He said to them, I agree that she should not sell or give away, but if she sold or gave away it is valid..” There came a case before Rebbi Immi. He said, is not Rabban Gamliel’s an isolated opinion? One cannot rely on it. A baraita supports him¹⁹ and disagrees with him: ²⁰”Our teachers took up the case again, voted, and instructed about property which she inherited before the definitive marriage and then was definitively married, that she should not sell or give away, and if she sold or gave away it is invalid.” It disagrees²¹ that the sale is invalid. It agrees that our teachers took up the case again, instructed, and voted. Before they voted, they did not disagree with him²².

footnotes: ¹⁶ She inherited real estate before her definitive wedding. ¹⁷ Tosephta 8:1, Babli 78b. In both of these sources the text seems to be more correct: The argument is inverted. If the husband has property rights after the definitive marriage, what does this prove for the preliminary? ¹⁸ He has joint rights to dissolve the vows of the adolescent preliminarily married girl; Mishnah Nedarim ¹⁹ Rabban Gamliel. The argument of R. Immi is faulty but his conclusion correct. ²⁰ Tosephta 7:1, Babli 78b. ²¹ With Rabban Gamliel. ²² In his time, Rabban Gamliel represented the majority opinion; his rule was invalidated by a later generation.

MISHNAH: Rebbi Simeon differentiates between properties: Properties known to the husband she shall not sell and if she sold or gave away it is invalid²³. Those unknown to the husband she shall not sell but if she sold or gave away it is valid.

footnotes: ²³ Since this is not practice, neither Talmud gives a reason. According to the Tosephta (8:1), the husband can claim that he married her only because of the property he knew was coming to her and that, therefore, the validity of the marriage depends on his getting his hands on that property.

HALAKHAH: “Rebbi Simeon differentiates between properties,” etc. Rebbi Joḥanan²⁴ said, properties known to the husband are real estate, those not known to the husband are movables. Rebbi Yose ben Ḥanina said, properties known to the husband are those she inherited in the presence of the husband, those not known to the husband are those she inherited while her husband was overseas²⁵. A baraita supports Rebbi Yose ben Ḥanina: The following are properties not known to the husband, what she inherited while her husband was overseas.

footnotes: ²⁴ In the Babli, 78b, this is attributed to R. Yose ben R. Ḥanina. ²⁵ In the Babli, 78a, R. Joḥanan holds that all properties discussed here are real estate; but properties unknown to the husband are what she inherits overseas. Since the husband cannot administer these properties, he cannot object to his wife’s selling the properties, turning them into money.

MISHNAH: If she inherited money; real estate should be bought²⁶ with it and he eats its yield. For produce cut from the ground, real estate should be bought and he eats its yield; with produce connected to the ground, Rebbi Meïr says one has to estimate how much the property²⁷ is worth with produce and how much without, for the difference real estate should be bought²⁸ and he eats its yield. But the Sages say, standing produce is his²⁹, cut it is hers; real estate should be bought from it and he eats its yield.

footnotes: ²⁶ Since it is the husband’s duty to preserve his wife’s property. In the economic environment of the later Roman Empire, real estate was the only investment guaranteed to keep its value (investments appropriate for the guardian of widows and orphans). Simce the husband is required to pay for all her needs, she has no direct use for the cash she inherited. ²⁷ The field in which the crop is standing. ²⁸ Since R. Meïr holds that a crop is yield only if it grew under his care. ²⁹ Since it is yield.

HALAKHAH: “If she inherited money; real estate should be bought,” etc. Rebbi Jeremiah said, this is Rebbi Meïr’s opinion since Rebbi Meïr considers standing [produce] as if it were cut³⁰ 6:6. In rabbinic interpretation, Ex. 22:8 defines when an oath is required by the court: “About any criminal matter, about an ox, a donkey, a sheep, a garment, or anything lost, if he agrees that this is it, the suit shall be heard by the judges …” This is read to mean that an oath is needed if the defendant agrees that the plaintiff has a case but that he owes less than what is being claimed (cf. Mekhilta dR. Ismael, Mišpaṭim 15). The part of the claim in dispute is what the claimant considers criminal withholding of his property by the defendant. If the defendant rejects the entire claim, the claimant has to prove his case by witnesses or documents; if the defendant admits part of the claim the claimant can request that he swear not to owe more. But since the examples given in the verse are all about movables, it is concluded that claims of real estate cannot be resolved by an oath (Mishnah Ševuot6:5). On that, R. Meïr states that “some things are on the ground but are not real estate”. The example given is that the claim is “I handed over to you (to harvest and make wine from) ten vines full of fruit” but the defendant claims “there were ony five.” In that case, R. Meïr requires the defendant to swear but the Sages hold that anything connected to the ground is like real estate. Since the produce on the field is considered as the wife’s capital, not the husband’s produce, R. Jeremiah infers that the Mishnah does not represent practice since it follows R. Meïr in a case in which the majority disagrees.. Rebbi Yose said, he did not hear that Rebbi Yose ben Ḥanina said, Rebbi Meïr said this only for standing grain ready to be harvested and grapes ready to be harvested; therefore not unripe produce³¹ 15:3, Note 79; Babli Ševuot 43a.. But here³², even unripe produce. Rebbi Jeremiah³³ asked, are not the arguments of Rebbi Meïr contradictory? There³⁴ 6:6., he did not consider standing [produce] as if it were cut, but here³² he considers standing [produce] as if it were cut. Rebbi Joḥanan said, Rebbi Meïr does not consider standing [produce] as if it were cut. But if you see cut grain, you empower the woman³⁵; if you see an unseeded field³⁶, you empower the man. In case of doubt you estimate how much it is worth unseeded and how much seeded. If before it was seeded it was worth (two denars)³⁷ and when it was seeded (one denar), with that denar real estate should be bought and he reaps its yield.

footnotes: ³⁰ This refers to Mishnah Ševuot ³¹ Cf. Yebamot ³² The case of the wife’s inheritance is not restricted to ripe produce. ³³ This attribution is impossible. Rebbi Jeremiah cannot ask a question answered by his teacher’s teacher’s teacher R. Joḥanan. It might be Rav Jeremiah, one generation before R. Joḥanan. ³⁴ In Mishnah Ševuot ³² The case of the wife’s inheritance is not restricted to ripe produce. ³⁵ Cut grain is as good as coin for an inheritance. ³⁶ This has to be tended; the husband will reap the fruits. ³⁷ Obviously, the numbers have to be switched since 1 2.

MISHNAH: Rebbi Simeon says, in the circumstances where he was empowered at her entrance he was disabled at her exit, and in the circumstances where he was disabled at her entrance he was empowered at her exit. What was connected to the ground at her entrance is his and at her exit is hers, what was cut from the ground at her entrance is hers and at her exit is his³⁸ 15:5, Notes 67–68..

footnotes: ³⁸ He follows the Sages in the previous Mishnah that produce she brings into the marriage as capital and real estate is given over to his administration. He adds that at a divorce (if she exits the marriage) he has to deliver the field as is at the moment the bill of divorce is delivered, with all the grain standing if it was not cut before the divorce but that all produce harvested before the moment of divorce is his; cf. Yebamot

HALAKHAH: “Rebbi Simeon says, in the circumstances where he was empowered,” etc. You say, at her entrance they are his: If she sold them they are not sold, if she gave them to a sharecropper he has the reward from it⁴¹, if she dedicated them as First Fruits they are not dedicated⁴² You say, at her exit they are hers, if he sold them they are not sold, if he gave them to a sharecropper she has the reward from it, if he dedicated them as First Fruits, this is the disagreement of Rebbi Joḥanan and Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish, since they disagreed: ⁴³ 1:6, Notes 119–121. Cf. Sifry Deut. #301.(Deut. 26:11): ‘You shall enjoy all the good things that the Eternal, your God, gave to you and your house.’ This teaches that a person brings First Fruits from his wife’s property.” Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish said, after her death but not during her lifetime. Rebbi Joḥanan said, there is no difference, during her lifetime and after her death. Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish follows his own opinion since he said, a person does not inherit from his wife as a biblical rule⁴⁴. 27:7–11 (only that the children inherit from their mother, Num. 36:3). In the Babli, Giṭṭin 47b. it is supposed that R. Simeon ben Laqish accepts that the wife is mentioned obliquely in Num. 27:11 and his disagreement with R. Joḥanan is about a technicality; the opinion attributed here to R. Simeon ben Laqish is attributed in the Babli, 84a, to Rav. In Bekhorot 52b, it is asserted without dissent that the husband’s right of inheritance is biblical. (Maimonides, Hilkhot Naḥalot 6:8, asserts that the husband’s right of inheritance from his wife is only rabbinic practice.). In the opinion of Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish it never was dedicated. In the opinion of Rebbi Joḥanan it is dedicated and the holiness is removed⁴⁵.

footnotes: ⁴¹ The text may mean: He takes it away from him. In the first interpretation, the standing crop given to the sharecropper is counted as part of the latter’s compensation. ⁴² Since nobody can dedicate anything which is not his property and not in his possession. ⁴³ The next few sentences are from Bikkurim ⁴⁴ This is the common Sadducee-Karaite opinion that the wife is never mentioned in Num ⁴⁵ If the First Fruits were dedicated during the marriage then the act of divorce removes the husband’s ownership and with it the dedication.

MISHNAH: If she inherited old male and female slaves, they should be sold and real estate bought with the proceeds, of which he eats the yield. Rabban Simeon ben Gamliel says, she does not have to sell⁴⁶ because they are the glory of her father’s house.

footnotes: ⁴⁶ He cannot sell her family’s slaves against her will.

HALAKHAH: “If she inherited male and female slaves,” etc. The Mishnah speaks of those who do not work enough⁴⁷ והרי), if they cannot work at all they cannot be sold. for their upkeep. But if they work enough for their upkeep, she does not have to sell⁴⁸ because the glory of her father’s house still exists.

footnotes: ⁴⁷ As Tosaphot notes (79b, s. v. ⁴⁸ Even according to the anonymous Tanna.

MISHNAH: If she inherited old vines or olive trees, they should be sold for their wood and real estate bought with the proceeds, of which he eats the yield. Rebbi Jehudah⁴⁹ says, she does not have to sell⁴⁶ because they are the glory of her father’s house.

footnotes: ⁴⁹ It seems that Alfassi reads “Rabban Simeon ben Gamliel”, with the Munich ms. of the Babli (38b in the Wilna edition.) ⁴⁶ He cannot sell her family’s slaves against her will.

HALAKHAH: “If she inherited old vines or olive trees,” etc. Rav Abun in the name of the rabbis there⁵⁰: The Mishnah deals with the case that she inherited olive trees but not their ground, vines but not their ground⁵¹. But if she inherited olive trees with their ground, vines with their ground, she does not have to sell since her father’s house’s glory still exists⁵². But the rabbis here say, even if she inherited olive trees with their ground, vines with their ground, did she not inherit the value of the olive grove, did she not inherit the value of the vineyard? A baraita⁵³ 2:5, Notes 107,108. The quote is from Tosephta Baba Batra 6:18, Babli Baba Batra7a,Baba Meṣi‘a 104a. supports the rabbis there: “ ‘I am selling you the vineyard’, this is a valid sale even if there are no vines since he sells him [the real estate] by description⁵⁴. ‘I am selling you the grove’, this is a valid sale even if there are no trees since he sells him [the real estate] by description.”

footnotes: ⁵⁰ According to the Babli, 79b, these Babylonian rabbis are Rav Cahana in the name of Rav. ⁵¹ Therefore, if one waits until the trees have died, all value from the inheritance is lost. ⁵² On condition that the orchard or the vineyard be generally known as “her father’s orchard or vineyard.” ⁵³ The remainder of this paragraph is from Ma‘serot ⁵⁴ If the lot was popularly known as “vineyard” or “olive grove”.

MISHNAH: If somebody invests in his wife’s properties⁵⁵, if he invested much but it yielded little, or he invested little but it yielded much, what he invested he invested and what it yielded it yielded⁵⁶. If he invested and had no yield, he shall swear how much he invested and get repaid⁵⁷ income from his investment, he can ask to be repaid..

footnotes: ⁵⁵ The paraphernalia properties which in case of a divorce have to be returned to the wife. ⁵⁶ He has no claim to be repaid for the excess of his investment over his gain. ⁵⁷ If he divorced his wife before he had any

HALAKHAH: “If somebody invests in his wife’s properties,” etc. Rebbi Abba⁵⁹ in the name of Rav Ḥiyya bar Ashi: Even if he ate only one basket of dates. Assi⁶⁰ said, that is, if the investment is greater than the increase in value. But if the increase in value is greater than the investment, one gives him the increase in value⁶¹. A baraita disagrees⁶²39a. with Assi: “In all cases⁶³ one evaluates it as for a sharecropper.” The baraita disagrees about planting; what Assi said was about a building. The baraita disagrees about planting, is that what Rebbi Abba said in the name of Rav Ḥiyya bar Ashi: Even if he ate only one basket of dates⁶⁴. He said to him, in one case if he ate, in the other if he did not eat.

footnotes: ⁵⁹ In the Babli, 80a, he says “one date cake”. ⁶⁰ It seems that he is the Babylonian, colleague of Rav; identified correctly in the Munich ms. of the Babli, 80a. ⁶¹ In the Babli, 80a, two interpretations are given for Assi’s statement but in both of them, the husband is restricted to restitution of the amount he spent. ⁶² Tosephta 8:3; Babli Baba Meṣi‘a ⁶³ Any person who has to return property to its rightful owner, including the husband who divorces his wife and has to return her paraphernalia properties in kind. If he returns a field before it is ripe, he can claim to be paid for his work only as sharecropper. ⁶⁴ Which is much less than the sharecropper’s part.

MISHNAH: ⁶⁵ 4:3, explained there in Notes 84–95 (variants noted י). If a woman waiting for her levir inherited property, the House of Shammai and the House of Hillel agree that if she sells or gives away it is valid. If she died, what shall be done with her ketubah and the properties which enter and leave with her? The House of Shammai say, the husband’s and the father’s heirs shall split it. But the House of Hillel say, the properties are in the hands of the holders; the ketubah in the hands of the husband’s heirs and the properties which enter and leave with her in the hands of the father’s heirs.

footnotes: ⁶⁵ Mishnah and Halakhah are also Yebamot

HALAKHAH: “If property came to a woman waiting for her levir,” etc. Here, you say “she may sell or give away and it is valid.” And you also say “the husband’s heirs should split with her father’s heirs!” Rebbi Yose ben Ḥanina said, when do you say “she may sell or give away and it is valid”? If they came to her before she became a woman waiting for her levir. When do you say “the husband’s heirs should split with her father’s heirs”? If they came to her after she became a woman waiting for her levir. If they came to her before she became a woman waiting for her levir and produced revenue after she became a woman waiting for her levir, [that revenue is as if] they came to her after she became a woman waiting for her levir. Rebbi Ze‘ira said, the levir in this situation is a problem for the House of Shammai. If he is a husband, he inherits everything. If he is not a husband, he inherits nothing. Because of the doubt, “the husband’s heirs should split with her father’s heirs.” For the House of Hillel it is obvious that he is a husband and inherits everything. For even his brother had only the usufruct.

Rebbi Hoshaia stated: Her heirs, those who inherit her ketubah are obliged to bury her. Rebbi Yose said, if Rebbi Hoshaia had not stated this, we would have had a problem. If she had no ketubah, do they not have to bury her? This is difficult. If a woman has no ketubah, does she not have to be buried? A wife, even if she has no ketubah, must be buried. This one, if she has a ketubah, is entitled to burial costs. But here, if she does not have a ketubah, she is not entitled to burial costs.

MISHNAH: If his brother left money, real estate should be bought with it and he eats its yield⁶⁶ it is not available to the brother who marries the widow without due safeguards.. ⁶⁷ For produce cut from the ground, real estate should be bought and he eats its yield; connected to the ground, Rebbi Meïr says one has to estimate how much it is worth with produce and how much without, for the difference real estate should be bought and he eats its yield. But the Sages say, standing produce is his⁶⁸, cut it is up for grabs⁶⁹ is guaranteed only by real estate. The author of this part of the Mishnah must hold that the statement about money left was R. Meïr’s who holds that a ketubah can be guaranteed and paid for by movables.. If he⁷⁰ took possession first, it is his; if she took possession first⁷¹, real estate should be bought for the proceeds and he eats its yield. ⁷² 4:4, Note 96. If he married her, she is his wife in every respect⁷³ 4:4, Notes 97–100. except that her ketubah is a lien on the property of her first husband.

footnotes: ⁶⁶ Since the first husband’s inheritance is mortgaged to his widow as security for her ketubah, ⁶⁷ These rules follow Mishnah 4. ⁶⁸ The Halakhah and the Babli (82a) change the text of the Mishnah and require: “are hers” for the same reason given for money left by her husband. ⁶⁹ This applies only if one follows the Mishnah that a ketubah ⁷⁰ The levir as heir of his brother. It is clear that a person without claim (i. e., other than the widow, a brother, or a creditor) has no right to the produce. ⁷¹ It becomes property coming to the wife after the wedding, i. e., paraphernalia property. ⁷² This is Mishnah Yebamot ⁷³ He can divorce and remarry her; Halakhah Yebamot

HALAKHAH: “If his brother left money,” etc. Rebbi Abbahu in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan: It is necessary, if the money was deposited with him⁷⁴ in a levirate marriage is guaranteed by the estate and Mishnah 11 states that all the property is under this lien, it seems superfluous to note that cash left by the first husband cannot be spent by the levir. Then it is noted that it is necessary to state that money deposited with the levir has to be accounted for and separated for the wife’s ketubah. In the Babli, 81b, this is an explicit baraita., that you would not let him say, since I am the heir it is mine.

footnotes: ⁷⁴ Since the Mishnah states at the end that the ketubah

Rebbi Abbahu in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan: One does not say “his”⁷⁶ is guaranteed by her first husband’s estate, there is no reason why the standing grain should go to the levir. If the husband had lived, it would have been his, but it could not be the levir’s before the latter actually married the widow. One has to correct the Mishnah to hers from his. This argument is R. Simeon ben Laqish’s in the Babli, 82a. but [ ]⁷⁷; it is understood in the text.. In which respect? In case the heir took it⁷⁸ fund, she can go to court and have him acquire real estate for the corresponding amount., one removes it from his hand. Does one have the same rule for the creditor? Was it not stated: If either the heir or the creditor took it, one takes it from their hands⁷⁹? Rebbi Aḥa bar Ulla said, let us hear from the following: “If he dedicated 90 minas but his debt was 100 minas, [the creditor] adds another denar and redeems these properties.⁸⁰ 46a,66b; Giṭṭin 40b; Ketubot 59b, Nedarim 86b; Baba Qama90a) that dedications to the Temple break contracts. This rule is not mentioned in the Yerushalmi and the latter’s position in this matter is not known. In Rashi’s interpretation, only dedications to the altar break contracts, not dedications which are purely monetary gifts to Temple or charity. Therefore, that principle does not apply here in any case. The text is Mishnah ‘Arakhin 6:2. There it is stated that if somebody dedicates his encumbered property, neither can the wife collect her ketubah nor a creditor his claim from Temple property which must first be redeemed. Then it is stated that if the creditor’s claim is at least equal to the appraised value of the property, he may lend another denar to the debtor and force him to redeem it to be able to foreclose the now secular property.” Not necessarily a denar, but anything, that a dedication should not be seen to be profanated without redemption⁸¹ 32b, Pesaḥim31a. The redemption is purely symbolical since the debtor did not have the right to injure the creditor’s claim by dedication; therefore, the dedication is invalid.. Rebbi Abbahu in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan: One would be guilty of complete larceny⁸² is larceny with Temple property which requires restitution in the amount of 125% and a sacrifice; Lev. 5:14–16. R. Joḥanan implies that a person using the dedicated property for his personal advantage before it was redeemed is obligated for a sacrifice. On the other hand, it is sinful to offer unnecessary sacrifices which would be ”profane animals in the Temple courtyard.” If the sacrifice is valid then the dedication must be valid and could not be undone by a token amount but would require appraisal by a Cohen (Lev. 27:11–14).. That is difficult. If one would be guilty of complete larceny, should if not be redeemed for its full value? If it can be redeemed for less than its full value, one should not be guilty of complete larceny! What are we talking about? If it is connected to the ground, can there be larceny about real estate⁸³. 5:14 restricts me‘ilah to “the Eternal’s holy things”, which excludes real estate.? But we talk about standing grain⁸⁴ when standing but will be subject once it is cut.. Since if the administrator⁸⁵ misbehaved and took it, one does not take it from his hand; the administrator and the heir follow the same rule⁸⁶ mean that the levir can take the standing grain, cut it, and keep it, but that the their’s standing vis-à-vis the creditor is like the administrator’s vis-à-vis the creditor. Since the creditor’s lien is on the real estate, it cannot cover the grain once it is cut and made movable. (Cf. the commentary RYDBZ ad loc. in the Wilna ed., and the novellae of Rashba, Giṭṭin 40b, end.). Also if the heir misbehaved and took it, one does not take it from his hand. Rebbi Samuel, Rebbi Abbahu in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan: The same rule holds for an ox. Can you say that an ox is real estate⁸⁷? Rebbi Tanḥum bar Mari in the name of Rebbi Yose: They made the rules for an ox parallel those of dedications that lost their value⁸⁸. Here, you say one takes it from his hand, but there you say, one does not take it from his hand⁸⁹. Since you diminished the woman’s power in that her ketubah is a lien only on the properties of her first husband, you strengthened her power in this matter that if the heir came and took it, one removes it from his hand. It was stated thus: Trees and cutting, old or young, one removes from their hands.

footnotes: ⁷⁶ Since the widow’s ketubah ⁷⁷ The word “hers” is missing in ms. and editio princeps ⁷⁸ If the levir harvested the grain without crediting it to the widow’s ketubah ⁷⁹ The same statement is quoted in Halakhah 9:3; there the scribe wrote: “one does not remove from their hands”, but the first corrector crossed out “not”. In both cases, the context implies that the scribe’s original text is the correct one. Since the heir does not have a claim on the standing grain, the heir’s creditor does not have one either. ⁸⁰ It is stated repeatedly in the Babli (Yebamot ⁸¹ This is a generally accepted principle; Babli Arakhin ⁸² Me‘ilah ⁸³ Lev ⁸⁴ This is not subject to me‘ilah ⁸⁵ The Temple’s chief financial officer. Since the dedication was invalid when made for the field, he should not have cut the grain. But once it was cut, it becomes legitimate Temple property and can be sold for the Temple’s upkeep. ⁸⁶ This does not ⁸⁷ Since the ox is movable, the dedication should be absolute. ⁸⁸ This is a rabbinical rule to protect the holders of chattel mortgages. ⁸⁹ This is the main question of this paragraph: Since the heir can cut the grain to the detriment of the lienholder, why can he not cut the grain to the detriment of the widow who also is a lienholder?

MISHNAH: He⁹⁰ cannot split the inheritance, reserve the amount necessary for the ketubah in a separate account, and use the remainder for his business. If he wants to commingle the inheritance with his own properties for his working capital, he has to pledge all his properties for her ketubah. should not say to her “here your ketubah is lying on the table” but “all my properties are pledged for your ketubah.” If he divorced her, she has no ketubah- lien⁹¹. If he took her back, she is like all women who have a ketubah⁹².

footnotes: ⁹⁰ The levir who marries his sister-in-law and whose brother’s inheritance is much larger than his wife’s ketubah ⁹¹ After he paid her, he has unlimited use of the remainder of his brother’s inheritance. ⁹² This is explained in the Halakhah.

HALAKHAH: ⁹³, explained there in Notes 97–101.“He should not say to her ‘here is your ketubah’”, etc. What does he do? “He marries her, he may divorce her and take her back, and she writes him a receipt for her ketubah.” Rebbi Yose said, the baraita has two possibilities. “Or she writes him a receipt for her ketubah.” Rebbi Ze‘ira in the name of Rav Hamnuna: If he married her, divorced her, and took her back, if he wrote her a new ketubah, the lien is on his property; otherwise, it is on the property of her first husband. Rebbi Yose ben Rebbi Abun said in the name of Rav Ḥisda, a Mishnah said so: “For he who takes back his wife, takes her back under the terms of her first ketubah⁹⁹ 65(18)..” In the end, if he married her, divorced her, and took her back? He tells you something new. Even if he married her, divorced her, and took her back, if he wrote her a new ketubah, the lien is on his property; otherwise, it is on the property of her first husband.

footnotes: ⁹³ These two paragraphs constitute Halakhah 4:4 in Yebamot ⁹⁹ The heads of the pre-Maccabean Ḥassidim sect; cf. Gen. rabba

Rebbi Ze‘ira in the name of Rav Hamnuna said: A betrothed woman who died does not have a ketubah since she was not permitted to marry outside. That you should not say [the case] should be considered as if he divorced her and she should have a ketubah; therefore it was necessary to say that she does not have a ketubah.

⁹⁴ was unsecured and not privileged against the heirs. In earlier times, her ketubah was deposited with her family; then it was easy for him to divorce her. They then instituted that her ketubah had to be deposited with her husband⁹⁵; even so it was easy for him to divorce her. Then they instituted that a man should buy with his wife’s ketubah cups, plates, and bowls; that is what we did state: “He should not say to her ‘here your ketubah is lying on the table’ but all his properties are pledged for her ketubah.” Finally they instituted that a person should use his wife’s ketubah in business, then because he uses his wife’s ketubah in his business dealings he loses track of it and it becomes difficult for him to divorce her.

footnotes: ⁹⁴ A different version is in the Babli, 82b. It starts with a statement that women did not want to marry because their ketubah ⁹⁵ In the Babli: With her father-in-law. Since the money was ready, there was no difficulty in finding the money for a divorce.

Simeon ben Sheṭaḥ decreed three things⁹⁶ 14b, he is credited only with the institution of the ketubah and a decree about impurity of metal vessels (Note 102). “The institution of the ketubah” probably means the formulation of the ketubah as a contract, which was unnecessary as long as the sum due was paid, or at least earmarked, as bride money. His decrees can be dated to the reign of his sister Shlomzion (Salome), widow of Alexander Yannai, 79–69 B.C.E.: That a person should use his wife’s ketubah in his business dealings. And that children have to go to school⁹⁷ 21a, universal mandatory schooling is attributed to the post-Herodian High Priest Joshua ben Gamla. The Babli also notes that before Joshua ben Gamla’s time there was organized higher instruction only for youths 16 years and older. This cannot refer to Simeon ben Sheṭaḥ’s institution reported in the Yerushalmi since by no stretch of the imagination can a 16 year old teenager be called תִּינּוֹק.. Also, he decreed impurity for glass ware⁹⁸ 6:21), leather and textiles (Lev. 13:49), bone and wood (Num. 31:20). Other vessels cannot become impure; to this fact one attributes the great number of stone vessels found on archeological sites of the Second Temple period. (Similarly intrinsically pure vessels made of cow dung have not survived for the archeological record.) The impurity of glass vessels, unknown to Moses, is purely rabbinical. One has to take the information that the impurity of glass ware “was decreed” by the head of the Synhedrion with a grain of salt. Most probably, he simply codified the rules which were popularly observed before, when the Pharisees obtained the leadership in the state. The reasons given in the Babli Šabbat 16a/b for the rules are inconsistent since the rules, derived from popular observance without any scriptural basis, are inconsistent as a mixture of two different sets of rules. Glass vessels are compared to earthenware vessels since the former are made from sand, the latter from clay. They are also compared to metal vessels since if broken they can be melted down and made into new vessels.. But did not Rebbi Ze‘ira, Rebbi Abuna say in the name of Rav Jeremiah: Yose ben Yo‘ezer from Ṣereda and Yose ben Joḥanan⁹⁹ 65(18). from Jerusalem decreed impurity for Gentile lands¹⁰⁰ 7:17) was codified which attributed to the earth of Gentile lands (within or without the Holy Land) the impurity of rotting human bodies. and glass ware; Rebbi Yose said, Rebbi Jehudah bar Ṭabbai¹⁰¹? Rebbi Jonah said, Jehudah bar Ṭabbai and Simeon ben Sheṭaḥ decreed on metal vessels¹⁰² 16b, what they decreed was that metal impure by the impurity of the dead should not become pure by being melted down, but only by sprinkling with water containing ashes of the red cow. The political background of this decision (which seems to contradict biblical rules, Num. 31:22–23) and the reliability of the Babli in this respect is difficult to establish.; Hillel and Shammai decreed on the purity of hands¹⁰³ 2:3, Notes 136–137; Babli Šabbat14b).. ¹⁰⁴ 1:7, following Note 55 (variants noted ש). Rebbi Yose ben Rebbi Abun in the name of Levi: That was the current practice; they forgot it¹⁰⁵, but the later ones got up and agreed to the opinion of the earlier ones to teach you that everything the Court insists on will come to be in the end just as Moses was told on Sinai; as Rebbi Mana said (Deut. 32:47): “For it is not an empty word, from you,” if it is empty it is from you because you do not exert yourself about it. “Because it is your life,” when is it your life? At the time that you exert yourself!

footnotes: ⁹⁶ In the Babli, Šabbat ⁹⁷ In the Babli, Baba batra ⁹⁸ Biblical impurity applies only to kinds of vessels and implements mentioned in the rules of impurity: earthenware and metal (Lev. ⁹⁹ The heads of the pre-Maccabean Ḥassidim sect; cf. Gen. rabba ¹⁰⁰ Here also, a long-standing popular observance (cf. Amos ¹⁰¹ The co-head with Simeon ben Sheṭaḥ in the leadership of the Pharisees under Shlomzion. ¹⁰² The possible impurity of metal vessels is biblical (Note 98). Following the Babli Šabbat ¹⁰³ They codified the rules that hands which were not all the time consciously guarded from impurity after being washed are impure in the second degree and, therefore, impart impurity to fluids, heave, and sacrifices but not to solid profane food (cf. Demay ¹⁰⁴ From here to the end of the Chapter, the text is from Ševi‘it ¹⁰⁵ There was no rule-making authority in the time between the two Yoses and Simeon ben Sheṭaḥ and Jehudah ben Ṭabbai.