MISHNAH: Father and husband jointly dissolve the vows of a preliminarily married adolescent girl¹ 30:4–6). Similarly, the husband can dissolve the vows of his wife if she lives “in his house” (vv. 11–15). A preliminarily married girl (cf. Peah 6:2 Note 46; Demay 4:1, Note 19; Terumot 8:1, Note 9) remains under her father’s jurisdiction until she is taken to her husband’s house in the final ceremony. It is asserted that during her status as preliminarily married wife, the father can dissolve her vows since she is “in his house” and the husband is given special authority over her vows in vv. 7–9 which, therefore, are not duplicated in vv. 11–15. The power of dissolution in any case is restricted to the day after the father or husband first was informed of the vow (vv. 6,9,13,15). But if one of them agreed to the vow within the allotted period, he can no longer object after that.. If the father dissolved but not the husband, or the husband but not the father, it is not dissolved; one does not have to mention whether one of them confirmed it.

footnotes: ¹ An underage girl can be married off by her father. A woman becomes an adult in two steps. At age 12 (if she had developed two pubic hairs) she becomes an adult before the law but the father retains the right to marry her off and the right to her earnings for an additional 6 months, when she is called נַעֲרָה “adolescent girl”. After these 6 months she becomes an adult, בּוֹגֶרֶת “ripe”, is totally independent from her father, and has to marry on her own. The vow of a minor below age 11 is void. If she made a vow after age 11 (for a male after age 12), one has to investigate whether she understands the meaning and implications of a vow. If the investigation has a positive result, her vows are valid and, as far as vows are concerned, she has acquired the status of adolescent, even though in other legal aspects she remains a minor.The chapter on vows states clearly that the father can dissolve his dependent daughter’s vows (Num.

HALAKHAH: “An adolescent girl,” etc. ² It is written³ 30:7. The masoretic text reads הָיוֹ., “if she should be a man’s”. What are we speaking about? If a married one, it already is written⁴ 30:11. “if she vowed in her husband’s house”. If about an unmarried one, it already is written⁵ 30:4. “if she vows a vow to the Eternal”. Why does the verse say³ 30:7. The masoretic text reads הָיוֹ., ““if she should be a man’s with her vows on her”? That refers to the preliminarily married adolescent girl whose vows are dissolved by father and husband. So far for vows which she vowed after she was prelinimarily married. Vows which she vowed before she was prelinimarily married? “With her vows on her,³ 30:7. The masoretic text reads הָיוֹ.” to include the vows which come with her from her father’s house.

footnotes: ² A similar argument in the Babli, 67a/b. In both Talmudim, the argument is amoraic. ³ Num. ⁴ Num. ⁵ Num. ³ Num. ³ Num.

It was stated in the name of Rebbi Eleazar⁶ 153 by R. Joshia, student of R. Ismael. The final argument in this paragraph is attributed to R. Ismael in the Babli, 68a.: “If she should be a man’s”³ 30:7. The masoretic text reads הָיוֹ., the verse speaks about a preliminarily married adult girl⁷ He reads the verse as dealing with a case where there is no residual power of the father. But since vv. 11 ff. speak of the married woman, he must find a case of a preliminarily married woman free from her father.. The colleagues say, Rebbi Eleazar says it correctly⁸. Is it not difficult for Rebbi Eleazar: Did she not leave her father’s power the moment she became an adult⁹? Who may dissolve the vows of an orphan whose father had died¹⁰1:2, Note 118). The husband can dissolve her vows only after the definitive marriage or after she became an adult. The latter case is the one dealt with by R. Eleazar.? The husband dissolves¹¹. It is difficult for the rabbis: If he may dissolve before she entered his power, is it not obvious [that he may dissolve] after she entered¹²? How do the rabbis explain “with her vows on her”? What are we talking about? If about vows which she made before she was preliminarily married and she became preliminarily married, already the father and the husband had the power to dissolve¹³. But we must talk about a vow which she made before her father died, then the father died¹⁴ and she became an adult. From where does Rebbi Eleazar obtain: “The father and the husband dissolve the vows of a preliminarily married adolescent girl.¹⁵” “Between a man and his wife.¹⁶ 30:17.” That deals with the husband. The father? “Between a father and his daughter.¹⁶ 30:17.” How do the rabbis interpret “between a man and his wife”? Not what is between her and others. “Between a father and his daughter,” not what is between her and others. Does Rebbi Eleazar not agree with this? He agrees; he understands everything from there: “Between a man and his wife”, not what is between her and others¹⁷; “between a father and his daughter,” not what is between her and others.

footnotes: ⁶ If the material in the first paragraph is Amoraic, R. Eleazar is the Amora, bar Pedat. If the argument is tannaїtic, he is the Tanna, ben Shamua. R. Eleazar’s argument is paralleled in Sifry Num. ³ Num. ⁷ At 12 years and 6 months (or 6 months after she developed two pubic hairs) she permanently leaves her father’s potestas. ⁸ His interpretation follows the wording of the verse more closely. ⁹ Vv. 7–8 give the husband the right to dissolve vows which preceded the marriage. But vv. 11 ff. restrict the right of the husband to vows made during the marriage (Mishnah 2). For the rabbis, the right to dissolve prior vows depends on the father’s collaboration. But R. Eleazar denies any participation to the father; why should the power of the preliminarily married husband be greater than that of the fully married one? ¹⁰ If the father had arranged his daughter’s preliminary marriage and then had died, the husband cannot dissolve his wife’s prior vows (Mishnah 2) and, after the definitive marriage ceremony, he cannot dissolve prior vows. (The existence of undisclosed prior vows might be grounds for divorce.) An underage girl orphaned from her father can be married off by her mother and brothers, but that is only a rabbinic institution (cf. Yebamot ¹¹ But only the vows made after the preliminary marriage and only after she has reached adulthood. ¹² Why are vv. 11 ff. needed after vv. 7–9? That is a rhetorical question since the two cases are not comparable. For the rabbis, the husband dissolves the vow of the preliminarily married minor only in conjunction with the father, but he also dissolves vows made before the marriage. Once the woman is emancipated from her father, either by completed marriage or by becoming of age, the husband dissolves alone but only vows made during the marriage. ¹³ If they do not exercise their powers, they get no second chance. If the girl became an adult between preliminary and definitive marriage, the father lost his right of dissolution and the husband lost it with him. If the father died between preliminary and definitive marriages, the husband alone cannot dissolve; therefore, he cannot dissolve her vow after the definitive marriage when he lives with her. ¹⁴ Before she was preliminarily married. Then the father never had any right concurrent with the husband; the husband is not hindered by the father’s power. ¹⁵ Since he rejects the references given in the first paragraph. ¹⁶ Num. ¹⁶ Num. ¹⁷ This is the topic of Chapter 11. The husband can only void vows that either involve the relations between husband and wife or “vows of deprivation” (v. 14); he can forbid his wife to mortify herself. As in Mishnah 11:13, if she had vowed not to sleep with any man, he can void his part but she remains forbidden if she should become a widow or a divorcee.

“One does not have to mention if one of them confirmed it.” Come and see; if the father dissolved, it is not dissolved, and you say so¹⁸? Not on that it was said, but on the following: If the father dissolved his part but the husband did not have time to dissolve before he died, the father dissolves the husband’s part¹⁹. Rebbi Nathan said, those are the words of the House of Shammai. But the statement of the Sages is that he does not need to dissolve²⁰ dissolve”. The Babli has a long discussion about the nature of the joint powers of dissolution. If the powers are parallel, then the dissolution by one of the parties has no influence on the other; the husband’s death leaves half of the vow undissolved and undissolvable. But if the powers are joint ones, then the husband’s death opens the way for the father to exercise his now unrestrained powers. There is no reason to think that the Yerushalmi makes a similar distinction. if [the husband] did not confirm it. But if [the husband] confirmed, [the father] cannot void²¹.

footnotes: ¹⁸ Since the Mishnah stated that if only one of them dissolved, in the example given, the father, the vow is not dissolved. Why does one have to mention that it is not dissolved if one of them confirmed the vow, since confirmation implies non-dissolution! ¹⁹ While the husband cannot dissolve after the father’s death (Mishnah 2), the father can dissolve alone after the husband’s death (as long as the marriage is in the preliminary stage) since after the husband’s death the underage daughter returns to the father’s tutelage. ²⁰ Since the husband’s power has disappeared, the father’s prior dissolution is sufficient.The Babli (69a, 71a) and the Tosephta 6:3 read: “[the father] cannot ²¹ Since the affirmation cannot be undone.

You say that the father dissolves the husband’s part. If he wanted to confirm, he says, it is confirmed for you, without details, (it is confirmed for you, without details)²²; the husband’s part is dissolved for you²³. The following is obvious: If the father did not dissolve his part and she violated her vow, she is whipped. If the father dissolved but the husband did not, would she be whipped²⁴? Or since if the husband died and his part became void in favor of the father, would she not be whipped? This follows him who said, death does not force [dissolution]²⁵ The argument follows the Sages in the previous paragraph, who hold that the husband’s death automatically voids the vow. For them, the power of the husband is secondary and the woman cannot be prosecuted.. But following him who said, death does force dissolution²⁶, and here since he did not dissolve for her and she violated her vow, she is whipped. It was stated: If the father dissolved his part but the husband died before he could dissolve²⁷, the last husband dissolves the part of the first one. Rebbi Yose said, a Mishnah says so: “Her father and her last husband dissolve her vows²⁸”.

footnotes: ²² It seems that this is a case of dittography, even though one could read it as: If the father confirmed without indicating what he confirmed, then the vow is legally confirmed without indication whose part was confirmed (since the confirmation by one party is absolute.) ²³ In contrast, for the House of Shammai who hold that the father has to dissolve the late husband’s part, the dissolution is invalid unless the father explicitly declares the husband’s part dissolved. ²⁴ Since the father may dissolve after the husband’s death but the husband cannot dissolve after the father’s death, it is clear that the father’s power over his underage preliminarily married daugher is greater than the husband’s. Is the father’s power strong enough to eliminate the prohibition to violate one’s vow contained in 30:3? ²⁵ It seems that the word בַּהֲפָרָה is missing here; it was inserted in editio princeps. ²⁶ The House of Shammai, who require the father explicitly to dissolve the late husband’s part, imply that the husband’s and the father’s powers are equal and that partial dissolution is of no legal value. ²⁷ And she was preliminarily married to another man on the same day (since the period of dissolution is at most 24 hours after the first person knew of the vow.). Tosephta 6:4; there the re-marriage is noted. ²⁸ Mishnah 3.

MISHNAH: If the father died, his power is not voided in favor of the husband. If the husband died, his power is voided in favor of the father¹⁹. In this, He strengthened the father’s power over the husband. In another matter, He strengthened the husband’s power over the father since the husband dissolves in adulthood but the father does not dissolve in adulthood¹ 30:4–6). Similarly, the husband can dissolve the vows of his wife if she lives “in his house” (vv. 11–15). A preliminarily married girl (cf. Peah 6:2 Note 46; Demay 4:1, Note 19; Terumot 8:1, Note 9) remains under her father’s jurisdiction until she is taken to her husband’s house in the final ceremony. It is asserted that during her status as preliminarily married wife, the father can dissolve her vows since she is “in his house” and the husband is given special authority over her vows in vv. 7–9 which, therefore, are not duplicated in vv. 11–15. The power of dissolution in any case is restricted to the day after the father or husband first was informed of the vow (vv. 6,9,13,15). But if one of them agreed to the vow within the allotted period, he can no longer object after that..

footnotes: ¹⁹ While the husband cannot dissolve after the father’s death (Mishnah 2), the father can dissolve alone after the husband’s death (as long as the marriage is in the preliminary stage) since after the husband’s death the underage daughter returns to the father’s tutelage. ¹ An underage girl can be married off by her father. A woman becomes an adult in two steps. At age 12 (if she had developed two pubic hairs) she becomes an adult before the law but the father retains the right to marry her off and the right to her earnings for an additional 6 months, when she is called נַעֲרָה “adolescent girl”. After these 6 months she becomes an adult, בּוֹגֶרֶת “ripe”, is totally independent from her father, and has to marry on her own. The vow of a minor below age 11 is void. If she made a vow after age 11 (for a male after age 12), one has to investigate whether she understands the meaning and implications of a vow. If the investigation has a positive result, her vows are valid and, as far as vows are concerned, she has acquired the status of adolescent, even though in other legal aspects she remains a minor.The chapter on vows states clearly that the father can dissolve his dependent daughter’s vows (Num.

HALAKHAH: “If the father died, his power is not voided in favor of the husband,” etc. They wanted to say that if the father had dissolved his part and died, his power is not voided in favor of the husband²⁹. Let us hear from the following³⁰: “The way of learned people is that, before his daughter left his house, he told her: ‘Any vows which you had vowed in my house are dissolved’.” This implies that if the father had dissolved his part and died, his power is not voided in favor of the husband.

footnotes: ²⁹ If the girl is preliminarily married and the father dies after he had dissolved her vow but before the husband did, her vow cannot be dissolved. ³⁰ Mishnah 4. The quote does not prove anything; the proof is from the second part of the Mishnah which requires the husband to dissolve all prior vows of his bride prior to her entering his house, i. e., as long as she still is only preliminarily married. After she enters his house, he can no longer dissolve prior vows. Since the final marriage ceremony emancipated the girl (older than three years and one day) from her father and the father’s death does the same, it is concluded that the husband’s power over a preliminarily married girl endures only as long as she is under her father’s tutelage.

If the husband died, his power is voided in favor of the husband.” They wanted to say, after the husband had dissolved his part. But if the husband had not dissolved his part when he died, the power is not voided in favor of the father. Let us hear from the following: “If she made a vow while being preliminarily married. If she was divorced on the same day, preliminarily married on the same day, even a hundred times, her father and her last husband dissolve her vows³¹.” That means, even if the husband had not dissolved his part and died, his power is voided in favor of the father.

footnotes: ³¹ Mishnah 3. Since the last husband has to dissolve, it follows that the first did not. Nevertheless, the father can dissolve her vows after the first husband was eliminated by divorce (or death).

“If the father died, his power is not voided in favor of the husband.³²” Rebbi Ḥaggai asked before Rebbi Yose. So far for vows she made after she was preliminarily married³³. Vows she made before she was preliminarily married; if the father died, was his power not voided in favor of the husband? He said to him, is it not true that vows she made before she was preliminarily married already could be dissolved by father and husband³⁴? Why do you have to say, if the father died, his power is not voided in favor of the husband? That means, even vows she made after she was preliminarily married. Vows she made before she was preliminarily married, if the father died, was his power voided in favor of the husband?³⁵ He said to him, is it not true that vows she made before she was preliminarily married already could be dissolved by father and husband? You say, “if the husband died, his power is voided in favor of the father”! That means, even vows she made after she was preliminarily married, if the husband died, his power is voided in favor of the father!

footnotes: ³² As R. M. Margalit points out, one would expect the quote to read: “If the husband died, his power is voided in favor of the husband.” ³³ Since it is a biblical decree that her vows can be voided only by the concurrent action of father and husband, we can understand that in the absence of the father, the husband has no authority. But the father was the only authority for vows preceding the preliminary marriage; why can we not say that at the father’s death the husband inherits his powers? ³⁴ Since the husband in conjunction with the father can void vows that precede the preliminary marriage, the requirement of joint action is permanent. ³⁵ The argument is parallel to the preceding one, only this time to confirm that even for vows made after the preliminary marriage, the sole powers of dissolution belong to the father after the husband’s death.

“Since the husband dissolves in adulthood.” The Mishnah follows Rebbi Eleazar, since it was stated in the name of Rebbi Eleazar⁶ 153 by R. Joshia, student of R. Ismael. The final argument in this paragraph is attributed to R. Ismael in the Babli, 68a.: “If she should be a man’s”³ 30:7. The masoretic text reads הָיוֹ., the verse speaks about a preliminarily married adult girl⁷ He reads the verse as dealing with a case where there is no residual power of the father. But since vv. 11 ff. speak of the married woman, he must find a case of a preliminarily married woman free from her father..

footnotes: ⁶ If the material in the first paragraph is Amoraic, R. Eleazar is the Amora, bar Pedat. If the argument is tannaїtic, he is the Tanna, ben Shamua. R. Eleazar’s argument is paralleled in Sifry Num. ³ Num. ⁷ At 12 years and 6 months (or 6 months after she developed two pubic hairs) she permanently leaves her father’s potestas.

MISHNAH: If she made a vow while preliminarily married, was divorced on the same day³⁶, preliminarily married on the same day, even to a hundred men³⁷, her father and her last husband dissolve her vows. That is the principle: as long as she did not leave her father’s power for one moment³⁸, her father and her last husband dissolve her vows.

footnotes: ³⁶ The day she told of her vow either to her husband or to her father. ³⁷ Sequentially, each one after the previous one’s divorce. ³⁸ Either by definitive marriage or by becoming an adult.

HALAKHAH: “If she made a vow while preliminarily married,” etc. Rebbi Hila said, “being she will be”³⁹. 30:7. “To be” applied to a woman means “to be married,” Deut. 24:2., even for a hundred beings, her father and her last husband dissolve her vows. Rebbi Yose said, a Mishnah says so: “Her father and her last husband dissolve her vows²⁸”.

footnotes: ³⁹ Num ²⁸ Mishnah 3.

MISHNAH: “The way of learned people is that, before his daughter left his house, he told her: ‘Any vows which you had vowed in my house are dissolved’. Similarly, the husband tells her before she enters his domain⁴⁰: ‘Any vows which you had vowed before you enter my domain are dissolved,’ for after she enters his domain he cannot dissolve³⁰. An adult girl and one who had waited⁴¹ twelve months and a widow 30 days⁴² 5:2 states that a girl who never was married before has 12 months after the preliminary marriage to prepare her trousseau and a widow 30 days. An adult girl, for whom the father no longer has responsibility, is supposed to have a trousseau by the twelfth month of her adulthood and can marry immediately (cf. the commentary ascribed to Rashi to the Babli, 73b, and Halakhah Ketubot 5:3). If the groom does not bring her into his house by the appointed time (by means of the final marriage ceremony), he nevertheless becomes resposible for her upkeep as if he were completely married., Rebbi Eliezer says, since her husband is responsible for her upkeep he may dissolve but the Sages say that the husband dissolves only after she enters his domain.

footnotes: ⁴⁰ I. e., before the final marriage ceremony. ³⁰ Mishnah 4. The quote does not prove anything; the proof is from the second part of the Mishnah which requires the husband to dissolve all prior vows of his bride prior to her entering his house, i. e., as long as she still is only preliminarily married. After she enters his house, he can no longer dissolve prior vows. Since the final marriage ceremony emancipated the girl (older than three years and one day) from her father and the father’s death does the same, it is concluded that the husband’s power over a preliminarily married girl endures only as long as she is under her father’s tutelage. ⁴¹ A different text of the Babylonian Mishnah is amended in the Halakhah there to the Yerushalmi text. ⁴² Mishnah Ketubot

HALAKHAH: “An adult girl and one who had waited twelve months,” etc. Rebbi Eliezer holds that the matter depends on the support. If he preliminarily married a woman on condition to support her⁴³, the husband dissolves for her⁴⁴. If he completely married a woman on condition that he⁴⁵ support her, the father dissolves for her⁴⁶. The words of the Sages? Rebbi Jacob bar Aḥa in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan: The husband never dissolves⁴⁷ before she enters his domain.

footnotes: ⁴³ He agrees to support his wife from the time of the preliminary marriage. ⁴⁴ Without the father’s concurrence. ⁴⁵ The father. ⁴⁶ Without the husband’s concurrence. This paragraph has been emended by the standard commentaries to mean the opposite it says. ⁴⁷ Alone.

MISHNAH: If a woman was waiting for her levir⁴⁸ 4:3, Note 84. The Mishnah must speak about an underage girl who became a widow after a preliminary marriage only, and who still is under her father’s jurisdiction. The question is only whether the levir may dissolve her vows in conjuction with the father, since for a woman who is emancipated from her father, either by coming of age or by final marriage, the husband can dissolve only vows made after the final marriage act., whether it be one or two, Rebbi Eliezer says, he shall dissolve⁴⁹ 2:12, Note 12; 6:1). The rabbinic equivalent of the preliminary marriage is called “bespeaking” (Yebamot 2:1, Note 6). The legal power of “bespeaking” is a matter of controversy but it is certain that adultery with a “bespoken” woman is not a capital crime. While under the obligation to marry a levir, the widow by biblical law is unable to contract a valid marriage with any other man (Yebamot 1:1, Note 94.) For R. Eliezer, the latter fact gives any levir the status of a husband in matters of vows.. Rebbi Joshua says, for one but not for two⁵⁰. Rebbi Aqiba says, neither for one nor for two⁵¹.

footnotes: ⁴⁸ She is a widow whose husband died without issue; she waits to be married to her husband’s brother; cf. Yebamot ⁴⁹ All the ceremonies involved in a levirate marriage are rabbinical; by biblical law the childless sister-in-law is married only by actual intercourse (Yebamot ⁵⁰ R. Joshua gives the right of the preliminary husband only to a single levir, even after “bespeaking”. Cf. Babli, 74a. ⁵¹ His position is explained in the following Mishnah.

HALAKHAH: “If a woman was waiting for her levir,” etc. Following Rebbi Aqiba⁵⁸, who can dissolve? For example, what Rebbi Abbahu said in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan, even a hundred qiddušin are valid for her⁵⁹ 60a; Yerushalmi Yebamot 3:4 (Notes 102–104), 5:1 (Note 35); Qiddušin 3:1, (63c 1. 71). A man gives something of value to a woman to serve as qiddušin money for a preliminary marriage in a month’s time. If other men also give her deferred qiddušin, they all might end up preliminarily married to her and none of them can marry her. In that case, she is not bound to any one by marriage in the sense of R. Aqiba., who dissolves? And what Rebbi Jacob⁶⁰ 1:2, 59c 1. 8, one reads: “R. Joḥanan said.” Since there is no R. Jacob without father’s name among the students of R. Joḥanan (there are R. Jacob bar Aḥa and R. Jacob bar Idi), the name has to be considered a scribal error. said in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan, he can allot her to his underage son⁶¹. 21:7–11), about a situation intrinsically connected to the Jubilee year which became void with the exile of the Ten Tribes. The verse gives the master the right to marry the girl by considering the price he paid for her as qiddušin money, or to give her to his son as wife without additional expenditure. If the son is a minor, she becomes his wife by biblical decree, But the wife of a minor cannot be prosecuted for adultery [Sifra Qedošim Pereq 9(11)]. Can the underage husband, biblically married to his underage wife, dissolve her vows?, who dissolves? And what Rebbi Jacob bar Aḥa sind in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan, she does not even need a reparation offering for a possible sin⁶², Babli 113a, Yerushalmi 14:1 Note 7. (The rules of reparation offerings for possible sins are in Lev. 5:17–19)., who dissolves?

footnotes: ⁵⁸ For whom the right of dissolution depends on his relationship with the woman defining adultery, can the husband dissolve in questionable cases? The answers, which are not given, are obviously “no”. ⁵⁹ Babli Qiddušin ⁶⁰ In the source of this statement, Qiddus̄in ⁶¹ This refers to the Hebrew slave girl (Ex ⁶² The wife of a deaf-mute or of an insane person (at the time of marriage) is not married by biblical standards and cannot commit adultery. Yebamot

MISHNAH: Rebbi Eliezer said, if he can dissolve vows for a wife which he himself acquired, so much more that he should be able to dissolve for a wife which Heaven acquired for him. Rebbi Aqiba answered him: No. What you say is about a wife which he himself acquired, where nobody else has any authority over her; what can you say about the wife which Heaven acquired for him, where others⁵² have authority over her? Rebbi Joshua said to him, Aqiba, your words apply to two levirs. What can you reply about one levir? He said to him, the sister-in-law does not belong completely to her man as the wife belongs completely to her husband⁵³.

footnotes: ⁵² The other brothers of the deceased husband. ⁵³ The childless widow is unable to contract a marriage except with the levir; she does not commit adultery if she sleeps with another man before she is married by the levir. But a married woman who sleeps with another man commits a capital crime. For R. Aqiba, marriage is only a relationship whose violation is a capital crime.

HALAKHAH: “Rebbi Eliezer said,” etc. ⁶³“Rebbi Eliezer said, since a woman on whom I had no claim before she entered into my domain, becomes absolutely mine after she entered my domain, is it not logical that a woman on whom I had some claim before she entered my domain, shall become absolutely mine when she enters my domain⁶⁴? Rebbi Aqiba told him, no. If you speak about a woman on whom you had no claim before she entered into your domain, but after she entered your domain she became absolutely yours, then just as you had no part in her so no other man had any part in her. What can you conclude about a woman on whom you had some claim before she entered your domain, and after she entered your domain she became absolutely yours, but just as you had some rights to her so others had the same rights to her⁶⁵! Rebbi Joshua told him, Aqiba, your argument holds for two levirs. What do you respond in the case of a single levir? He said to him, just as you make no difference in the rules of one waiting for one levir or for two levirs, whether he ‘bespoke’ her or did not ‘bespeak’ her, can it not be the same for vows and oaths? He said to him, that is true⁶⁶. He said to him, if you had lived in the times of Rebbi Eleazar ben Arakh, he would have said that ‘bespeaking’ does not acquire completely since he would agree that he cannot dissolve until she enters his domain⁶³.

footnotes: ⁶³ Tosephta 6:5, Babli 74b. ⁶⁴ A man has no relation to an unrelated woman. After the preliminary marriage he has the exclusive right to her and dissolves her vows (together with the father). Since he has potential rights to his childless sister-in-law, should he not have the right to dissolve her vows (together with the father) after “bespeaking”? ⁶⁵ The other brothers. ⁶⁶ The text in the Tosephta is different: אָמַר לוֹ. הֲבָל אִילּוּ הָיִיתָ בִימֵי רִבִּי לָעְזָר בֶּן עֲרָךְ וַהֲשֵׁבתָ תְשוּבָה זוֹ. “He said to him, I am sorry that you did not live in the time of R. Eleazar ben Arakh and give him this reply” (maybe he would have changed his mind). ⁶³ Tosephta 6:5, Babli 74b.

MISHNAH: If somebody says to his wife, all vows that you might vow from now until I shall return from place X shall be confirmed⁵⁴, he did not say anything; [if he says] they shall be dissolved, Rebbi Eliezer says, they are dissolved, but the Sages say, they are not dissolved. Rebbi Eliezer said, if he can dissolve vows that came under the category of prohibition⁵⁵, should he not be able to dissolve vows that did not yet come under the category of prohibition⁵⁶? They said to him, it says⁵⁷. 30:14. The verse treats confirmation and voiding as parallels. ‘her husband may confirm them and her husband may dissolve them”. What can be confirmed can be dissolved; what cannot be confirmed cannot be dissolved.

footnotes: ⁵⁴ In his absence. Everybody agrees that an as yet nonexistent vow cannot be confirmed. ⁵⁵ Vows actually made by which the wife imposes a legally enforceable prohibition on herself. ⁵⁶ Vows not yet made. ⁵⁷ Num

HALAKHAH: ⁶⁸“He⁶⁹ answered to the words of Rebbi Eliezer: Let the miqweh⁷⁰ prove it! It frees the impure from their impurities but it cannot save pure ones. Rebbi Eliezer argued another track: Since in a situation where he cannot dissolve his own vows before he made them, he dissolves his wife’s vows before she made them, in a situation where he can dissolve his own vows after he made them, would it not be logical that he could dissolve his wife’s vows before she made them?⁷¹ No! Why can he not dissolve his own vows before he made them⁷² he can dissolve his own vows before he made them?”? For if he wants to confirm them, he confirms them. Could he dissolve his wife’s vows after she made them, when if he wanted to confirm them, he could not confirm them?⁷³ when if he wanted to confirm them, he could not confirm them?” (As R. Eliezer agrees in the Mishnah.)” ⁷⁴“But it says⁵⁷. 30:14. The verse treats confirmation and voiding as parallels., ‘her husband may confirm them and her husband may dissolve them’. What can be confirmed can be dissolved,; what cannot be confirmed cannot be dissolved.”

footnotes: ⁶⁸ This refers to Mishnaiot 8,9. Tosephta 6:5; Babli 75b. ⁶⁹ In the parallel sources: They. This is no longer part of R. Aqiba’s argument, but belongs to the anonymous Sages. ⁷⁰ The ritual bath cleanses from most impurities. But a pure person cannot immerse himself to become immune to future impurities. ⁷¹ It is difficult to make sense of this text. In Tosephta and Babli one reads: מָה אִם בְּמָקוֹם שֶׁאֵינוֹ מֵפֵר נִדְרֵי עַצְמוֹ מִשֶׁנָּדַר הֲרֵי הוּא מֵיפֵר נִדְרֵי עַצְמוֹ עַד שֶׁלֹּא יִדּוֹר. מָקוֹם שֶׁמֵפֵר נִדְרֵי אִשְׁתּוֹ מִשֶׁנָּֽדְרָה אֵינוֹ דִין שֶׁיָּפֵר נִדְרֵי אִשְׁתּוֹ עַד שֶׁלֹּא תִדּוֹר. “Since he cannot dissolve his own vows after he vowed (for only a Sage can do that), but he can dissolve his own vows before he vows (by a declaration that all his future vows are null and void), then since he can dissolve his wife’s vows after she vowed it is only logical that he should be able to dissolve his wife’s vows before she vowed.” It seems that the Yerushalmi text should follow similar lines. ⁷² This text contradicts the next sentence. The Tosephta reads אָֽמְרוּ לוֹ וּמָה מֵיפֵר נִדְרֵי עַצְמוֹ עַד שֶׁלֹּא יִדּוֹר. “They said to him, why is it that ⁷³ The Tosephta reads יָפֵר נִדְרֵי אִשְׁתּוֹ עַד שֶׁלֹּא תִדּוֹר. שֶׁכֵּן אִם רָצָה לְהָקֵם אֵינוֹ מוּקָם. “Could he dissolve his wife’s vows before she made them ⁷⁴ Tosephta 6:6; Babli 76b. ⁵⁷ Num

MISHNAH: The dissolution of vows may take place the entire day⁷⁵; this can imply a lenient or a stringent implementation. How is that? If she made the vow Friday night⁷⁶, he may dissolve during the night and the next day until [the next] nightfall. If she made the vow shortly before nightfall, he dissolves until it becomes dark; for after dark he cannot dissolve.

footnotes: ⁷⁵ The day of Creation, the night followed by daylight. ⁷⁶ It could be any other night; the Mishnah informs us that dissolution of vows is permitted on the Sabbath.

HALAKHAH: “The dissolution of vows may take place the entire day,” etc. It was stated⁷⁷ 157a.: “Rebbi Yose ben Rebbi Jehudah and Rebbi Eleazar ben Rebbi Simeon say⁷⁸ Num. 156 this is attributed to R. Simeon himself., the dissolution of vows may take place from time to time⁷⁹.” What is the reason of the rabbis? “From day to day⁸⁰. 30:15..” What is the reason of Rebbi Yose ben Rebbi Jehudah? “On the day of his hearing⁸¹. 30:6,8,13. In the Babli, 76b, and Sifry Num. 156, the arguments are switched: “On the day of his hearing” implies that at nightfall the time has run out, “from day to day” implies 24 hours. It is not necessary to amend the Yerushalmi since Targum Pseudo-Jonathan and Rashi explain Num. 30:15 following the rabbis: “If her husband remains silent from the day he was informed to another day”, i. e., the next night. R. Yose ben R. Jehudah will explain that “the day of his hearing” starts only with his hearing..” How do the rabbis explain Rebbi Yose ben Rebbi Jehudah’s reason, “on the day of his hearing”? Explain it that she made the vow on the start of the night⁸². How does Rebbi Yose ben Rebbi Jehudah explain the rabbis’ reason, “from day to day”? Explain it that she made the vow at the start of Friday night⁸³ of Friday night is problematic. It is a correction by the scribe himself and probably an insertion at the wrong place., he became paralyzed⁸⁴, and then his power of speech returned⁸⁵. In the opinion of Rebbi Yose ben Rebbi Jehudah one gives him 24 hours. In the opinion of the rabbis he has only that day⁸⁶. If he became paralyzed, and later⁸⁷ his power of speech returned, in the opinion of Rebbi Yose ben Rebbi Jehudah one adds up to a total of 24 hours⁸⁸. In the opinion of the rabbis he always can dissolve when his speech returns. But if it happened one hour⁸⁹ before sundown, he can no longer dissolve.

footnotes: ⁷⁷ Babli 76b, 77a, Šabbat ⁷⁸ In Sifry ⁷⁹ 24 hours from the moment the husband is informed. ⁸⁰ Num ⁸¹ Num ⁸² In that case, the husband has 24 hours even according to the rabbis. ⁸³ The mention of the start ⁸⁴ After he was informed of the vow. ⁸⁵ Within 24 hours after he heard from his wife. ⁸⁶ Until nightfall on Saturday, less than 24 hours. ⁸⁷ Not on the same day. ⁸⁸ The paralysis does not stop the clock. In this case, R. Yose ben R. Jehudah is more restrictive than the rabbis. ⁸⁹ “One hour” means “a short time”. If the husband was informed of the vow shortly before sundown and before he could dissolve the vow was paralyzed at sundown, for the rabbis he had his day and when he regains his speech cannot undo the vow.

“It shall be dissolved at the time of the afternoon prayer,” it is permanently dissolved⁹⁰. “It shall be confirmed at the time of the afternoon prayer,” it is permanently confirmed. “It shall be dissolved until the time of the afternoon prayer,” it is as if he said, “it shall be dissolved starting with the time of the afternoon prayer.”

footnotes: ⁹⁰ There can be no partial confirmation or dissolution. Since he did not mention confirmation, one does not take his word to mean that the vow shall be valid until the time of the afternoon prayer; it is dissolved immediately and permanently. The same holds in the following two cases.

There⁹¹ 24:5., we have stated: “One dissolves vows on the Sabbath.” It was stated⁹²: Both vows that intrude on the Sabbath and vows that do not intrude on the Sabbath. “And one asks about vows that intrude on the Sabbath⁹¹ 24:5.,” therefore not if there is no need for the Sabbath. The Elder can dissolve the next day⁹³. Then for Rebbi Yose ben Rebbi Jehudah and Rebbi Eleazar ben Rebbi Simeon who say that the dissolution of vows is from time to time, he should not dissolve even vows that intrude on the Sabbath⁹⁴! Explain it according to everybody, if she made the vow at the start of Friday night.

footnotes: ⁹¹ Mishnah Šabbat ⁹² In the Babli, 77a, this is the result of a discussion of late Amoraïm. ⁹¹ Mishnah Šabbat ⁹³ But the husband who was informed on the Sabbath must dissolve on the Sabbath or lose his right to dissolution. ⁹⁴ This argument is also made in the Babli, 77a.

⁹⁵ Rebbi Abbahu in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan: The husband who said “there is no vow, there is no oath,” did not say anything. Also the Elder who said “it is dissolved for you, it is voided for you,” did not say anything. But everybody has to follow his own rules. The husband says “it is dissolved for you, it is voided for you,” and the Elder says, “there is no vow, there is no oath”.

footnotes: ⁹⁵ Babli 77b, with biblical support for the change in language between dissolution and permission.

Rebbi Joḥanan⁹⁹; required by the general style of the Yerushalmi. said, earlier generations were asking, may a man ask about his confirmation? How is that? If his wife made a vow, her husband heard it and did not dissolve for her¹⁰⁰. It is obvious that he cannot dissolve as a husband. May he dissolve as an Elder? What are we talking about? If it is about vows between him and her, these are vows of himself¹⁰¹. But we must talk about vows between her and others. [Is that not a Mishnah¹⁰² 2:5: “A man [sitting as judge] can permit all vows except his own. R. Jehudah says, nor his wife’s vows concerning others.”? “Not his wife’s vows between her and others!”] Is that not Rebbi Jehudah’s? It was stated in the name of Rebbi Judah; Rebbi Ḥiyya stated it in the name of the Sages¹⁰³ 2:5; Code Hilkhot Ševu‘ot 6:6) disagrees and follows the majority opinion in the Mishnah..

footnotes: ⁹⁹ From Naḥmanides, missing in ms. and editio princeps ¹⁰⁰ He did not dissolve in time and by inaction lost his veto power. The Yerushalmi seems to hold that a vow explicitly confirmed by the husband cannot be referred to an Elder for annulment, since it discusses only confirmation by default. ¹⁰¹ The husband can interfere with his wife’s vows only if it touches him personally or is a vow of mortification (cf. Note 17). If it touches him personally, he certainly cannot act as an Elder in his own behalf. ¹⁰² Mishnah Nega‘im ¹⁰³ R. Ḥiyya [the older] is the great authority for the Mishnah text. According to him, one has to switch the attributions in the Mishnah and, therefore, practice has to follow what in the common Mishnah is attributed to R. Jehudah. Naḥmanides (11:1) holds that practice has to follow the Yerushalmi in this since the Babli does not discuss the theme; Maimonides (Commentary to Nega‘im

May one permit¹⁰³ 2:5; Code Hilkhot Ševu‘ot 6:6) disagrees and follows the majority opinion in the Mishnah. vows in the night? Since vows under the husband’s jurisdiction, about which “on the day” is written⁸¹. 30:6,8,13. In the Babli, 76b, and Sifry Num. 156, the arguments are switched: “On the day of his hearing” implies that at nightfall the time has run out, “from day to day” implies 24 hours. It is not necessary to amend the Yerushalmi since Targum Pseudo-Jonathan and Rashi explain Num. 30:15 following the rabbis: “If her husband remains silent from the day he was informed to another day”, i. e., the next night. R. Yose ben R. Jehudah will explain that “the day of his hearing” starts only with his hearing., he may dissolve in the night, vows under the jurisdiction of the Elder, where “on the day” is not written, not so much more¹⁰⁴ 62b.? Can one permit through an interpreter? Let us hear from the following: Rebbi Abba bar Ẓutra was made an interpreter for Rebbi Joḥanan in the case of a woman who did not know Syriac¹⁰⁵. 19:15; Makkot 1:9. Sifry Deut. 188.).

footnotes: ¹⁰³ R. Ḥiyya [the older] is the great authority for the Mishnah text. According to him, one has to switch the attributions in the Mishnah and, therefore, practice has to follow what in the common Mishnah is attributed to R. Jehudah. Naḥmanides (11:1) holds that practice has to follow the Yerushalmi in this since the Babli does not discuss the theme; Maimonides (Commentary to Nega‘im ⁸¹ Num ¹⁰⁴ The Babli agrees, 77b, Eruvin ¹⁰⁵ She spoke only Greek. In general, a judge is only competent to sit in a case if he understands all witnesses since it says “by the mouth of two witnesses”, not the mouth of an interpreter (Deut

It was stated: One is asked about vows only while sitting and wrapped¹⁰⁶. The one who is asked must be sitting and the one who is asking is standing; from the following¹⁰⁷ 19:17.: “And the two people who have the dispute shall stand.” “Standing” means only “being judged”. That is for asking legal rules¹⁰⁸ 4:1 (35b, 1. 30 ff.), Sanhedrin 3:10 (21c 1. 15ff.), Yoma 6:1 (43b 1. 51 ff.); Babli Ševu‘ot 30a; Sifry Deut. 190.. Asking about sermons from where? The verse says “shall stand, and shall stand”¹⁰⁹ is interpreted as sign of an addition; to answer anything of a theological nature, the Sage has to sit. The Babli disagrees, 77b; the opinion of the Yerushalmi is quoted as that of Rabban Gamliel II.. Rebbi Aḥa bar Pappus went to permit the vow of Rebbi Immi. He remained standing to say “there is no vow”¹¹⁰. Rebbi Mana went to permit the vow of the older Gamliel. He remained standing to say “there is no vow, there is no oath”. Rebbi Mana went to permit the vow of Gamliel the grandson. He said to him, do not treat me as you treated my grandfather, but sit down and I shall remain standing¹¹¹.

footnotes: ¹⁰⁶ According to the rules of court proceedings. The judges have to be seated and wrapped in their judicial robes. ¹⁰⁷ Deut. ¹⁰⁸ The verse does not imply that the parties have to stand before the judges but that they have to remain there to be judged. The interpretation of the verse is in dispute, cf. Ševu‘ot ¹⁰⁹ The consecutive vaw ¹¹⁰ Following the opinion of the Babylonian Amoraïm for the Babylonian Immi. ¹¹¹ He asked him to follow the Palestinian rules.

¹¹² 1:8, 76c 1. 62. Rebbi Ze‘ira, Rav Jehudah, Jeremiah bar Abba, in the name of Rebbi Samuel¹¹³: Three who know how to find an opening may permit like an Elder¹¹⁴., s. v. אמר רב אחא בר יעקב.). In Bekhorot 36b, the same rule is attributed to R. Ḥiyya bar Abin in the name of Rav Amram, a student of Samuel’s student Rav Naḥman.. They thought, at a place where no Elder was available. The rabbis of Caesarea: Even at a place of an Elder¹¹⁵. They said before Rebbi Yasa: Rav Huna is “head of tribes”¹¹⁶. 30:2).. Who are the heads of tribes¹¹⁷? Rav Huna is head of the heads of tribes¹¹⁸.

footnotes: ¹¹² From here to the end of the Halakhah, the text also is in Ḥagigah ¹¹³ Probably one should read: R. Ze‘ira, Rav Jehudah, Rav Jeremiah bar Aḥa in the name of Samuel. ¹¹⁴ Persons who are not ordained but know the rules of invalidating vows explained in the preceding Chapters. In the Babli, 78a, R. Aḥa bar Jacob admits any three lay persons to invalidate vows (cf. R. Nissim Gerondi ad loc ¹¹⁵ Invalidation of a vow by three laymen is not infringing on the privileges of the rabbinate. The ordained rabbi has the privilege to invalidate a vow alone (Babli, 78a). ¹¹⁶ Who was the undisputed head of the Babylonian rabbinate and was of the family of the davidic Head of the Diaspora. He certainly had the right to invalidate vows, being of the “heads of the tribes” (Num ¹¹⁷ Since they are mentioned in the plural, it appears that more than one person in a generation was empowered to invalidate vows. ¹¹⁸ He is the head of all ordained rabbis, even though his Babylonian ordination is not complete as explained in the next paragraph.

May one appoint Elders for selected topics¹¹⁹? Let us hear from the following: Rebbi appointed Rav to invalidate vows and to see stains¹²⁰. After his death, [Rav] asked his son for [permission to see] defects of firstlings. He said to him, I shall not add to what my father gave you. Rebbi Yose ben Rebbi Abun said, he gave him everything: To sit in judgment alone, to invalidate vows, to see stains, and to see outside blemishes¹²¹ 5a, Rav received full rabbinic powers except the right to decide anything in matters of firstlings. (A firstling of cattle, sheep, or goats must be sacrificed unless it has a blemish which disqualifies it as a sacrifice. In the absence of a Temple, the firstling must graze until it develops a blemish; Deut. 15:19–23.) The full ordination was refused to him since his intent was to return to Babylonia and Rebbi disapproved of that. After him, all rabbis with the limited diaspora ordination received the title of “Rav”.. After his death, [Rav] asked his son for [permission to see] hidden defects. He said to him, I shall not add to what my father gave you. Even though you say, one appoints Elders for selected topics, only if he is competent for everything. As the following: Rebbi Joshua ben Levi ordained all his students, but he was sorry about one who had a defect in his eye and he could not ordain him¹²². 13–14) must be seen with both eyes, a one-eyed or blind person could not be ordained to decide on their ritual purity.; so he ordained him for selected topics¹²³. That implies that one who is competent in one thing has to be competent in everything, and one who is not competent in everything cannot be declared competent in one thing¹²⁴.

footnotes: ¹¹⁹ Is it possible to give ordination without conferring all rabbinical powers on the candidate? ¹²⁰ To decide whether a female genital discharge was menstrual blood or not; i. e., whether the woman would be permitted to her husband or not. This is taken as example of his power to decide in matters of ritual prohibitions and includes permission to judge in all matters of such prohibitions. ¹²¹ In the tradition of the Babli, Sanhedrin ¹²² Since skin lesions (wrongly translated as “leprosy”, Lev ¹²³ For everything except matters of impurity and duties as judge. ¹²⁴ The difference between the titles of “Rav” and “Rebbi” is one of circumstances, not of quality.

May one appoint Elders for a fixed time? Let us hear from the following: Rebbi Ḥiyya bar Abba went to Rebbi Eleazar and asked him to intervene with the Patriarch Rebbi Jehudah, that the latter should write him a letter of recommendation for seeking a livelihood in a foreign country. He intervened, and [the Patriarch] wrote for him: Here we are sending you as our representative a great personality with all our powers until he shall return to us¹²⁵ 5b, has a similar story involving R. Joḥanan who similarly gave conditional ordination to Rebbi Shimen.. Rebbi Ḥizqiah, Rebbi Dositheus, Rebbi Abba bar Zamina in the name of the old Rebbi Dositheus: He wrote him the following. Here we are sending you a great personality who will not be ashamed to say “1 did not learn this”¹²⁶.

footnotes: ¹²⁵ He shall have full ordination until he returns to the Patriarch. The Babli, Sanhedrin ¹²⁶ In this version, which has no parallel in the Babli, the ordination was unconditional and permanent.

May one permit wearing a coat¹²⁷ “coat”.? Rebbi Abbahu in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan: One permits wearing a coat. Rebbi Joshua ben Levi permitted wearing a coat. Rebbi Huna in the name of Rebbi Jeremiah: At a place where one does not wear a toga. Rebbi Yose ben Abun said, for easy vows¹²⁸.

footnotes: ¹²⁷ Must the rabbi always be wrapped in his robe (Note 106)? The word פלונס parallels Syriac פלימנא, פילמנא, Greek φαινόλης (φαιλόνης) παινόλης, Latin paenula ¹²⁸ Those which can be permitted unquestionably, for which no argument is needed.