MISHNAH: An oath about testimony¹. 5:1 requires a variable value sacrifice by a person who heard an imprecation when he had knowledge and refuses to testify. This is read to mean that a person is approached by a party in a civil suit and asked to testify in their behalf. If then either he swears an oath that he will testify in court (“by his own word”) or the party asks him to swear that he will appear (“by the word of others”) while he answers “Amen” but does not utter an oath by himself, he becomes liable for the sacrifice if he reneges on his commitment. applies to men but not to women², to unrelated persons but not to relatives³, to qualified but not to disqualified ones⁴; it applies only to those admitted to testify⁵, in court and out of court, and by the person’s own words. By the words of others they only become liable if they renege before a court, the words of Rebbi Meїr. But the Sages say, whether by the person’s own words or by the words of others they only become liable if they renege before a court⁶. They are liable both for intentional [violation of the] oath and for erroneous one²⁷, and for intentional [refusal of] testimony, but one is not liable unintentionally²⁸. What is one liable for if intentional? A variable value sacrifice.

footnotes: ¹ Lev ² Since women are not admitted as formal witnesses in court, the rule of an oath of testimony cannot apply to them. ³ Since relatives are barred from appearing as witnesses in court, the rule of an oath of testimony cannot apply to them. ⁴ Felons are not permitted to appear as witnesses in court; the rule of an oath of testimony cannot apply to them. ⁵ Even if their disability only is a rabbinic tradition they will not be heard and the rule of an oath of testimony cannot apply to them. ⁶ Since testimony is used only in court, a refusal to testify outside of court is irrelevant and cannot trigger liability. ²⁷ If he swore falsely that he did not know testimony but did not know that this makes him liable for a sacrifice. ²⁸ If honestly he was erroneously thinking that he did not know testimony.

HALAKHAH: “An oath about testimony,” etc. ⁷ 3:10, Notes 150–165, with a related text in Yoma 6:1. The many parallels in Babli (30a,b, Yoma 62b), Tosephta, and halakhic Midrashim are indicated in Sanhedrin.Rams⁸. 16:5,7,8. Any indeterminate plural means 2, the minimum of many., the minimum of rams are two. Why does the verse say two? That they be equal.

footnotes: ⁷ This text essentially is Sanhedrin ⁸ Lev

Sheep, the minimum of sheep are two. Then why does the verse say two? That both be equal⁹. 27:38, Num. 28:3..

footnotes: ⁹ Ex

The minimum of birds are two. Then why does the verse say two? that both be equal¹⁰. 14:4..

footnotes: ¹⁰ Lev

The minimum of trumpets are two. Then why does the verse say two? that both be equal¹¹. 10:1..

footnotes: ¹¹ Num

Rebbi Ḥaggai objected to Rebbi Yose¹², not R. Yasa as in Sanhedrin.. Is there not written: The two men shall stand¹³. 19:17.? Now, is not two the minimum of “men”? Why does the verse say two? That both be equal? But it is written¹⁴. 24:17.: Do not bend the lawsuit of the proselyte, the orphan, … That means that a proselyte can have a lawsuit against one who is not a proselyte, an orphan may have a lawsuit against one who is not an orphan, a widow against a married woman. Then why is there written two? It is free to be combined and to infer from it an equal cut. It is said here two and it is said there two men were left¹⁵. 11:26.74. Since there one speaks of men but not women nor underaged, also here men but not women nor underaged. From this we learn that a woman may not be a judge; consequently a woman may not be a witness.

footnotes: ¹² This is the correct reading, also given in Yoma ¹³ Deut ¹⁴ Deut ¹⁵ Num

Rebbi Yose ben Rebbi Abun, Rebbi Huna in the name of Rebbi Yose¹⁶. It is said here two and it is said there¹⁷. 19:15. by the mouth of two witnesses. Since there it must be by the testimony of two witnesses, also here by the testimony of two witnesses. Then why does the verse say two¹³. 19:17.? Lest one of them be standing while the other be sitting; one says everything he has to say, but to the other one says, make your statement short. With one he puts up, to the other he is unfriendly.

footnotes: ¹⁶ Here it seems better to read “Rav Joseph” with the other two sources. ¹⁷ Deut ¹³ Deut

Rebbi Jehudah said, I heard that if the judge wants to let both of them sit, he may tell them to sit down. What is forbidden is that not one be standing and the other sitting; one says everything he has to say, but to the other one says, make your statement short. Rebbi Ismael says, one says to him, either you dress as he is dressed or pay him to be dressed as you are.

Rebbi Abba said in the name of Rav Huna: The witnesses have to stand while testifying. What is the reason? The two men shall stand¹³. 19:17.. Rebbi Jeremiah in the name of Rebbi Abbahu: Also the parties have to stand at the moment the verdict is given. What is the reason?: Who have the quarrel before the Eternal¹³. 19:17..

footnotes: ¹³ Deut ¹³ Deut

¹⁸ 3:10, Notes 166–200. (Babli Sanhedrin 27b,28a). It is written¹⁹. 24:16.: Fathers shall not be killed because of sons. Is it not already written, each one should be killed for his own crime? Why does the verse say, fathers shall not be killed because of sons? Fathers shall not be killed on the testimony of sons, and sons shall not be killed on testimony of fathers. From here that witnesses shall not be relatives of the accused.

footnotes: ¹⁸ This and the following paragraphs also have an almost identical copy in Sanhedrin ¹⁹ Deut

From where that witnesses may not be relatives of one another? Think of it, if they be found perjured, would each of them not be killed by the other’s testimony? From where that witnesses may not be relatives of the judges? Think of it, if one of them be found perjured, he could not be killed unless the other also was found perjured. If you say so, would he not be killed by the other’s sentencing?

From where that judges may not be relatives of one another? The Torah said, kill on the testimony of witnesses, kill on the sentence of judges. Since witnesses may not be relatives of one another, neither may judges be relatives of one another.

So far only fathers and sons; from where the other relatives? Rebbi Ze`ira says, and sons includes the remaining relatives.

So far according to Rebbi Aqiba.

From where following Rebbi Ismael? Rebbi Ismael stated: The congregation shall judge between the beater, etc²⁰35:24; between the slayer and the avenger of the blood.. The congregation be neither relatives of the murderer nor relatives of the murdered. Rebbi Yose said, otherwise you would say that the court is engaged in vendetta. This implies that the judges may not be related to the accused. And from where that the witnesses may not be related to the accused? The Torah said, kill on the testimony of witnesses, kill on the sentence of those who vote²¹. 23:2.. Since judges may not be related to the accused, neither may witnesses be related to the accused. From where that witnesses may not be relatives of one another? Think of it, if they be found perjured, would they not be killed by each other’s testimony?

footnotes: ²⁰ Num. ²¹ I. e., the judges; the expression is from Ex

From where that witnesses may not be relatives of the judges? Think of it, if one of them be found perjured, he could not be killed unless the other also was found perjured. If you say so, would he not be killed by his sentence?

“To qualified but not to disqualified ones.” For it is said, if he does not tell, he has to bear his punishment¹. 5:1. If he told, the other would have to pay money. This excludes one where the other would not have to pay money even if he told.

footnotes: ¹ Lev

“Before the court.” To exclude a single witness. If they told him that they would accept his word as if there were two witnesses, from where? The verse says, if he was a witness, had seen or known; if he does not tell he shall bear his punishment¹. 5:1. One who is qualified to testify according to biblical standards; this excludes a single witness who is not qualified to testify.

footnotes: ¹ Lev

“Outside of court.” If he does not tell, he has to bear his punishment. If he told, one would have to pay money. This excludes outside of court where the other would not have to pay money even if he told.

From where two witnesses? And he is a witness, this makes two. Following Rebbi Ismael, who said, any place where the Torah mentions a witness without further determination it implies two witnesses; unless the verse informs you that a single witness is meant. It was found stated in the name of Rebbi Ismael: “Two witnesses.” Can a single witness be found guilty of a blurted oath? Since it is possible to say that one person could team up with him, then he would be subject to the oath of testimony, you could find him liable for an oath of testimony. How could you find him guilty of a blurted oath?

Should a relative be found guilty of a blurted oath? Does it follow what Rebbi Abba said in the name of Samuel²²: “An oath that X gave to Y,” and it turns out that X had not given; since there is nothing in the future there is nothing in the past. Or the following: “Where is my ox?” He responded, “I do not know what you are referring to.” Rebbi declares him not liable for a keeper’s oath but liable because of a blurted oath. Rebbi Joḥanan said, since it is a religious duty to appease him, he is not liable because of a blurted oath. In the rabbis’ opinion, is there no religious duty to appease him? One appeases with truthful statements, not with lies.

footnotes: ²² Chapter 3:6, Note 75. Babli 49b.

Rebbi Ismael stated: He has to bear his punishment²¹. 23:2., a sacrifice. From where that one needs a court? “Telling, telling”. Since telling mentioned there is before a court, also telling here is before a court.

footnotes: ²¹ I. e., the judges; the expression is from Ex

²³ 1:1 Notes 56–71, Ketubot 2:4 Note 87, Sanhedrin 3:10 Note 197. Or like the following. “One accepts the witnesses’ testimony only if they saw it together. Rebbi Joshua ben Qorḥa says, even if they saw it one after the other.” Rebbi Jeremiah, Rebbi Samuel ben Rav Isaac in the name of Rav Isaac who said in the name of Rav: The Sages agree with Rebbi Joshua ben Qorḥa with regard to witnesses of firstlings and witnesses of squatters’ rights. Rebbi Abba in the name of Rebbi Jeremiah: the same holds for testimony regarding signs. In that case, it is obvious if one says, I saw two hairs on his back²⁴ and one says, I saw one hair on his back and the other says, I saw one hair on his belly, that is nothing; so much more his back and his back²⁵. Two are saying, we saw one hair on his back; and one is saying, I saw one hair on his belly. Rebbi Yose ben Rebbi Bun and Rebbi Hoshaia ben Rebbi Shammai, one said, it is invalid, but the other said, it is valid. He who says it is invalid considers him as one who testifies to half a sign. He who says it is valid? I say, maybe it was rubbed off. One says, I saw two hairs on his back; and one says, I saw two on his belly. Rebbi Abba said, everybody agrees that this is valid. Rebbi Ḥaggai said, everybody agrees that this is invalid [testimony]. Rebbi Yose says, this is in disagreement. Rebbi Yudan said, this is in disagreement. Rebbi Yose said to Rebbi Ḥaggai, does not Rebbi Yudan follow my opinion? He answered, I am disagreeing with his teacher, so much more with him. Rebbi Mana said, Rebbi Ḥaggai was correct. If a document was signed by four seals, if one person (permitted)²⁶ two, and another (questioned)²⁶ the other two, and the document was attacked, is that worth anything? Does not every single signature need two witnesses? And here, every single sign needs two witnesses. Rebbi Ḥanina learns it from the years of squatting rights. If one [witness] testified that he ate from the property the first, second, and third years and another testified that he ate it the fourth and fifth years, is that worth anything? Does not every single year need two witnesses? And here, every single sign needs two witnesses.

footnotes: ²³ This is a careless copy of a text in Soṭah ²⁴ There is a sentence missing: “the other says, I saw two hairs on his side. If”. ²⁵ It should read: “back and side”. ²⁶ This clearly is corrupt. In both cases, read: “testified to”. ²⁶ This clearly is corrupt. In both cases, read: “testified to”.

MISHNAH: What is an oath about testimony? One said to witnesses, come and testify for me. “An oath that we do not know testimony for you;” or they said to him, we do not know any testimony for you, “I am asking you to take an oath upon this;” if they said “Amen”, they are liable¹. 5:1 requires a variable value sacrifice by a person who heard an imprecation when he had knowledge and refuses to testify. This is read to mean that a person is approached by a party in a civil suit and asked to testify in their behalf. If then either he swears an oath that he will testify in court (“by his own word”) or the party asks him to swear that he will appear (“by the word of others”) while he answers “Amen” but does not utter an oath by himself, he becomes liable for the sacrifice if he reneges on his commitment.. If he asked them five times outside of court to take an oath; when they came to court and admitted it they are not liable²⁹. If they deny, they are liable for each single one. If he asked them five times in court to take an oath and the refused, they are liable only once. Rebbi Simeon said, what is the reason? Because they cannot come back and admit³⁰.

footnotes: ¹ Lev ²⁹ Since refusal of testimony outside of court is irrelevant (Note 6). ³⁰ Since the courts operate on the principle that a witness can testify only once, i. e., he cannot change his testimony, after a first refusal in court the witness would not be permitted to change his statement. The additional oaths put on the witnesses are pointless; the court should prohibit them. In the language of the Babli, כֵּיוָן שֶׁהִגִּיד אֵינוֹ חוֹזֵר וּמַגִּיד “after he told, he does not return to tell”.

HALAKHAH: “What is an oath about testimony,” etc. A person, a person³¹. 5:1 about oaths concerning testimony and 5:21 about the person accused of larceny who swears falsely in purgation by oath; cf. Chapter 3:12, Note 165. The parallel use of identical terms is an equal cut which allows transfer of rules from one occurrence to the other.. Since there it is from his own words, also here from his own words. Since here it is from others’ words, also there it is from others’ words³²; others formulate the oath to which he is asked to assent. In 5:21 he himself formulates the oath to deny a deposit, or a loan, or robbery. The equal cut allows one to transfer one situation to the other; oaths about testimony may be formulated by the potential witness himself; oaths of a person accused of larceny may be formulated by the aggrieved party.. Rebbi Meїr explains the equal cut which was said here: Since there it is said about his own words, so also here about his own words. Also the rabbis explain the equal cut which was said here. Since others’ words said there are in court, also others’ words said here are in court³³11:1 Notes 30,34 (Sanhedrin9:1); Chapter 5:2]. R. Meїr holds that the laws to be transferred are what can be read off the corresponding verses; the rabbis transfer laws only in the context of the verses on both sides. Verse 5:21 reads, to deny a deposit … and he swears to a lie; it is understood that this creates guilt whether or not it was before a court. But testimony is before a court; therefore v. 5:1 only speaks of guilt incurred in a court trial. R. Meїr holds that an oath formulated by another person following the situation of v. 1 transferred to v. 21 cannot create liability for a sacrifice outside of court, but an oath pronounced by himself (v. 21) always creates such a liability. The rabbis hold that while we accept that the equal cut shows that oaths formulated by himself are covered by v. 1, the context of that verse forces the conclusion that one refers to court proceedings only..

footnotes: ³¹ A comparison of Lev ³² In v. 5:1 the potential witness hears the sound of an imprecation ³³ This paragraph refers to the disagreement between R. Meїr and the rabbis in Mishnah 1.The formulation here presupposes that one knows what was explained elsewhere about interpretation of equal cuts [Yebamot

Rebbi Jeremiah asked: Is a relative liable for an oath about testimony formulated by himself? Can we hear it from the following: since they inferred formulation by himself for an oath about testimony only from oaths about deposits, and since there relatives are liable, so they also are here³⁴? Rebbi Yose said, can relatives here be inferred from relatives there³⁵?

footnotes: ³⁴ This question makes sense only according to R. Meїr who disregards context. Relatives are barred as witnesses and judges; they are not barred as claimants. If somebody embezzled the property of a relative, that relative can go to court. Therefore, oaths about deposits can be sworn to relatives. Would R. Meїr agree that oaths about testimony, even though they cannot be enforced in court, create liabilities for sacrifices? ³⁵ Even R. Meїr will agree that an equal cut allows one to transfer only rules that make sense in the new context. Since oaths about testimony are void among relatives, they may create liabilities for “vain” oaths but no liability for variable sacrifices.

Rebbi Yudan the Cappadocian asked: He made him swear five times by his own formulation before the court: would he not be liable for each instance separately? Rebbi Yose said, is this not the Mishnah: “Rebbi Simeon said, what is the reason? Because they cannot come back and admit³⁰?” But here, since they can come back and admit, they are liable for each single instance³⁶.

footnotes: ³⁰ Since the courts operate on the principle that a witness can testify only once, i. e., he cannot change his testimony, after a first refusal in court the witness would not be permitted to change his statement. The additional oaths put on the witnesses are pointless; the court should prohibit them. In the language of the Babli, כֵּיוָן שֶׁהִגִּיד אֵינוֹ חוֹזֵר וּמַגִּיד “after he told, he does not return to tell”. ³⁶ Since it is his own oath, it is not testimony and not under the rule that nobody can testify twice in the same case.

Rebbi Jeremiah asked: If he made him swear five times in his own words and let him swear five times by the mouth of others, what³⁷? Since Rebbi Meїr considered “in his own words” as if in court, would they determine the sacrifice on the first occasion, even without request? It should come like the following:³⁸ is formulated independently from the Babylonian Tosephta. “Why do you go after us? An oath that we do not know any testimony relevant for you. Should they be liable? The verse says, and he heard the voice of an imprecation³⁹. 5:1.. Only one who hears an imprecation⁴⁰. This excludes those who did not hear a voice.” Would he be liable from his own mouth for real estate⁴¹. 5:21–22 (a deposit, a loan, extortion and robbery, a find) refer to monetary claims about movables. Since there can be no sacrifice for an oath about deposits relating to real estate, one might argue that there can be no sacrifice for an oath about testimony involving real estate, asserted in Tosephta 4:1.? From his own mouth would he be liable for fines⁴²? From his own mouth would he be liable for a variable value sacrifice⁴³?

footnotes: ³⁷ Again this is a question following R. Meїr. It is clear that the demand that they answer to an oath formulated by the person who wants to force testimony must be made in court. Therefore, one has to assume that the first five oaths were made outside of court. Then they are not subject to the rule that there can be only one testimony. The next question is about the status of an oath of denial of knowledge before the other even had asked for their testimony. ³⁸ Cf. Tosephta 2:11 (Babli 31b). The baraita ³⁹ Lev ⁴⁰ The Tosephta states clearly, “they are not liable unless he requested [the testimony]”. ⁴¹ All examples in Lev ⁴² These fines are biblically imposed for misdeeds. Whether there can be an oath about these is in dispute between the majority and R. Simeon, Mishnah 5:6. ⁴³ From the equal cut (Note 32) we know that for a false oath regarding testimony formulated by the potential witness he is liable for a sacrifice. Is that the variable value sacrifice for a false oath regarding testimony or a fixed value sacrifice required for a false testimony about deposits?

Rebbi Abba, Rav Jehudah in the name of Rav: in error, a sacrifice; intentional, a sacrifice. But if he said, I was of the opinion that this oath does not exist, he is free⁴⁴. Ḥizqiah stated: At any place where the Torah mentions sin without attribute you include intentional equally with unintentional unless Scripture inform you that it is unintentional⁴⁵. 4 it is emphasized that these apply only to atone for חֵטְא בִשְׁגָגָה “sins in error.” In most cases of reparation sacrifices described in Chapter 5, there is no mention of error. It follows that the word חֵטְא alone covers both intentional and unintentional sins..

footnotes: ⁴⁴ This now refers to Mishnah 2. The only case in which one is not liable is if he was of the opinion that swearing to evade appearing as a witness was not forbidden. Then his action is without criminal intent. ⁴⁵ In all cases of purification sacrifices mentioned in Lev

MISHNAH: If both of them disavowed simultaneously, both of them are liable; one after the other, the first is liable but the second is not liable⁴⁶. If one reneged but one confessed, the one who disavowed is liable⁴⁷. If there were two groups of witnesses, if the first group disavowed and after this the second, both are liable since testimony could be upheld by either one of them⁴⁸.

footnotes: ⁴⁶ If there are only two witnesses and one refuses to testify even though he had assented to an oath that he would testify, the second witness becomes a single witness whose testimony cannot compel the defendant in a civil suit to pay money. All the testimony of a single witness in a civil suit can do is force the defendant to swear that he does not owe money. Since the refusal of the second witness to testify does not inflict a monetary loss on the claimant, he is not liable for a sacrifice unless he disavowed simultaneously with the first. ⁴⁷ The action of the first witness deprived the claimant also of the testimony of the second; this triggers liability. ⁴⁸ Only two witnesses are needed for conviction; the two groups of witnesses are independent of one another and the order of their appearance is irrelevant.

HALAKHAH: “If both of them disavowed simultaneously,” etc. If they dedicated a sacrifice and said, we are going to disavowe in court. This is what Rebbi Ḥiyya stated, his sacrifice for the Eternal for his vow of nazir; that his vow of nazir precede his sacrifice, not that his sacrifice precede his vow of nazir⁴⁹. 6:21. An obligatory sacrifice cannot be brought voluntarily. Therefore it cannot be dedicated before the obligation exists. The dedication cannot be undone (Lev. 27:9). Therefore, the original sacrifice has to be rededicated as voluntary offering and a new sacrifice be given as obligatory sacrifice. Nazir 2:9 (Note 118), 3:2 (Note 32), Tosephta Nazir 2:6, Num. rabba 10(42).. If they were sworn to out of court, dedicated a sacrifice and said, we are going to renege in court, how do you treat this? As if his sin did precede his sacrifice or since the are liable only in court as if their sacrifice did precede their sin⁵⁰ 10:11 Note 110.?

footnotes: ⁴⁹ Num ⁵⁰ The question is not answered. Possibly it is a sequel to R. Jeremiah’s questions in the preceding Halakhah; cf. Terumot

So is the Mishnah: “If one disavowed but one confessed, the one who disavowed is liable.⁵¹” Rebbi Yose said, our Mishnah if the second changed his opinion immediately after the speaking of the first. Because if the first changed his opinion, one would accept him; then the second would become the first⁵² 2:1 (Notes 50–52), Mo`ed qaṭan 3:7 (83c l. 37), Nazir 4:1 Note 12]. Anything said immediately following testimony is part of the testimony. The rule that a witness cannot change his testimony does not apply to corrections made immediately. Babli 32a..

footnotes: ⁵¹ The question is why does the Mishnah speak of “one” and not “first” or “second”? The sentence must refer to the first clause in the Mishnah, that both disavowed together but then one of them changed his mind. ⁵² “Immediately” is defined either as the time needed to say “peace upon you” or “peace upon you, my master” [Berakhot

If they were ten⁵³. There are Tannaïm who state, the first one is liable and all the rest are not liable. There are Tannaïm who state, the last one is not liable and all the rest are liable. The one who said, the first one is liable and all the rest are not liable, holds with him who said, the testimony can be verified by the remaining [witnesses]. The one who said, the last one is not liable and all the rest are liable, holds with him who said, testimony that was partially invalidated is totally invalidated⁵⁴ 1:12–13 (in most Mishnah editions, Mishnah 1:8). It is obvious that the attributions have to be switched. If in civil suits any testimony supported by 2 witnesses is acceptable then only the last, single, remaining witness is not liable (Note 46). But if the testimony of a group is only acceptable if all witnesses are qualified and testify in parallel then the first disqualification disqualifies the group and only the first witness is liable.. Rebbi Yose said, the Mishnah says so: “if there were two groups of witnesses.” He only said “two”. Therefore if there had been one⁵⁵, testimony that was partially invalidated it is totally invalidated.

footnotes: ⁵³ Ten witnesses asked as a group to testify. ⁵⁴ Both opinions are expressed in Mishnah Makkot ⁵⁵ The formulation of the Mishnah is “two groups of two witnesses” and not “four witnesses”.

MISHNAH: “I am putting an oath on you that you should come and testify for me that I have a claim against X for a deposit, and a loan, and robbery, and a lost object.” “An oath that we do not know testimony for you;” they are liable only once. “An oath that we do not know that you have a claim against X for a deposit, and a common venture, and robbery, and a lost object;” they are liable for each single one⁵⁶. 5:21–22.. “I am putting an oath on you that you should come and testify for me that I have a claim against X for a deposit of wheat, and barley, and spelt.” “An oath that we do not know testimony for you;” they are liable only once. “An oath that we do not know that you have a claim against X for a deposit of wheat, and barley, and spelt;” they are liable for each single one¹. 5:21–22.⁶⁵.

footnotes: ⁵⁶ Since each single item mentioned would need separate testimony, the detailed oath counts as a separate oath for each detail. The list is taken from Lev ¹ Since each single item mentioned would need separate testimony, the detailed oath counts as a separate oath for each detail. The list is taken from Lev ⁶⁵ Since a claim to money’s worth is equal to a claim to money.

HALAKHAH: “I am putting an oath on you that you should come and testify for me,” etc. ⁵⁷ Ḥova (Wayyiqra 2) Parashah 8(8–10). From where that this only refers to monetary claims? Rebbi Eliezer said, it uses here “or” and it uses “or” with a deposit⁵⁸. 5:1, “or” is used twice, in vv. 21–22 four times.. Since the “or” used with a deposit only refers to monetary claims, also the “or” used here only refers to monetary claims. The “or” of the homicide will disprove⁵⁹. 35:22–23, in the description of accidental homicide, “or” is used twice. since they do not refer to monetary claims. One argues about “or” accompanied by an oath from “or” accompanied by an oath; the “or” of the homicide cannot disprove since they are not accompanied by an oath. The “or” of the deviant woman will disprove⁶⁰. 5:14, the presumption of innocence of the deviant woman is introduced by “or”. The imprecation is not the woman’s but the Cohen’s, v. 19. since they are accompanied by an oath and do not refer to monetary claims. One argues about “or” accompanied by an oath not accompanied by a Cohen from similar “or”; the “or” of the deviant woman cannot disprove since they are accompanied by a Cohen. The “or” of blurting lips will disprove⁶¹. 5:4, “or” is used twice. since they do not refer to monetary claims. One argues about “or” where He made intent equal to error⁶² from similar “or”; the “or” of blurting lips cannot disprove since there He did not make intent equal to error. Rebbi Aqiba says, for some of these one is liable, for some one is not liable. For monetary claims one is liable; for non-monetary claims one is not liable⁶³. 5:5: It shall be if he causes damage by some of these; some will require a sacrifice but not others. The decision what to include is left to the religious authorities guided by the hermeneutical principle of “equal cut”. Babli 33b, Sifra Ḥova (Wayyiqra 2) Pereq 17(1).. Rebbi Simeon says, He made liable here and he made liable for a deposit. Since deposits only refer to monetary claims, so here also it only refers to monetary claims¹. 5:21–22 (a deposit, a loan, extortion and robbery, a find) refer to monetary claims about movables. Since there can be no sacrifice for an oath about deposits relating to real estate, one might argue that there can be no sacrifice for an oath about testimony involving real estate, asserted in Tosephta 4:1.⁶⁴ 17(2)..

footnotes: ⁵⁷ Babli 33b, Sifra ⁵⁸ In Lev ⁵⁹ Num ⁶⁰ Num ⁶¹ Lev ⁶² As explained in the preceding Chapters, blurted oaths create a liability for a sacrifice only if they were broken in a period of forgetting, i. e., unintention- ally. There is no mention of unintentional sin for liability in cases of oath about testimony or monetary damages. ⁶³ He refers to Lev ¹ All examples in Lev ⁶⁴ Babli 33b, Sifra Ḥova (Wayyiqra 2) Pereq

MISHNAH: “I am putting an oath on you that you should come and testify for me that X owes me full damages or half damages⁷⁵. 21:35–36., double restitution or quadruple and quintuple restitution⁷⁶. 22:3; 21:37., that X raped or seduced my daughter⁷⁰. 22:16) or raping her (Deut. 22:29)., or that my son hit me⁷⁷. 21:15)., or that my neighbor injured me⁷⁸. 21:18; Mishnah Bava qamma 8:1., or that he set fire to my grain stack on the Day of Atonement⁷⁹ 5:4 Notes 138–139.;” these are liable.

footnotes: ⁷⁵ For damage caused by another’s animals to the claimant’s animals, Ex ⁷⁶ The punishment of the thief, Ex ⁷⁰ The biblical fines for seducing a virgin (Ex ⁷⁷ If the son hit his parents without causing a wound, they can sue him for damages; it is a monetary claim. But if he injured them it is a capital crime (Ex ⁷⁸ He has to pay, Ex ⁷⁹ Even though it is a deadly sin punishable by extirpation, the desecration is not a case for the earthly court and has no influence on a possible damage suit. Cf. Giṭtin

HALAKHAH: “I am putting an oath on you,” etc. ⁶⁶ 17(1). It was stated: Rebbi Yose the Galilean says, why does the verse say, and he is a witness, or saw, or knew⁶⁷. 5:1., etc.? I said this only for testimony which may be accepted about knowing without seeing, or seeing without knowing. ⁶⁸ How is knowing without seeing in monetary claims? “Give me my 200 zuz which you are holding.” “I do not have anything of yours.” “But did you not confess before X and Y”? “They should testify and I shall pay.” This refers to knowing without seeing. They came and said, whether he confessed to him or whether he robbed him, we do not know. Whether he gave him a loan we do not know⁶⁹. How is seeing without knowing in monetary claims? “Give me my 200 zuz which you are holding.” “I do not have anything of yours.” “But did I not count them for you in a meeting with X and Y”? “They should testify and I shall pay.” This refers to seeing without knowing. They came and said, whether he counted for him or whether he robbed him, we do not know. Whether he took a loan from him, we do not know. “Give me the fine for my daughter which you owe me⁷⁰. 22:16) or raping her (Deut. 22:29)..” But he says, “I never in my life was found liable for a fine.” Witnesses testify that he was found liable for a fine⁷¹, but we do not know whether the fine was for his daughter or the fine for another woman. “You raped or you seduced my daughter.” But he says, “I never in my life did rape or seduce a woman.” Witnesses testify that he raped a woman⁷¹, but we do not know whether it was his daughter or another woman. “You killed my ox and cut down my orchard.” But he says, “I do not know.” He is liable⁷² 12b, בָּרִי וְשֶׁמָּא בָּרִי עָדיף “between certain and perhaps, certain is preferred.” If a claim is asserted as certain but the defense is that possibly it is false, there is no defense.. “You told me to kill and cut down,” one follows the majority of orchards. What means, one follows the majority of orchards? Rebbi Ḥaggai said, if his ox was goring, he would have told him; if the orchard was barren, he would have told him⁷³ 91b.. Rebbi Yudan said, in matters of monetary claims, since he may tell him, you told me to kill and cut down, even if he told him “I did not kill, I did not cut down,” he is not liable⁷⁴.

footnotes: ⁶⁶ Babli 33b, Sifra Ḥova (Wayyiqra 2) Pereq ⁶⁷ Lev ⁶⁸ Babli 33b, Tosephta 2:5. ⁶⁹ The witnesses came and testified that they saw a transaction but they have no knowledge about the kind of transaction it was. Had the debtor not said that he would pay if the witnesses came, that testimony would be worthless, but now he has to pay. The Babli assumes that the testimony is without a disclaimer. ⁷⁰ The biblical fines for seducing a virgin (Ex ⁷¹ Since he is found in court to be a liar he is barred from swearing to clear himself from the claim. Therefore even a weak testimony will buttress the claim against him. ⁷¹ Since he is found in court to be a liar he is barred from swearing to clear himself from the claim. Therefore even a weak testimony will buttress the claim against him. ⁷² In the Babli, e. g., Ketubot ⁷³ Babli Bava qamma ⁷⁴ Since the burden of proof is on the claimant.

MISHNAH: “I am putting an oath on you that you should come and testify for me that I am a Cohen⁸⁰, that I am a Levite⁸¹, that I am not the son of a divorcee, that I am not the son of a woman having received ḥalîṣah⁸², that X raped or seduced his daughter⁸³ 7:1, Notes 19–70)., or that my son injured me⁷⁷. 21:15)., or that my neighbor injured me or set fire to my grain stack on the Sabbath⁸⁴:” these are not liable⁸⁵.

footnotes: ⁸⁰ Even though the claimant may bring the suit in order to be recognized as a Cohen because he wants to receive a priest’s prebends, the suit is classified as one for status, not for money. ⁸¹ The same holds for a Levite who may receive tithe. ⁸² The last two cases are suits to be declared a qualified priest, not directly for monetary claims. ⁸³ Capital crimes; the deflowered daughter cannot sue for damages since a possible death sentence precludes damage suits (Terumot ⁷⁷ If the son hit his parents without causing a wound, they can sue him for damages; it is a monetary claim. But if he injured them it is a capital crime (Ex ⁸⁴ A capital crime. ⁸⁵ All these suits are not for monetary claims; even though there may be a duty for witnesses to testify, no sacrifice is due for a refusal to obey a summons under oath in a case which never can result in monetary claims.

HALAKHAH: “I am putting an oath on you,” etc. Halakhah 8: “I am putting an oath on you,” etc. ⁸⁶ 11(4).A person who would sin, a person who would sin as an equal cut³¹. 5:1 about oaths concerning testimony and 5:21 about the person accused of larceny who swears falsely in purgation by oath; cf. Chapter 3:12, Note 165. The parallel use of identical terms is an equal cut which allows transfer of rules from one occurrence to the other.. Since a person who would sin which was said further on refers to an active monetary claim⁸⁷, also a person who would sin must refer to an active monetary claim.

footnotes: ⁸⁶ Babli 35a, Sifra Ḥova (Wayyiqra 2) Pereq ³¹ A comparison of Lev ⁸⁷ There is liability for a sacrifice only if the requested testimony was for the claimant in a suit under the law of obligations. This excludes testimony for the defendant or for the claimant in a suit for breach of promise.

“I am putting an oath on you,” etc. Does this not disagree with Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish who said, there is no money when there is flogging⁹⁰ 7:1 Note 51 is true only for R. Joḥanan but not for R. Simeon ben Laqish. The latter holds that since a violation of the Day of Atonement in front of witnesses after due warning will expose the perpetrator to flogging, there can be no monetary claim even if there are no witnesses and the case of desecration is not one for the courts.. He explains it following Rebbi Meїr who said, he is flogged and he pays⁹¹ 7:1 Note 7. Cf. Babli Ketubot 33b.. In any case he did not make him lose money. Is it not that since he wanted to give him but did not give to him; it is as if he made him lose money⁹².

footnotes: ⁹⁰ It seems that this paragraph refers to Mishnah 7 (and in the Leiden ms. Halakhah 9 precedes Halakhot 7 and 8) declaring that a claim about damage on the Day of Atonement is a monetary claim which according to Terumot ⁹¹ The same explanation is given in Terumot ⁹² This now refers to Mishnah 9. The formulation of the Mishnah is necessary since a breach of promise could be considered inflicting monetary loss. It is necessary to state that this loss does not qualify under the rules of equal cut.

MISHNAH: “I am putting an oath on you that you should come and testify for me that Mr. X promised to give me 200 zuz⁸⁸ but did not give them to me.” These are not liable⁸⁷ since one is liable only for an (oath about)⁸⁹ money similar to a deposit. “I am putting an oath on you, that you shall come and testify for me when you know testimony for me.” These are not liable⁹³. 5:1 is quite explicit that it applies only to persons who already know the testimony. since the oath preceded the testimony⁹⁴. If he stood in the synagogue and said, “I am putting an oath on you, that you shall come and testify for me if you know testimony for me.” These are not liable⁹⁵.

footnotes: ⁸⁸ The Babylonian half-sheqel, identified with the Roman denar. ⁸⁷ There is liability for a sacrifice only if the requested testimony was for the claimant in a suit under the law of obligations. This excludes testimony for the defendant or for the claimant in a suit for breach of promise. ⁸⁹ This is a scribal error. With all other Mishnah sources on has to read תְּבִיעַת “claim of.” ⁹³ If they disobey the imprecation. Lev ⁹⁴ This sentence is elliptic. The oath preceded the possibility of testimony. ⁹⁵ Since the imprecation is not directed at any specific persons.

HALAKHAH: “I am putting an oath on you,” etc. ⁹⁶ 10:9 Notes 133–134; Giṭtin 6:1 Note 39, Bava meṣia* 4:2 Note 49; Babli *Bava meṣia49a, Bekhorot 13b; Sifra Qedošim Pereq 8(7). Rebbi Yose, Rebbi Jacob bar Zavdi, Rebbi Abbahu in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan: If somebody wanted to change his mind after he had promised a gift to another person, he may change his mind. Rebbi Jacob bar Zavdi asked before Rebbi Abbahu: Did He not say “a true yes”⁹⁷. 19:36. The pun identifies the measure הִין with the Aramaic equivalent הֵן of the Hebrew כֵּן “yes”. It shows that -ֵ was pronounced like -ִי (Itacistic η = ῖ). The verse is read as exhortation to be honest in business dealings.? At the moment when he said it, it was a true yes.

footnotes: ⁹⁶ Ševi`it ⁹⁷ Lev

Why⁹⁸? Because he does not know them, or because he does not intend to ask them⁹⁹? What is the difference between them? If he obligated them in pairs of two. If you would say because he does not know them, he knows them. Therefore the reason only can be that he does not intend to ask them¹⁰⁰ 8(6) the language is that of the Sephardic Mishnah, based on the expression and he is a witness of Lev. 5:1. The Babli (35a) infers from this verse that the demand for testimony must be personal; it is not enough that the claimant know the identity of the witness, the request must be delivered individually. If the claimant sees a group of people which includes the two whom he wants as his witnesses, he may not address the group collectively; he must summon them personally..

footnotes: ⁹⁸ This refers to Mishnah 11, that a wholesale imprecation is invalid. ⁹⁹ Is it because the person demanding testimony does not know the identity of the person whom he is asking to testify or does he not know whom to ask to testify because he does not know who would be able to testify. ¹⁰⁰ In the Sephardic tradition of the Mishnah, independent and in the Babli, including Maimonides’s autograph, this statement is part of the Mishnah. In the Ashkenazic tradition of the Babli, as exemplified by the Munich ms., the Mishnah is identical with the version given in the Yerushalmi. In Sifra Ḥova (Wayyiqra 2) Parashah

MISHNAH: If he said to two persons, I am putting an oath on you, X and Y, that you shall come and testify for me if you know testimony for me, but they knew from another witness¹⁰¹, or one of them was a relative or disqualified. These are not liable.

footnotes: ¹⁰¹ This is hearsay evidence inadmissible in court. If one of a group of witnesses is disqualified, the other one at most could force the defendant to swear; he never could force him to pay money. Therefore the oath is invalid also for the party which would be qualified.

HALAKHAH: “If he said to two persons, I am putting an oath on you,” etc. Rebbi Mana understood it from the following, “or one of them was a relative or disqualified.” Therefore, unless one of them was a relative or disqualified, they are liable. And he knows who they are. Therefore the reason can only be that he does not intend them. Rebbi Yose understood it from the preceding, “since the oath preceded the testimony.” Therefore, if the oath did not precede the testimony, they are liable. And he knows who they are. Therefore the reason can only be that he does not intend them¹⁰².

footnotes: ¹⁰² This again refers to Mishnah 11, it is a continuation of the preceding Halakhah. All the Mishnaiot quoted presuppose that the claimant knows exactly whom he wants as witness; nevertheless his imprecation is ineffective. Therefore it may be assumed that also in the case of Mishnah 11 it would be ineffective even if he knew exactly whom he intended.

MISHNAH: If he sent through his slave¹⁰³ in law. or the defendant said to them, “I am putting an oath on you that you shall come and testify for him,” they are not liable unless they hear from the mouth of the claimant¹⁰⁴ 8(4)..

footnotes: ¹⁰³ To ask the witnesses to testify. Even though the slave is his personal property and acts as his messenger he is disqualified since he is not the claimant and has no persona ¹⁰⁴ To create liability, the oath must be delivered directly by the claimant asking for the testimony. Cf. Note 87. Sifra Ḥova (Wayyiqra 2) Parashah

HALAKHAH: “If he sent through his slave,” etc. Rebbi Eleazar said, why does the verse say, if he does not tell, he has to carry his iniquity? Not¹⁰⁵. 5:8*1 writes the negation as לוֹא which is read both as לוֹ and as לֹא. In the first version, אִם לוֹ יַגִּיד, the liability may only be triggered if he told him, if the claimant personally challenged the witness and if the witness personally accepted the challenge (Babli 35a). In the second version, אִם לֹא יַגִּיד, the liability is triggered if he does not testify., from the mouth of the claimant. Our Mishnah needs what Rebbi Eleazar said, and what Rebbi Eleazar said needs our Mishnah. If we had stated but Rebbi Eleazar had not stated, we would have said that they are liable if they had heard from the claimant but had sworn to the defendant. Therefore what Rebbi Eleazar said is necessary. If Rebbi Eleazar had stated but we had not stated, we would have instructed that they are liable if they heard it from the defendant but had sworn to the claimant. Therefore one needs our Mishnah and needs what Rebbi Eleazar said, only if they heard from the claimant and swore to the claimant.

footnotes: ¹⁰⁵ This is a misquote which makes the text unintelligible. The masoretic text of Lev

MISHNAH: “I put an oath upon you, I command you, I bind you,” these are liable¹⁰⁶. “By Heaven and Earth,” they are not liable¹⁰⁷. “By א-ד, by י-ה, by the Almighty, by Sabaoth, by the Gracious and Merciful, by the Forbearing and Most Benevolent,” and all substitute names¹⁰⁸, they are liable. One who curses by any of these is liable, the words of Rebbi Meїr; but the Sages declare him not liable¹⁰⁹. 24:15) refers only to blaspheming the Name (Sanhedrin 7:14).. One who curses his father or mother by any of these is liable, the words of Rebbi Meїr; but the Sages declare him not liable¹¹⁰. 21:17).. One who curses himself or another person by any of these violates a prohibition¹¹¹. 19:14; Sifra Qedošim Parashah 2(13).. “May God punish you, so may God punish you,” this is the imprecation mentioned in the Torah. “May He not punish you, may He bless you, may He do well with you,” Rebbi Meїr declares liable¹¹² but Rebbi Jehudah declares not liable¹¹³.

footnotes: ¹⁰⁶ These are valid versions of a summons to testify. ¹⁰⁷ “Heaven” is not a sobriquet of God’s Name. ¹⁰⁸ א-ד stands for Adonay, י-ה for YHWH. A substitute name is any translation of any Name of Attribute of God in any vernacular. ¹⁰⁹ The crime of blasphemy (Lev ¹¹⁰ The same holds for cursing father and mother (Ex ¹¹¹ Lev ¹¹² If the claimant says “may He not punish you if you come to testify”, or “may He bless you if you come to testify”, for R. Meїr this implies the opposite, i. e., “may he punish you if you do not come to testify” etc. ¹¹³ For R. Jehudah, what has been said explicitly is the only thing that counts.The Mishnah versions in the Babli and in the independent Mishnah mss. all read “but the Sages declare not liable.” It is clear from the Halakhah that this also was the reading in the Yerushalmi underlying the Halakhah since it was necessary to state that the Mishnah represents R. Jehudah’s opinion.

HALAKHAH: “I put an oath upon you,” etc. to the end. “I put an oath upon you” without addition¹¹⁴, they are liable. “I am binding you, I am roping you in,” they are liable.

footnotes: ¹¹⁴ Obviously he has to add what he actually demands from them but he does not have to invoke the Name, neither does he have to state that this is an oath; the verb alone is sufficient.

Rebbi Joḥanan in the name of Rebbi Yannai, as our Mishnah¹¹⁵. But some say, Rebbi Abbahu in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan, so is our Mishnah: “Rebbi Meïr declares liable but Rebbi Jehudah declares not liable.¹¹³” Rebbi Meїr follows his own opinion and Rebbi Jehudah follows his own opinion, as we have stated: “If he cursed them by a substitute name, Rebbi Meїr declares him guilty but the Sages free him from prosecution.¹¹⁶ 7:14. Only here is opinion of the Sages attributed to R. Jehudah; in the Babli (Sanhedrin 66a) it is attributed to R. Menaḥem ben R. Yose.”

footnotes: ¹¹⁵ This seems to be a scribal error; one should read as in the next sentence כֵּינִי מַתְנִיתִין “so is our Mishnah.” ¹¹³ For R. Jehudah, what has been said explicitly is the only thing that counts.The Mishnah versions in the Babli and in the independent Mishnah mss. all read “but the Sages declare not liable.” It is clear from the Halakhah that this also was the reading in the Yerushalmi underlying the Halakhah since it was necessary to state that the Mishnah represents R. Jehudah’s opinion. ¹¹⁶ Mishnah Sanhedrin

“One who curses himself or another person by any of these violates a prohibition.” What about flogging? The colleagues say, he cannot be flogged. Rebbi Yose said to them, why? Because it is a prohibition not involving an action. But is not one who substitutes and one who swears falsely also a prohibition which involves no action¹¹⁷?

footnotes: ¹¹⁷ Cf. Chapter 3:11, Notes 166–168, and the parallels indicated there. It seems that R. Yose considers any speech as an action, against the consensus that speech can be considered action only if recognized as such by a verse.

Rebbi Yasa in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan: Rebbi Meïr is the one who says that out of a negative one understands a positive¹¹⁸ 3:4 Note 136, Nedarim1:4 Note 158. (The explanation given there that the statement of R. Yasa in the name of R. Joḥanan is a rhetorical question is incorrect; the statement is a straightforward declarative sentence.) The Babli (36a, Nedarim 11a,13b, Soṭah 17a) is totally opposed; it proposes to switch the attributions in the Mishnah between R. Meїr and the Sages.. “May He not punish you if you come and testify for me.” Therefore, if you do not come and testify for me He shall punish you. There is not only an imprecation accompanied by an oath. From where one not accompanied by an oath be like one which is accompanied by an oath? The verse says, and heard an imprecation, and heard a voice¹¹⁹. 5:1., to make one without imprecation like one with an imprecation. Therefore not an imprecation without an oath. Rebbi Yasa in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan: There is no difference; an imprecation without oath is the same as an oath without an imprecation¹²⁰ 8(2)..

footnotes: ¹¹⁸ This is the position of the Yerushalmi here and in 7:1 (Note 11), Eruvin 3 (21b l. 24), Qiddušin ¹¹⁹ Lev ¹²⁰ Babli 36a, Sifra Ḥova (Wayyiqra 2) Parashah