MISHNAH: In which way¹ “the wife of his brother who did not live in his world”? There were two brothers, one of them died, then a brother was born to them², and after that the second brother took his brother’s wife in levirate³, and died. The first woman⁴ leaves as widow of his brother who did not live in his world and the second one⁵ because she is her co-wife. If he had “bespoken” her⁶ 25:5). Since it was felt that having sex without prior ceremony was unbecoming, there is a requirement (rabbinic for the Babli, possibly biblical for the Yerushalmi) to go through the formalities of qiddushin; cf. Chapter 1, Note 63. Qiddushin make a free woman a wife for the purposes of criminal law. But for the sister-in-law, the act is invalid by biblical standards (cf. Chapter 1, Note 94); the wife of the second brother does not become co-wife of the sister-in-law through the latter’s qiddushin by the standards of criminal law. Therefore, the act is not called qiddushin but מאמר “bespeaking”: she is reserved for the brother claiming her; all other brothers are excluded from levirate with her. “Bespeaking” is not preliminary marriage since it is voided not by a bill of divorce but by ḥalîṣah(but it needs a rabbinic bill of divorce). The other woman is not freed as co-wife but, rabbinically, one does not admit levirate since she is almost a co-wife., the second performs ḥalîṣah but not levirate.

footnotes: ¹ In which way does the wife of his brother who did not live in his world free her co-wife?, cf. Mishnah 1:1. ² To whom the widow now is forbidden. She remains forbidden. ³ Having already another wife. He then died childless. ⁴ The widow taken in levirate. ⁵ The original wife of the second brother. ⁶ In biblical law, only cohabitation makes the sister-in-law the wife of the levir (Deut.

HALAKHAH: Why “the wife of his brother who did not live in his world”⁷? “Together”, this excludes the wife of his brother who did not live in his world⁸. Because if it were not so, what would we say? If he died childless, his widow would be forbidden to remarry, for maybe his father would have another son and his widow would then be a candidate⁹ is always called זקוּקה, the fact of obligation זיקה. It does not seem reasonable to connect this meaning to biblical זקק “to refine, purify”; maybe the root is related to Arabic زقّ، زقق “to feed (a bird his young)”, that she is fodder for the levirate, or even Akkadic zāqiqum“ghost; necromancer”. {Jewish Berber tribes held that a brother who rejects levirate will be punished by the ghost of his dead brother.} for the levirate! Even if [the deceased’s] mother had died, his widow would be forbidden to remarry, [because] maybe the father would go and marry a new wife who could have a son and the widow would then be a candidate for the levirate! Then the verse would have to read¹⁰: “He has neither father nor son”! One would compare this to the case that he left his widow pregnant; does she not have to wait to know whether the child is viable or not¹¹? Here also, should she not have to wait to know whether the child is viable or not? Therefore it was necessary to say “together”; this excludes the wife of his brother who did not live in his world.

footnotes: ⁷ Mentioned in Mishnah 1:1. In contrast to all other cases enumerated there, this is not based on a direct incest prohibition. ⁸ Cf. Chapter 1, Note 39. ⁹ The one under obligation of levirate or ḥalîṣah ¹⁰ To free her for remarriage. ¹¹ A posthumous child who does not survive for 30 days does not free its mother from levirate or ḥalîṣah.

“Her levir shall come upon her¹² 25:5.”, that is cohabitation. “And take her as wife for himself”, that is “bespeaking”¹³. I might think that just as cohabitation is final so “bespeaking” is final¹⁴ if the levir changes his mind, in contrast to qiddushin which can be undone only by a bill of divorce. Tosephta 3:1: “Qiddushin are final, ‘bespeaking’ is not final”. The Babli, 54a, formulates: “Cohabitation is final, money or a document are not final.” Cohabitation is final even if in error or unintentional (Mishnah 6:1); money or a document are not final even if given as qiddushin and not as “bespeaking”.; the verse says “and act as levir towards her.” This directs the entire paragraph towards levirate. Cohabitation is final, “bespeaking” is not final. Then what is “bespeaking” good for? To forbid her to the brothers¹⁵.

footnotes: ¹² Deut. ¹³ A better translation, if one identifies biblical and rabbinic Hebrew, would be: “Acquires her as a wife for himself”, by giving her some valuables as for legally valid qiddushin. ¹⁴ Cohabitation makes the widow his wife; her marriage to him can be terminated only by death or by a bill of divorce. “Bespeaking” does not remove the obligation of ḥalîṣah ¹⁵ After “bespeaking”, she remains forbidden to the other brothers even if the “bespeaker” changes his mind.

Rebbi Simeon says, “bespeaking” either acquires¹⁶ or does not acquire¹⁷. What is the argument of Rebbi Simeon? “Her levir shall come upon her”, that is cohabitation. “And take her as wife for himself”, that is “bespeaking”. Just as cohabitation is final so “bespeaking” is final. Or “her levir shall come upon her”, then she has been acquired by him and “bespeaking” was of no use to her¹⁸.

footnotes: ¹⁶ As a biblically required act. This is the opinion of the House of Shammai, cf. Halakhah 3:5, Babli 18a. ¹⁷ As a rabbinic institution. In the Babli, 18b–19b, the question whether R. Simeon’s problem is rabbinic or biblical is only marginally hinted at. ¹⁸ Since in the interpretation given above, “bespeaking” is mentioned in the verse after intercourse. This is incomprehensible since everybody agrees that cohabitation makes the widow the full wife of the levir without any “bespeaking”. If “bespeaking” is not needed, it cannot be a biblical requirement and “take her as wife for himself” does not refer to “bespeaking” but that “she is his wife in every respect” (Mishnah 4:4).

Rebbi Eleazar ben Arakh says, “bespeaking” acquires a sister-in-law completely. What is the argument of Rebbi Eleazar ben Arakh? “And take her as wife for himself”, the same expression is used as for qiddushin of a woman¹⁹22:13, “If a man takes a wife”.. Just as qiddushin acquire completely, so “bespeaking” acquires a sister-in-law completely. What is the formula for “bespeaking” a sister-in-law? “You are betrothed to me by money or money’s worth.²⁰; Babli 52a, Tosephta 1:1 (the latter also has the formula for “bespeaking” by document).”

footnotes: ¹⁹ Deut. ²⁰ The same formula as for qiddushin

Both the rabbis and Rebbi Simeon agree to the following²¹. According to the rabbis, the aspect which “bespeaking” acquires is forbidden in the co-wife, the aspect which “bespeaking” does not acquire is permitted in the co-wife; therefore, the latter has to have ḥalîṣah but not levirate²² since she was not a full co-wife of the forbidden woman.. According to Rebbi Simeon, if “bespeaking” acquires, both are permitted²³. If “bespeaking” does not acquire, the first one is forbidden but the second one permitted. Out of doubt, she has to have ḥalîṣah but not levirate. What is the difference between them²⁴? If he slept with the second one²⁵, this is to some degree incestuous intercourse, he cannot acquire her in levirate, and a child from this union is a bastard.. In the opinion of the rabbis, an incestuous intercourse because he²⁶ had “bespoken”. Therefore, if he had not “bespoken” she may have levirate and there is no candidacy at all²⁷ does not establish a relationship with any one of the brothers. In the Babli, 17b, this is the minority opinion ascribed to Rav Huna in the name of Rav.. Rebbi Ḥaggai said, I explained that following what Rebbi Jacob bar Aḥa said in the name of Rebbi Eleazar: If a woman waiting for her levir died, her mother is permitted to him²⁸ 4:8, 4:16; Soṭah 2:5), rejected in the Babli, 17b. The position of R. Simeon is not explained but is clear: The relationship is possibly incestuous, the child is only possibly a bastard and cannot be forbidden by the court to marry inside the congregation.. He had in her an interest of candidacy. When she died, the candidacy was eliminated. And here, when he died, the candidacy was eliminated²⁹.

footnotes: ²¹ Two different reasonings lead to the same practical result. ²² Since “bespeaking” is neither final nor useless, the wife of the brother becomes possibly a co-wife of his sister-in-law; if he dies she is excluded from levirate since that is possible only for a woman certainly permitted to the (newly born) levir. She cannot leave the family without ḥalîṣah ²³ If “bespeaking” preceded the birth of the next brother, the widow of the first brother already was the wife of the second and after his death will be permitted to the third. If the birth of the next brother preceded bespeaking, both are forbidden: the first as widow of a brother who did not live in his world, the second as her co-widow. Whether one wants to emend the text here, from “permitted” to “forbidden”, depends on which case one chooses. ²⁴ Is there any case where there is a practical difference between the rabbis and Rebbi Simeon? ²⁵ If the third brother sleeps with the woman to whom he should give ḥalîṣah ²⁶ The second brother. ²⁷ The simple fact that the widow may not marry outside the family without ḥalîṣah ²⁸ Quoted many times affirmatively in the Yerushalmi (Yebamot ²⁹ Rejected in the Babli, 18a: “Candidacy cannot disappear without action.”

MISHNAH: There were two brothers, one of them died and the second³⁰ took his brother’s widow in levirate; afterwards a brother was born to them, and he died. The first woman³¹ leaves as wife of his brother who did not live in his world and the second one as her co-wife. If [the second brother] had bespoken [the widow of the first] when he died, the second performs ḥalîṣah but cannot have levirate³². Rebbi Simeon says, he may take in levirate any one he wants or performs ḥalîṣah with any one he wants³³.

footnotes: ³⁰ Who already has a wife. If he has no wife, the rules for the widow of the first brother do not change. ³¹ The widow. The author of this Mishnah holds that the widow does not lose her status as widow of the first by her marriage to the second brother. She leaves the family of her dead husbands and is free to marry any outsider without further ceremony. ³² As explained in the preceding paragraph. ³³ As shown in the next paragraph, this must refer to the first case and R. Simeon must hold that the marriage to the second brother erases her status as widow of the first.

HALAKHAH: “If there were two brothers, one of them died”, etc. Rebbi Simeon says, “bespeaking” either acquires or does not acquire, and you say so³⁴? May one permit levirate with the “bespoken” woman? One should suspect that “bespeaking” does not acquire; then he³⁵ would be guilty because of “wife of his brother who did not live in his world.” Can the “bespoken” one perform ḥalîṣah? Should one not suspect that “bespeaking” does acquire; then the second {widow] is a candidate for [the third brother]³⁶. It must be that Rebbi Simeon refers to the first case.

footnotes: ³⁴ Could R. Simeon refer to the woman “bespoken” when the second brother died? ³⁵ The youngest brother born after the death of the first. ³⁶ According to R. Simeon, see Note 33. Another argument with the same result is in the Babli, 18b.

Rebbi Joḥanan said, Rebbi Simeon agrees in the first case³⁷. It was found stated, that also is in disagreement. What is the difference between the first and second cases? In the first case he came and found her forbidden³⁸, in the second he came and found her permitted³⁹. Rebbi Joḥanan asked, if he found his father’s wife⁴⁰ 18:8)? married to an outsider, what does Rebbi Simeon say about her? Because he came and found her permitted, is she permitted? Rebbi Simeon said that only relative to paternal brothers⁴¹ 25:5 cancels the prohibition of Lev. 18:16 but no other prohibition from Lev. 18; the same conclusion in Babli, 20a. In the Babli, 20a, the impossible question is about a maternal halfsister married to a paternal halfbrother when the new baby was born.. Rebbi Jacob bar Aḥa said, Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish asked: His maternal halfbrother’s wife which he found married to an outsider, what does Rebbi Simeon say about her? Because he came and found her permitted, is she permitted? Rebbi Simeon said that only relative to paternal brothers. Rebbi Yudan asked, a co-wife of his maternal aunt which he found married to an outsider? Because he came and found her permitted, is she permitted? Rebbi Abin asked, if a divorcee became a widow⁴² 21:7). If a Cohen was born when a certain woman who had been divorced had remarried and now was a widow, is she a widow or a divorcee for him? No answer is given since she is both a divorcee and a widow.? You have to say that Rebbi Simeon referred to the first case.

footnotes: ³⁷ The case of Mishnah 1, when the third brother was born after the death of the first and before the second brother married the widow in levirate. ³⁸ “He” is the newly born brother, “she” is the widow of the first brother. The argument shows that R. Simeon could not possibly disagree with Mishnah 1. ³⁹ As wife of a living brother. The text is from Tosephta 3:1; the same argument is found in Babli, 19b. ⁴⁰ A man with two wives dies, leaving one of them pregnant while the other is already married to an outsider when the pregnant widow gives birth to a boy. Is the remarried one still “his father’s wife” (Lev. ⁴¹ The answer is readily understood but not the question. Deut. ⁴² This is a different case altogether. A Cohen is forbidden to marry a divorcee (Lev.

What does Rebbi Simeon say about the “bespoken” woman⁴³? Let us hear from the following: “Rebbi Simeon says, the cohabitation or the ḥalîṣah of one of them⁴⁴ frees her co-wife but if he performed ḥalîṣah with the “bespoken” woman, her colleague also needs ḥalîṣah⁴⁵ means anything.. You say, the cohabitation or the ḥalîṣah of one of them frees her co-wife. However one argues, if “bespeaking” acquires, both are his wives and any one of them becomes free by her colleague’s ḥalîṣah. If “bespeaking” does not acquire, the first one does not need ḥalîṣah, but if he performed ḥalîṣah with the “bespoken” one, the second one also needs ḥalîṣah. Maybe “bespeaking” does not acquire, then ḥalîṣah or levirate do not apply to her. Maybe “bespeaking” does acquire; then she is freed by her colleague’s ḥalîṣah. What is the difference between them⁴⁶? If he performed ḥalîṣah with the first and cohabited with the second⁴⁷. In the opinion of the rabbis it was an incestuous cohabitation⁴⁸ with the first” means “even if” since for the rabbis ḥalîṣah of the first is legally impossible and therefore irrelevant. The relation with the second was certainly partially incestuous.. In the opinion of Rebbi Simeon it was not an incestuous cohabitation⁴⁹. If he cohabited both with the first and the second widow, in the opinion of the rabbis with the first it was incest⁴⁴ and the second needs a bill of divorce and ḥalîṣah⁵⁰ 25:5.. In the opinion of Rebbi Simeon, both need a bill of divorce. The first one needs a bill of divorce; perhaps the “bespeaking” did acquire. The second one needs a bill of divorce; perhaps levirate did acquire; if “bespeaking” did acquire, she was freed by her colleague’s ḥalîṣah⁵¹ for that aspect which was not acquired. In no case can she be permitted to stay with the third brother..

footnotes: ⁴³ The second case in the Mishnah, when the additional brother was born after the second brother bespoke his brother’s widow and before his death. ⁴⁴ A slightly confusing wording. “One of them” means “a certain one of them”, viz., the brother’s original wife. ⁴⁵ Since it is doubtful whether the “bespoken” one was his wife it is doubtful whether her ḥalîṣah ⁴⁶ Are there additional practical differences between the theories of the rabbis as given in the Mishnah and R. Simeon? ⁴⁷ Again, “the first” is the widow of the first brother, “the second” the wife of the second brother. “He” is the third brother born after the death of the first. ⁴⁸ “If he performed ḥalîṣah ⁴⁹ Since the second one is permitted, Note 44. ⁴⁴ A slightly confusing wording. “One of them” means “a certain one of them”, viz., the brother’s original wife. ⁵⁰ With the sister-in-law in a case not covered by Deut. ⁵¹ Since for the rabbis “bespeaking” is partial acquisition of the widow as a wife, the second, the original wife of the second brother, was partially co-wife of the widow of the first brother. That aspect of her which was not that of co-wife is acquired by the third brother in levirate and needs a divorce; then she also needs ḥalîṣah

Rebbi Ze‘ira in the name of Rav Sheshet: There⁵³, one stated: The words of Rebbi Simeon are that both are forbidden. This is difficult. If “bespeaking” acquires, are not both permitted? This is a question of acquiring not by “bespeaking” but by candidacy. This is difficult. If candidacy acquires, both are permitted. If candidacy does not acquire, the first one is forbidden but the second permitted. Maybe candidacy for Rebbi Simeon is like “bespeaking” for the rabbis. Just as the rabbis say, “bespeaking” acquires but leaves a remainder, so Rebbi Simeon says, candidacy acquires but leaves a remainder. This is difficult. That aspect which is acquired by candidacy implies a prohibition of an equal part of the co-wife, that part which is not acquired by candidacy implies permission of an equal aspect of the co-wife! Shammai⁵⁴ said, is this kind of argument applicable to incest prohibitions? What does he mean? As Rebbi Aḥa said in the name of Rebbi Abun bar Ḥiyya, the aspect acquired in any sister-in-law which is not totally inside [the family] is considered to be under the incest prohibition and an incest prohibition frees her co-wife⁵⁵ 18:16 applies only to a brother who can marry the widow without doubt. If any condition of the levirate is not fully met, there can be no levirate and the co-wife is freed without ḥalîṣah..

footnotes: ⁵³ In Babylonia. No similar statement is found in the Babli. In the discussion there, whether candidacy has any legal consequences other than preventing the widow to marry outside the clan, the name of R. Simeon is not mentioned. ⁵⁴ Rebbi Shammai, the late Amora. ⁵⁵ This statement is stronger than that ascribed to the Sages about “bespeaking”. The lifting of the incest prohibition of Lev.

MISHNAH: They formulated a principle about a sister-in-law: Any woman forbidden by an incest prohibition has neither ḥalîṣah nor levirate⁵⁶ 25:5 do not apply to her.. If she is forbidden by a commandment prohibition⁵⁷ or one of sanctity⁵⁸ 21:1–14. In these two cases, while marriage is sinful, the act of marriage is not void., she has ḥalîṣah but not levirate. Her sister who is also her sister-in-law has either ḥalîṣah or levirate⁵⁹ 25:5 do not apply to the forbidden one; an example is given in the Halakhah..

footnotes: ⁵⁶ Since the rules of Deut. ⁵⁷ Simple biblical prohibition as well as rabbinic prohibitions, explained in the next Mishnah. ⁵⁸ A woman prohibited to a Cohen by the laws of Lev. ⁵⁹ If two sisters married to two brothers become widows and there is a third brother to whom one of the sisters is forbidden by one of the incest prohibitions, her sister may be married in levirate since the rules of Deut.

HALAKHAH: “They formulated a principle about a sister-in-law: Any woman forbidden,” etc. Rebbi Ze‘ira said: When I was still there⁶⁰, we extracted fourteen cases from “her sister which is also her sister-in-law has levirate”, except his daughter⁶¹. When we came up here, we heard what Rebbi Ḥiyya stated, since Rebbi Ḥiyya stated: His daughter from a woman he raped was married to a paternal halfbrother; she⁶² a scribal error. also has a maternal sister from a different father married to a second brother who died childless. His daughter is forbidden to him but her sister, who is her sister-in-law, is permitted to him⁶³ or is taken in levirate”.. That is, “her sister which is also her sister-in-law has levirate”.

footnotes: ⁶⁰ In Babylonia. ⁶¹ From the 15 cases of Mishnah 1:1, excluded from the laws of levirate. ⁶² לו read as לה, as in Tosephta, Chap. 2. The use of the masculine for the feminine is not uncommen in the Yerushalmi; the substitution is most likely not ⁶³ Since he never was married to her mother and the prohibition of a woman and her daughter is formulated in terms of “taking”, i. e., marriage. In the Tosephta, Chapter 2, “she either has ḥalîṣah

It is obvious that if somebody had ḥalîṣah with a woman forbidden by a commandment or because of sanctity, the co-widow was freed⁶⁴ must be valid.. When he had intercourse with her? Rebbi Yose said, Rebbi Eleazar and Rebbi Joḥanan disagree; they say the co-widow was not freed⁶⁵ the co-widow was not freed” (קרבן העדה). The Babli is no help; the Venice text (20b) asserts that R. Joḥanan and R. Eleazar disagree in the matter but it is unsure who said what (parallel the Yerushalmi, supporting קרבן העדה), but Tosaphot (fol. 5a, s. v. ואכתי) reads “Rebbi Aḥa and Rebbi Eleazar”, supporting פני משה. The people denying that the co-widow was freed must hold that this is a rabbinic ordinance since “commandments” and “sanctity” are treated together. The Babli, 20b/21a, treats only the prohibition of a widow to the High Priest which is simultaneously a prohibition and the transgression of a positive commandment (to marry a virgin) and therefore in a different category.. Rebbi Shammai switches the [names] of this tradition. The position of Rebbi Shammai is reasonable since everywhere Rebbi Eleazar seeks support from the great Rebbi Ḥiyya and Rebbi Ḥiyya stated for women forbidden by a commandment or because of sanctity, if he had ḥalîṣah or intercourse with her, the co-widow was freed⁶⁶.

footnotes: ⁶⁴ Since marriage would be valid, ḥalîṣah ⁶⁵ In this interpretation, Rebbis Eleazar and Joḥanan agree with one another but disagree with everybody else (interpretation of פני משה). Another way would be to postulate a lacuna: “R. Eleazar and R. Joḥanan disagree, R. Joḥanan said, the co-widow was freed, R. Eleazar said, ⁶⁶ Statement not found in Tosephta.

MISHNAH: Commandment prohibition: Secondary prohibitions⁶⁷ 18, one more generation is forbidden by common law, a tradition ascribed to the “Sopherim”, the colleagues and successors of Ezra in reconstituting Judaism in Israel after the Babylonian exile. instituted by the Sopherim. Holiness prohibiton: A widow for the High Priest⁶⁸ 21:14., a divorcee⁶⁹ 21:7. or one who had ḥalîṣah⁷⁰ with divorce is rabbinic for the majority, possibly biblical for R. Simeon; cf. Note 17. for a simple priest, a bastard⁷¹ 23:3. or a Gibeoness⁷²21:2). They are called “given” for Joshua “gave” them as hewers of wood and drawers of water (Jos. 9:27). to an Israel, a Jewish woman to a Gibeonite or a bastard⁷³25..

footnotes: ⁶⁷ For any biblical incest prohibition of Lev. ⁶⁸ Lev. ⁶⁹ Lev. ⁷⁰ The identification of ḥalîṣah ⁷¹ Deut. ⁷² A popular tradition ascribes the exclusion of Gibeonites from the Jewish marriage community to their cruel behavior towards the family of Saul when it was decided that “the Gibeonites are not part of Israel” (2S. ⁷³ Both of them could be illegitimate paternal halfbrothers of the deceased obligated by the laws of Deut.

HALAKHAH: Commandment prohibition: Incest prohibitions instituted by the Sopherim; it is a biblical commandment to listen to the words of the Sopherim. And Holiness prohibition: A widow for the High Priest, a divorcee or one who had ḥalîṣah for a simple priest. “These are the commandments,⁷⁴ 27:35. The last verse of Lev. includes all commandments contained in the book. This sentence is redundant here; it belongs to the argument of those who switch the attributions.” all commandments are one. “⁷⁵ 21:8; this explains the expression “holiness prohibitions”. You should sanctify him, for he brings the bread of your God.” But some⁷⁶ do switch: A widow for the High Priest, a divorcee or one who had ḥalîṣah for a simple priest, “you should sanctify him, for he brings the bread of your God.” “These are the commandments,” all commandments are one⁷⁷. And holiness prohibitions, incest prohibitions instituted by the Sopherim⁷⁸ 19:2, “you shall be holy”, is taken as general injunction to the religious leadership to institute “fences around the law” to which the secondary prohibitions belong..

footnotes: ⁷⁴ Lev. ⁷⁵ Lev. ⁷⁶ In the Babli, 20a, the first interpretation is that of the rabbis, the second that of Rebbi Jehudah. ⁷⁷ The special rules for priests are called “commandment prohibitions”. ⁷⁸ Lev.

Rebbi Jehudah ben Pazi said, why did Scripture put the incest chapter next to the holiness chapter⁷⁹ 19.? To teach you that every one who shies away from incest⁸⁰ is called “holy”. In this sense, the woman of Shunem said to her husband: “⁸¹ 4:9. The parallel is in Babli Berakhot 10b, mostly in the name of R. Yose ben Ḥanina. Lo, I know that he is a holy man of God”. Rebbi Jonah said, “he is holy”, but not his student. Rebbi Abin said, that he never looked at her. But the rabbis say that he he never had an involuntary emission. {The slave girl of Rebbi Samuel ben Rav Isaac said, I never saw a bad thing on my master’s garments.}⁸² It is written “Geḥazi drew near to push her away⁸³ 4:27.”. What is לְהָדְפָהּ⁸⁴? Rebbi Yose ben Ḥanina said, he put his hand on her beauty spot⁸⁵, between her breasts.

footnotes: ⁷⁹ Lev. ⁸⁰ “Incest” always includes adultery. ⁸¹ 2K. ⁸² The statement is added to explain how the Sunamite could know that Elisa was holy.. ⁸³ 2K. ⁸⁴ A poetic contraction of לַהֲדוֹף אוֹתָהּ, somewhat out of place in a prose text. ⁸⁵ In the Babli, בְּהוֹד יופְיָהּ, better suited as expansion of הוֹדפה.

How can one prove secondary prohibitions? Rebbi Ḥuna said: “These⁸⁶ 18:27, כִּי אֶת־כָּל־הַתּוֹעֵבוֹת הָאֵל “all these abominations”, these should have been written הָאֵלֶּה; the short form is taken as a hint of the root אל “power” (the meaning of the word commonly but wrongly translated as “God”).”, the strong ones. This implies that there are weaker ones⁸⁷. The following are the secondary prohibitions⁸⁸ 1, extended to contain most of the next paragraph.: His paternal grandmother and his maternal grandmother, his paternal grandfather’s wife and his maternal grandfathers wife, his grandson’s wife whether from son or daughter, the wife of his mother’s brother and the wife of his father’s maternal brother.

footnotes: ⁸⁶ Lev. ⁸⁷ In the Babli, 21a, the argument is in the name of Rava. ⁸⁸ Babli 21a, Tosephta 3:1 (parallels the Babli in content and the Yerushalmi in language), Derekh Ereṣ Rabba

It was stated: Rebbi Ḥanin said, all of them have no limit⁸⁹ except for the wife of his maternal grandfather⁹⁰. Bar Qappara said, all of them have a limit, since Bar Qappara added the mother of his maternal grandfather and the mother of his paternal grandfather⁹¹ 1.. Rav said, his son’s daughter-in-law is the limit⁹². Why does he disagree? His son’s daughter-in-law comes under a different category⁹³. Rav said, his [grandson’s] issue from her is forbidden⁹⁴. 18:17).. Rebbi Yose ben Rebbi Abun said, the reason of Rav is that all Jewish women are forbidden for Abraham and all Jewish men are forbidden for Sarah.

footnotes: ⁸⁹ This sentence has no formal equivalent in the Babli but is understood there since the exceptions to the rule are discussed at length, 21a–22a.“No limit” means no limit to the number of generations to which it applies. Not only the grandmother is forbidden but also the great-grandmother and all her female ancestors. Daughter and granddaughter are biblically forbidden, the great-granddaughter and all her descendants are rabbinically forbidden. ⁹⁰ The text reads “the mother of his maternal father.” This makes no sense. The translation follows the Babli (21a), where Ze‘iri tentatively interprets a statement of Rav that the wife of his maternal grandfather is the last in her line but her female ancestors are permitted. ⁹¹ It is not claimed that Bar Qappara made a formal statement to this effect but, since he found it necessary to include an extra generation in some cases, it is clear that he assumes that only the cases enumerated are forbidden. The statement is also in Derekh Ereṣ Rabba ⁹² In the Babli, 21a, Rav declares a limit in the number of generations to exist only in 3 or four cases: the wives of any maternal uncle (whether maternal or paternal (half)brother of his mother), his daughterin-law (per mitting her daughter who is not his granddaughter), and possibly the case quoted by R. Ḥanin. ⁹³ She is no blood relative. ⁹⁴ The great-granddaughter and all her descendants are rabbinically prohibited since the granddaughter is biblically prohibited (Lev

Rav said⁹⁵: In all cases where the female is forbidden by the Torah, the wife of the corresponding male is forbidden. The father’s sister is forbidden as female; the wife of the father’s brother, the corresponding male, is forbidden⁹⁶. 18:12,14. It seems that Rav claims biblical status for his statement.. The mother’s sister is forbidden as female⁹⁷. 18:13. The second case is a secondary prohibition.; the wife of the mother’s brother, the corresponding male, is forbidden His son’s daughter is forbidden as female⁹⁸. 18:17.; the wife of his son’s son, the corresponding male, is forbidden His daughter’s daughter is forbidden as female⁹⁸. 18:17.; the wife of his daughter’s son, the corresponding male, is forbidden Rebbi Jacob the Southerner said before Rebbi Yose, there are another two. His mother is biblical⁹⁹. 18:7.. His mother’s mother is secondary to her. They forbade his father’s mother because of his mother’s mother¹⁰⁰ and grand father by the grandchildren, which gives them status of father and mother. The Yerushalmi disagrees and holds that there is never a fence for a fence of the law. In the next paragraph one proves the biblical prohibition of some so-called secondaries.. His son’s wife is biblical¹⁰¹. 18:15.. His son’s son’s wife is secondary to her. They forbade his daughter’s son’s wife because of his son’s son’s wife. Rebbi Mattaniah said, there are another two. His father’s wife is biblical¹⁰². 18:8.. His paternal grandfather’s wife is secondary to her. They forbade his maternal grandfather’s wife because of his paternal grandfather’s wife. His father’s paternal brother’s wife is biblical¹⁰³. 18:14. It was stated in Halakhah 1:1 that “brother” means “paternal brother”.. His father’s maternal brother’s wife is secondary to her. They forbade his mother’s maternal halfbrother’s wife because of his father’s maternal brother’s wife.

footnotes: ⁹⁵ In the Babli, 21b, this is reported as a Galilean statement which is rejected because it is not valid in all cases. ⁹⁶ Both cases are biblical, Lev ⁹⁷ Lev ⁹⁸ Lev ⁹⁸ Lev ⁹⁹ Lev ¹⁰⁰ She is in the list of secondary prohibitions. As the Babli notes, 21b, in general one does not admit fences around fences of the law (cf. Note 72), so without Rav’s rule, she should be permitted. The Babli has a special explanation for the prohibitions, because grandmother and grandfather are called grand mother ¹⁰¹ Lev ¹⁰² Lev ¹⁰³ Lev

Rebbi Ḥuna understood all of them from this verse¹⁰⁴. 18:17. “The genitals of a woman and her daughter you should not uncover; her son’s daughter or her daughter’s daughter you should not take to uncover her genitals, they are relatives, this is taboo.” Take means “to marry”.: “The genitals of a woman and her daughter you should not uncover; her son’s daughter or her daughter’s daughter.” Taboo - taboo, for an equal cut¹⁰⁵ a woman and her mother, it is taboo, in fire they should burn him and them, so that there be no taboo amongst you.” In contrast to v. 18:17 which speaks “downwards” of future generations, that verse speaks “upwards” of preceding generations. They are connected by the word taboo {Accadic zamū “to exclude from something, to refuse something to somebody”} which must “cut” the same way in both cases. The argument is refuted in Babli Sanhedrin 75a/b since it contradicts verses dealing with earlier generations which seem to insist that the kinds of sin and their punishments are not comparable.. Since there are three generations downwards, so there are three generations upwards¹⁰⁶. Since there is a prohibition downwards, so there is a prohibition upwards. Since upwards one requires marriage, so downwards one requires marriage¹⁰⁷. Since upwards they are burned, so downwards they are burned. Since downwards, He¹⁰⁸ gave the male’s daughter the same status as the female’s daughter¹⁰⁴. 18:17. “The genitals of a woman and her daughter you should not uncover; her son’s daughter or her daughter’s daughter you should not take to uncover her genitals, they are relatives, this is taboo.” Take means “to marry”., so upwards He gave the male’s mother the same status as the female’s mother. What is this about? His father-in-law’s mother and his mother-in-law’s mother. Should not his father’s mother be like his father-in-law’s mother¹⁰⁹? Should not his mother’s mother be like his mother-in-law’s mother¹¹⁰? They forbade his father’s father’s wife because of his father’s mother. They forbade his mother’s father’s wife because of his mother’s mother. Should not his son’s son’s wife be like his wife’s son’s daughter? Should not his daughter’s son’s wife be like his wife’s daughter’s daughter?

footnotes: ¹⁰⁴ Lev ¹⁰⁵ In v. 20:14 one reads: “If a man take ¹⁰⁶ Wife, her mother, and grandmothers as well as himself, his mother and grandmothers. ¹⁰⁷ To make it a capital crime. ¹⁰⁸ The Lawgiver. ¹⁰⁴ Lev ¹⁰⁹ His mother-in-law’s mother is under a biblical prohibition since his wife is her granddaughter. Since the verse puts the daughter’s daughter on the same level as the son’s daughter, the paternal grandmother also must be forbidden. ¹¹⁰ So there is only one fence, not two. The same argument holds for all the rhetorical questions; all the prohibitions are reduced to single fences.

Rebbi Ḥaggai objected before Rebbi Yose: Does not a baraita contradict Rav? “A person’s stepson’s wife is permitted to him but the latter’s daughter is forbidden.¹¹¹ 13 (15).” Is his stepdaughter not forbidden to him¹¹²? The stepson is the corresponding male but his wife is permitted¹¹³!

footnotes: ¹¹¹ Tosephta 3; Babli 21a; Sifra Aḥare Mot Pereq ¹¹² Babli 21a. A biblical prohibition; she is his wife’s daughter. ¹¹³ Babli 21b.

Rebbi Zeriqan in the name of Rebbi Ḥanina: His father-in-law’s wife¹¹⁴ is forbidden because of the bad impression. If¹¹⁵ you want to say it is biblical, did not David marry Riṣpah bat Ayyah¹¹⁶? As it was said¹¹⁷. 12:8.: “I gave you your master’s house and your master’s wives in your bosom.” Rebbi Jeremiah in the name of Rebbi Eleazar: Two stepchildren who grow up in the same house¹¹⁸ are forbidden to marry because of the bad impression. A case came before Rebbi Ḥanina ben Rebbi Abbahu. He said, they should marry in a place where they are not known¹¹⁹ 9, Notes 34ff..

footnotes: ¹¹⁴ Who is not his wife’s mother. The Babli disagrees, 21a. Tosaphot report that Rabbenu Tam did follow the Yerushalmi in a case at Provins (Champagne), but his contemporaries objected. ¹¹⁵ The word was missing in the text; it was inserted by the corrector. It probably should have been אִין since אִי meaning “if” is Babylonian. ¹¹⁶ His father-in-law Saul’s concubine. ¹¹⁷ 2S ¹¹⁸ And are not related. ¹¹⁹ In line with the general attitude of the Yerushalmi, cf. Kilaim

There, we have stated¹²⁰ Mishnah 3:5. The Mishnah speaks of the grandfather’s grandson’s daughter’s daughter who was married to his brother. If that brother dies without issue, the widow is forbidden to her great-grandfather by a secondary prohibition. If the old man marries her in levirate instead of having ḥalîṣah as required, since the prohibition is rabbinic she is married and, if the son sleeps with her, Rebbi Yose the Tanna declares him guilty both for his granddaughter and his father’s wife, committing two sins in one act.: “Rebbi Yose says, if the grandfather transgressed and married her.” What did he transgress? He transgressed the words of the Sopherim¹²¹. Rebbi Yose in the name of Rebbi Abbahu, he asked Rebbi Joḥanan: Does this mean that secondary prohibitions have no limit? He said to him, did we learn “secondaries to secondaries”? No. Secondaries to the words of the Torah, and all of them because of his son’s daughter-in-law¹²². Rebbi Ḥizqiah in the name of Rebbi Jonah, Rebbi Abbahu did not say so, but Rebbi Eleazar asked Rebbi Joḥanan, did we not learn of eight secondaries, and here they are nine! But all of them because of his son’s daughter-in-law¹²³ 21b..

footnotes: ¹²⁰ Keritut ¹²¹ Three generations are biblically forbidden. She would be secondarily forbidden to the father. Since the Mishnah does not mention the father but “the old man”, generally interpreted as “grandfather”, this is one generation more than that spelled out in the Tosephta. Does this support R. Ḥanin that these prohibitions are unlimited in the number of generations? ¹²² Rebbi Yose the Tanna does not refer to the first part of the Mishnah speaking of a granddaughter but has a new case where the woman was the son’s daughter-in-law before marrying the father’s brother who is permitted to her. ¹²³ Since this case is the root of all secondary prohibitions it was not spelled out before; Babli Yebamot

MISHNAH: Any [male] who has a brother anywhere¹²⁴ makes his brother’s wife a candidate⁹ is always called זקוּקה, the fact of obligation זיקה. It does not seem reasonable to connect this meaning to biblical זקק “to refine, purify”; maybe the root is related to Arabic زقّ، زقق “to feed (a bird his young)”, that she is fodder for the levirate, or even Akkadic zāqiqum“ghost; necromancer”. {Jewish Berber tribes held that a brother who rejects levirate will be punished by the ghost of his dead brother.} for levirate and he is his brother in every respect¹²⁵, except if he were from a slave woman¹²⁶ becomes a full Jew. Therefore, she is not in the same category as a non-Jewish woman. or a non-Jew.

footnotes: ¹²⁴ Even illegitimate or bastard. ⁹ The one under obligation of levirate or ḥalîṣah ¹²⁵ Including inheritance. ¹²⁶ If she is not his own property. In the latter case, one might assume that he freed the mother of his child. She is a semi-Jew who upon manumission and immersion in a miqweh

MISHNAH: Any person who has a child¹²⁴ anywhere frees [the child’s] father’s wife from levirate; [the child] would be guilty for wounding or cursing [the father]¹²⁷. 21:15,17.; he is his child in every respect¹²⁵ except if he were from a slave woman¹²⁶ becomes a full Jew. Therefore, she is not in the same category as a non-Jewish woman. or a non-Jew.

footnotes: ¹²⁴ Even illegitimate or bastard. ¹²⁷ Ex ¹²⁵ Including inheritance. ¹²⁶ If she is not his own property. In the latter case, one might assume that he freed the mother of his child. She is a semi-Jew who upon manumission and immersion in a miqweh

HALAKHAH: “Any person who has a child anywhere”, etc. Rebbi Avin asked: “His child in every respect”, even for being fruitful and multiplying¹²⁹? Is there no difference¹³⁰ between a Gentile who came to a Jewish woman and she gave birth and a Jew who came to a Gentile woman and she gave birth¹³¹, Chapter 1, Note 116), the child has only two since legally it has no father.? “When she became Jewish and gave birth it is a first-born for inheritance but not a first-born for the Cohen.¹³² 8:1. If the Gentile first has a child as a Gentile, then converts and marries the father of her child, the next child, if male, will be the father’s firstborn (since he is no relative of the other child) but does not have to be redeemed (Ex. 34:20) since he is not the first child of the mother.”

footnotes: ¹²⁹ Cf. Mishnah 6:6. Since no answer is given, it seems obvious that a bastard counts as a child. This is the interpretation of R. Mose Isserls. ¹³⁰ The Spanish tradition, from Nachmanides to R. Nissim, reads לפריה וּלרביה ולשניות “for being fruitful and multiplying and secondary prohibitions”. ¹³¹ In both cases, of the three partners in the creation of a child, father, mother, and God (Peah ¹³² Mishnah Bekhorot

A Gentile came to a Gentile woman and she gave birth. Rebbi Joḥanan said, Gentiles have family relationships¹³³. 2:24: “Therefore, a man abandons his father and his mother and clings to his wife so they will be one flesh” is interpreted to mean that, by the laws of Creation, incest between parents and children, adultery (with a wife not his own) and possibly homosexuality are forbidden. The question is whether a court can enforce the incest prohibition between father and daughter. If there is no recognized legal relationship, that cannot be enforced. R. Joḥanan holds that any court on earth, even a Jewish one, can punish incest between Gentile father and daughter. R. Simeon ben Laqish disagrees. In the Babli, 62a, the parallel discussion is on a completely different topic, whether the firstborn of a proselyte who converted together with his father is entitled to the customary double portion of the inheritance. R. Joḥanan answers in the affermative, R. Simeon ben Laqish in the negative.. Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish said, Gentiles have no family relationships. But is it not written¹³⁴. 39:1.: “At that time, Merodakh-Baladan, son of Baladan, king of Babylon, sent letters and a gift to Ḥizqiah.” Since he honored his elder¹³⁵ 96a reports that Baladan was incapacitated and Merodakh added his father’s name to his own so that all acts of his regency should also be in his father’s name., he was honored with a family relationship. But is it not written¹³⁶ 15:18. The text is contaminated with 2Chr. 16:2.: “At that time, king Asa sent to Ben-Hadad, son of Tabrimon, son of Ḥezayon, king of Damascus, as follows.” Destroyer son of a destroyer. As you say¹³⁷. 9:24. In Targum Šeni 3:1, the family tree of Haman is given up to his ancestor Esaw. It is not clear there whether “Hamedata the Agagite” is intended as a name or a title. In the latter case, Haman’s father’s name was Seraḥ.: “For Haman ben Hamedata was”. Was he the son of Hamedata? That means, oppressor son of an oppressor. So here also, destroyer son of a destroyer. Rebbi Tanḥuma said, so did Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish answer Rebbi Joḥanan, but is there not written¹³⁸. 9:10. In v. 2, Ṣiba is called “ ‘ebed of the House of Saul”. Since in v. 9 he is called “esquire of Saul”, it seems that ‘ebed represents the usage of the time the book was finally edited, the later kingdom of Judah, when ‘ebed was the recognized title of officials directly responsible to the king.: “Ṣiba had sixteen sons and twenty slaves.” Do slaves have family relationships¹³⁹? It is to enumerate those who served Mephiboshet together.

footnotes: ¹³³ The verse Gen ¹³⁴ Is ¹³⁵ Babli Sanhedrin ¹³⁶ 1K. ¹³⁷ Esth ¹³⁸ 2S ¹³⁹ Not being able to legally marry, they are empowered to be promiscuous without guilt.

A slave woman: “The woman and her children shall belong to her owner.¹⁴⁰. 18:4, speaking of the Jewish indentured servant who has to serve for six years. If the children he had during that time with a slave woman were his, they would have to be freed with him at the end of his servitude.” A Gentile woman. Rebbi Joḥanan said in the name of Rebbi Sineon ben Ioḥai, it is written¹⁴¹. 7:3–4. Since only the masculine is used, “he will divert”, but not the feminine, it is concluded that the verse speaks only about the Gentile husband. Therefore, the child of the Jewish husband and the Gentile wife is not the husband’s child. The parallel to this paragraph is in the Babli 23a.: “You shall not conclude marriage with them”. And it is written: “For he will divert your son from after Me.” Your son from a Jewish woman is called your son; but your son from a Gentile woman is not called your son but her son.

footnotes: ¹⁴⁰ Ex ¹⁴¹ Deut

¹⁴² 3:14; Gen. rabba 7(3); Eccl. rabba 7:26; Bemidbar rabba, Tanḥuma, both Pesiqtot, to Ḥuqqat (Parah). Jacob from Kefar Naboraia went to Tyre. They came to ask him, may one circumcise the son of a Gentile woman¹⁴³ on the Sabbath? He wanted to permit it from the verse¹⁴⁴. 1:18, which determines the clan by patrilinear descent. The principle is expressed in Mishnah Qiddušin 3:12: “If there is a possibility of marriage without sin, the child follows its father”, even if the parents are not married.: “They determined their genealogies for their families according to their fathers’ houses.” Rebbi Ḥaggai heard it and said, he shall come. They brought him in order to be whipped. He said to him, for what reason do you whip me? He said, from what is written¹⁴⁵ 10:3: “Now we shall make a covenant for our God to expel all these [foreign] women and what was born to them, as counseled by the Lord, by those who fear the commandments of our God; it should be done according to the Torah”. As usual, the main point is the part not quoted.: “Now we shall make a covenant for our God”. He said, you want to whip me based on tradition¹⁴⁶? He said, “and it should be done according to the Torah.” He said to him, from which teaching? He said, from that which Rebbi Joḥanan said in the name of Rebbi Simeon ben Ioḥai, it is written: “You shall not conclude marriage with them”. And it is written: “For he will divert your son from after Me.” Your son from a Jewish woman is called your son; but your son from a Gentile woman is not called your son but her son. He said to him, whip your whipping, because it is good to impress¹⁴⁷.

footnotes: ¹⁴² Parallels in Qiddušin ¹⁴³ The son of a Jewish father born on the Sabbath, converted at birth. ¹⁴⁴ Num ¹⁴⁵ Ezra ¹⁴⁶ “Tradition” is the name for the books of Prophets and Hagiographs which are not books of law. The most one can infer from a text of tradition is how Torah laws were handled in later times. ¹⁴⁷ To impress upon him the lesson he should not forget.

MISHNAH: If somebody gave qiddushin to one of two sisters but he does not know to which one of them, he gives a bill of divorce to each¹⁴⁸. If he died and has one brother, that one has to perform ḥalîṣah with both sisters. If he had two [brothers], one performs ḥalîṣah and one may marry in levirate¹⁵⁰ had received qiddushin from the deceased, the other one is free to marry his brother. If she did not get qiddushin, then the levirate is valid.. If both married without asking, one¹⁵¹. does not remove [the women] from them.

footnotes: ¹⁴⁸ Both are forbidden to him since each one is possibly hi his sister-in-law’s sister. ¹⁵⁰ If the one who performed ḥalîṣah ¹⁵¹ The court does not intervene since one has correctly married in levirate and the other is free to marry his brother since she had no qiddushin

HALAKHAH: “If somebody gave qiddushin to one of two sisters but he does not know to which one of them, he gives a bill of divorce to each. If he died and has one brother, that one has to perform ḥalîṣah with both sisters.” Everywhere else you say¹⁵² “there cannot be ḥalîṣah after ḥalîṣah” but here you say so? There if it is certain, here one is in doubt¹⁵³. “If he had two [brothers], one performs ḥalîṣah and one may marry in levirate.” Everywhere else you say, in any case one asks him to perform the levirate one does not say perform ḥalîṣah; but here you say so? There if it is certain, here one is in doubt. “If both married without asking, one does not remove [the women] from them.”

footnotes: ¹⁵² Mishnah 5:1. ¹⁵³ It is impossible to do otherwise.

MISHNAH: If two¹⁵⁴ [men] gave qiddushin to two sisters and neither of them knows to which one he gave his, each one of them gives two bills of divorce¹⁵⁵. If they died and each one had a brother, each [brother] performs ḥalîṣah with both [sisters]¹⁵⁶. If one had one [brother] but the other had two, the single one performs ḥalîṣah with both [sisters], but of the two brothers one performs ḥalîṣah and the other may marry in levirate¹⁵⁷ with his brother since she either is his sister-in-law or an unrelated person.. If both married without asking, one does not remove [the women] from them¹⁵¹..

footnotes: ¹⁵⁴ Unrelated. ¹⁵⁵ Both sisters are forbidden to both men since each relation would possibly be adultery. Of the two bills each of the women gets, one is valid and the other, given by a man not her husband, is as if it had not been written; only they do not know which is which. ¹⁵⁶ They are forbidden to both of them for each one is possibly a candidate for levirate with the other man’s brother. ¹⁵⁷ The second sister which did not perform ḥalîṣah ¹⁵¹ The court does not intervene since one has correctly married in levirate and the other is free to marry his brother since she had no qiddushin

HALAKHAH: “If two [men] gave qiddushin to two sisters,” etc. It was stated: These rules apply both for Israel and for Cohanim¹⁵⁹ is treated like divorce, one should assume that both sisters are forbidden to priests. But since this treatment is only a rabbinic enhancement of the priest’s status, it is not applied to cases of doubt.. That is, if ḥalîṣah was performed first and the levirate afterwards. But to perform levirate first is forbidden; maybe his brother will die and it will turn out that he cohabited with the sister of his sister-in-law¹⁶⁰. Rav Ḥisda said, that means that having relations with the sister of his sister-in-law¹⁶¹ does not make her unfit for [marriage into] priesthood. Rebbi Yose bar Abba said, Rebbi Ḥiyya stated: He who cohabited with the sister of a woman for whom he had performed ḥalîṣah did not make her unfit for [marriage into] priesthood.

footnotes: ¹⁵⁹ Babli 24a, with an explanation: Since for priests, ḥalîṣah ¹⁶⁰ Who still is bound to him as a candidate for levirate. Babli 23b. ¹⁶¹ Who is not known certainly to be his sister-in-law. The conclusion is reached since all parts of this Mishnah are approved if one of the men is a Cohen.

“If they died and each one had a brother, each [brother] performs ḥalîṣah with both [sisters]. Everywhere else you say “there cannot be ḥalîṣah after ḥalîṣah” but here you say so? There if it is certain, here one is in doubt. “If one had one [brother] but the other had two, the single one performs ḥalîṣah with both [sisters], but of the two brothers one performs ḥalîṣah and the other may marry in levirate. Everywhere else you say, in any case one asks him to perform the levirate one does not say perform ḥalîṣah; but here you say so? There if it is certain, here one is in doubt. “If both married without asking, one does not remove [the women] from them.”

MISHNAH: If each [of the deceased] had two brothers, one brother of each [of the deceased] performs ḥalîṣah with one [of the sisters] and the other brother takes the other [sister] in levirate¹⁶² of his brother was correct, then the other brother marries an unrelated widow. If it was incorrect then he enters a valid levirate marriage.. If two [brothers] both performed ḥalîṣah¹⁶³, the other two should not [both] marry in levirate¹⁶⁴ but one of them performs ḥalîṣah and the other one may take in levirate. If both married without asking, one does not remove [the women] from them.

footnotes: ¹⁶² If the ḥalîṣah ¹⁶³ Each of them for another woman. ¹⁶⁴ Since one of them might marry the sister of a candidate of levirate with him. But if they married without asking, one of them certainly executed a valid levirate and the other married an unrelated woman.

HALAKHAH: “If each [of the deceased] had two brothers”. That is, for Israel, but for Cohanim they are forbidden¹⁶⁵ and the second are Cohanim then one of the second pair certainly will marry a woman freed by ḥalîṣah, who is considered a rabbinic divorcee. The Babli, 24a, seems to extend the permission given to Cohanim (Note 159) even to this case since for each single person there is only a 50/50 chance that he married a woman with a legally valid ḥalîṣah..

footnotes: ¹⁶⁵ If the first pair of brothers both performed ḥalîṣah

MISHNAH: The obligation of levirate is on the oldest [brother] but if a younger one got the start on him, he acquired. If somebody is accused in matters of a slave woman¹⁶⁶ and she was manumitted, or of a Gentile and she converted, he should not marry her but if he married her one does not remove her from him. If somebody is accused in matters of a married woman and she was forcibly divorced from [her husband], even if he married her he must divorce her¹⁶⁷ 5:1)..

footnotes: ¹⁶⁶ That he has an affair with the slave. ¹⁶⁷ An adulteress is permanently forbidden both to the husband and the adulterer (Mishnah Soṭah

HALAKHAH: “The obligation of levirate is on the oldest [brother] but if a younger one got the start on him, he acquired, etc.” “The obligation of levirate is on the oldest,” since it is said¹⁶⁸. 25:6: “The firstborn she will bear shall rise in the name of his dead brother.” This seems to imply that the child should be called X son of Y, where Y is not the biological father but the dead first husband. The Babli, 24a, discusses the same verse in a different manner, based on Sifry Deut. #289., “the firstborn she will bear shall …”. How do we hold? If about the newborn, the verse should read “he should rise in the name of his dead father.¹⁶⁹” But it must be that the newborn is a firstborn. In that case, even if he had children and they died before he died, his widow should not be a candidate for levirate! Then the verse should have said, “he never had children¹⁶⁴”. But if it cannot refer to the newborn; let it refer to the levir, “the obligation of levirate is on the oldest.”

footnotes: ¹⁶⁸ Deut ¹⁶⁹ The first hand in the ms. had יקוּם על שם אחיו המת which is exactly the biblical text and therefore cannot have been meant. The corrector changed this into יקוּם על שם אחיו המת as given in the text. Ms. A reads יקוּם על שם אחיו אביו המת “shall rise on the name of his dead brother-father” and this seems to be the superior reading; cf. Note 168. ¹⁶⁴ Since one of them might marry the sister of a candidate of levirate with him. But if they married without asking, one of them certainly executed a valid levirate and the other married an unrelated woman.

“If somebody is accused in matters of a slave woman and she was manumitted, or of a Gentile and she converted, he should not marry her but if he married her one does not remove her from him.” If he agreed lawfully not to marry her and [nevertheless] married her, she is forcibly removed from him¹⁷³. If he divorced her, may he take her back? If you would say that, would you not defame her children¹⁷⁴? “If somebody is accused in matters of a married woman,” Rav said, that is, he was accused by witnesses¹⁷⁵. Rebbi Yose asked, if he was accused by witnesses, is that what was stated: If he¹⁷⁶ divorced her, even if he¹⁷⁷ married her, he must divorce her? If somebody else divorced her¹⁷⁸, he can keep her! If he was accused by witnesses, even if somebody else divorced her, he must divorce her¹⁶⁷ 5:1).! But that is what we deal with: If he was accused not by witnesses, if somebody else divorced her, he may keep her¹⁷⁹.

footnotes: ¹⁷³ But without a confession of guilt by the husband, the rabbinic authority cannot interfere. ¹⁷⁴ If she was divorced and one would prohibit remarriage (as long as she had no other husband in between), at the same time one would declare her children from that man as bastards. This is unacceptable. ¹⁷⁵ Only for adultery proven in court is the marriage with the presumed adulterer forbidden. A parallel statement in Babli, 24b. ¹⁷⁶ The husband. He may divorce her for suspected adultery and refuse to pay her anything. If she goes to court for the money, he can defend himself by circumstantial evidence permitted in civil law. ¹⁷⁷ The adulterer. ¹⁷⁸ After her divorce, she married a party other than the presumed adulterer. ¹⁶⁷ An adulteress is permanently forbidden both to the husband and the adulterer (Mishnah Soṭah ¹⁷⁹ Tosephta 4:5.

MISHNAH: If somebody brings a bill of divorce from overseas and says “it was written and signed in my presence”, he shall not marry the wife¹⁸⁰ 1:1). If the witness would marry the divorcee, his testimony would be suspect because of his interest in the validity of the divorce.. “He died¹⁸¹”, “I killed him”, or “we killed him”, he shall not marry the wife. Rebbi Jehudah said, “I killed him”, the wife cannot be married¹⁸². 23:1). Therefore, there is no evidence of the death and the wife cannot claim to be a widow., “we killed him”, the wife can be married¹⁸³.

footnotes: ¹⁸⁰ A bill of divorce brought from another country is valid only if the person who delivers the document can testify to the circumstances in which it was executed (Mishnah Giṭṭin ¹⁸¹ If the husband died far from home and somebody testifies to his death to free the widow for another marriage, he cannot marry her because of conflict of interests. The same holds for the other cases. ¹⁸² The killer cannot testify since he declares himself to be wicked and persons officially declared wicked cannot be witnesses (Ex ¹⁸³ The witness only says that he was with a group containing a killer, not that he himself is a killer. His testimony is valid; cf. Mishnah 15:4.

HALAKHAH: ¹⁸⁵ 3:7 on the Mishnah quoted later, “I betrothed one of my daughters but I do not remember to whom I betrothed her. If someone comes and says, I gave her qiddushin, he is trustworthy.”“If somebody brings a bill of divorce from overseas and says”, etc. About what is he trustworthy? Samuel says, he is trusted to give a bill of divorce¹⁸⁶ 63b, this is the opinion of Rav; Samuel is not mentioned there.. Assi said, he is trusted to marry¹⁸⁷. Rav Huna said in the name of Rav: He is trusted to marry. Rebbi Joḥanan said, he is trusted to marry but one does not infer from this ruling anything for another case. What means, one does not infer from this ruling anything for another case? I sold one of my fields but I do not remember to whom I sold it. If someone comes and says, I bought it, he is not trusted in any way. In qiddushin, the same holds. “¹⁸⁸ 3:7. I betrothed one of my daughters but I do not remember to whom I betrothed her. If someone comes and says, I gave her qiddushin,” he is not trusted in any way¹⁸⁹ reads לא הכל ממנו “is not everything from him?”; the father’s evidence is nothing and everything depends on the word of the suitor. This seems to be the correct version even though the two mss. agree in Yebamot.. The Mishnah disagrees with Rav: “If somebody brings a bill of divorce from overseas and says, it was written and signed in my presence, he shall not marry the wife¹⁹⁰.” There, she is considered by everybody to be a married woman. Here, she is considered to be a married woman only by two persons¹⁹¹ are invalid. If they come and testify, there will be no doubt; the testimony of the suitor is verifiable. In the case of the divorce, everybody knows that the woman is married and the testimony is unverifiable.. One waits until these two come and say, this is the man who gave her qiddushin. The Mishnah disagrees with Rebbi Joḥanan¹⁹²: Samuel. This is the correct version even though the two mss. agree in Yebamot. If one of the two suitors is permitted to marry the girl, the rest of the world is excluded and both are trustworthy even for marriage.: “¹⁸⁸ 3:7. This one says, I gave her qiddushin, and that one says, I gave her qiddushin. Both of them give a bill of divorce, but if they agree, one gives a bill of divorce and the other one marries.¹⁹³ 3:7, about the father who btrothed his daughter to an unknown suitor.” He explains this, if [the father] says, I did betroth her to one of these two but I do not remember which one it was. Rebbi Ze‘ira, Rebbi Yasa, in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan: If one of them jumped the gun and married her, one does remove her from him. That is, if this one says, I gave her qiddushin, and that one says. I gave her qiddushin¹⁹⁴ and one of them jumped the gun and married her. But if he said, I gave her qiddushin and married her, and another one comes¹⁹⁵ and says, I gave her qiddushin, he is not trusted in any way. It was stated thus: If after the marriage another man comes and says, I gave her qiddushin, he is not trusted in any way.

footnotes: ¹⁸⁵ This paragraph is a copy of the parallel in Qiddušin ¹⁸⁶ But without further evidence he is not allowed to marry the girl since he is testifying in his own behalf. In the Babli, Qiddušin ¹⁸⁷ Without evidence to the contrary, we do not accuse him of attempted adultery. ¹⁸⁸ Mishnah Qiddušin ¹⁸⁹ To marry her; this is the point made by Samuel. The text in Qiddušin ¹⁹⁰ The person on whose word the woman becomes free to marry may not marry her; why should a person whose word frees the girl from being unable to marry anybody in the world be allowed to marry her? ¹⁹¹ The two witnesses without whom any qiddushin ¹⁹² In Qiddušin ¹⁸⁸ Mishnah Qiddušin ¹⁹³ End of Mishnah Qiddušin ¹⁹⁴ They both came at the same time, or at least the existence of both of them was known when one of them married the girl. ¹⁹⁵ He comes later; his identity was not known at the time of marriage.

¹⁹⁶ As you take it, if he killed him, a suspect in a case can neither judge nor testify in it. If he did not kill him, the person is alive.

footnotes: ¹⁹⁶ In both mss. the reference to the Mishnah is missing, that R. Jehudah bars the one who says, I killed the husband, from marrying the widow. It is explained here that such testimony is always invalid.

“We killed him,” she should be married to others but not to him¹⁹⁷. ¹⁹⁸“They said before Rebbi Jehudah, it happened that a robber was caught in Kappadokian Caesarea¹⁹⁹. When he went out to be executed, he said to them, go and tell the wife of Simeon ben Cahana that I killed him when he was coming into Lydda. The case came before the Sages and they confirmed his words. Rebbi Jehudah said to them: Is that a proof? He only said, we killed him.”

footnotes: ¹⁹⁷ Even though R. Jehudah says only that the woman can remarry; he will agree that she cannot marry the person upon whose testimony she becomes a widow. ¹⁹⁸ Tosephta 4:5; a somewhat different version in Babli, 25b. The Babli insists that the robber explicitly dissociated himself from the killers. This is not the position of the Yerushalmi; a possibility that he was not the killer is enough, given all the leniencies admitted in testimonies concerning women whose husbands had disappeared. ¹⁹⁹ Today Kaisarie.

MISHNAH: A rabbi who forbade a woman to her husband because of a vow²⁰⁰. 30:2–17). She can go to a competent rabbi who may find a way to relieve her from her vow if she sincerely repents. If he did not find a way to repeal the vow, the husband will divorce her (obviously, he need not pay her anything.) Since the refusal of the rabbi to annul the vow forces the divorce, he cannot profit from his act or people will suspect him of bending the law for his own profit. cannot marry her. If she repudiated or performed ḥalîṣah before him he may marry her since he acts as a court²⁰¹ 5 judges. In the other cases of the Mishnah, the availability of the woman for marriage depends on unforseeable circumstances.. And all who had wives who [subsequently] died may marry them²⁰² of this kind are known from the Cairo Genizah.. And to all who were married to others and were divorced or widowed, they can be married. All are permitted to their sons or brothers²⁰³.

footnotes: ²⁰⁰ A woman made a vow that she will have no usufruct from her husband. This is a vow the husband cannot dissolve since it is not a “vow of deprivation” (Num ²⁰¹ In this case, he does not act alone since a repudiation needs 3 and ḥalîṣah ²⁰² The rabbi who forces the divorce or the witnesses who testified that she was a widow. If they were married at the time of the action, they may marry the woman after the death of their wives since death is an unpredictable event. In this case, it is presumed that the marriage contract of the rabbi or any member of the court forbade the husband to take an additional wife without the first wife’s consent. Then the members of the court are truly disinterested parties. Ketubot ²⁰³ Nobody sins for the profit of others; see the Halakhah.

HALAKHAH: “A rabbi who forbade a woman to her husband because of a vow”, etc. “A rabbi who forbade a woman to her husband because of a vow cannot marry her.” I would say, that was his intention from the start. “If she repudiated or performed ḥalîṣah before him he may marry her since he acts as a court”, because two will not usually sin for the benefit of a third. There²⁰⁵, Mishnah 3:7., we have stated: “If somebody deposits fruit with another person, that one should not touch it even if it spoils. Rabban Simeon ben Gamliel said, he shall sell it under the supervision of a court because one is obliged to return a find to its owners.” Rebbi Abba bar Jacob said in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan, practice follows Rabban Simeon ben Gamliel²⁰⁶ 39b (R. Abba ben R. Jacob in the name of R. Joḥanan). In the Babli, the circumstances of this ruling are very much in dispute.. What does one do with the money? Rav Jehudah said, the disagreement of Rebbi Aqiba and Rebbi Ṭarphon²⁰⁷ 2:7. If somebody finds perishables (with characteristics that might allow the indentification of the lawful owner), he sells them under the supervision of a court. R. Tarphon holds that he uses the money in his own business; therefore he is totally responsible for it. R. Aqiba says, he may not touch the money; therefore, he is not responsible if it is stolen.. It is a condition that the members of the court cannot buy. Rebbi Aqiba²⁰⁰. 30:2–17). She can go to a competent rabbi who may find a way to relieve her from her vow if she sincerely repents. If he did not find a way to repeal the vow, the husband will divorce her (obviously, he need not pay her anything.) Since the refusal of the rabbi to annul the vow forces the divorce, he cannot profit from his act or people will suspect him of bending the law for his own profit. said, Rebbi Ḥiyya ben Rebbi Sabbatai²⁰⁸ asked: Here, you say, “if she repudiated or performed ḥalîṣah before him he may marry her since he acts as a court,” and here, you say so²⁰⁹? Rebbi Yose said, there, the buy could be in thirds²¹⁰, but here, two will not usually sin for the benefit of a third.

footnotes: ²⁰⁵ Baba Meṣi‘a ²⁰⁶ Babli Baba Meṣi‘a ²⁰⁷ Mishnah Baba Meṣi‘a ²⁰⁰ A woman made a vow that she will have no usufruct from her husband. This is a vow the husband cannot dissolve since it is not a “vow of deprivation” (Num ²⁰⁸ An otherwise unknown Amora. ²⁰⁹ Why are the members of the court forbidden to buy the produce to be sold under their supervision? ²¹⁰ Every judge could profit from the transaction.

“ “And all who had wives who [subsequently] died may marry them.” It only says “who died”; therefore, not if they were divorced. “And to all who were married to others and were divorced or widowed, they can be married”, since usually nobody sins for an uncertain future. “All are permitted to their sons or brothers,” since usually nobody sins for the benefit of either his son ot his brother.