The Great Court that interprets, etc. Our teacher (Rambam) learned this from what we find with later Tannaim who dispute earlier Tannaim, and similarly with later Amoraim who dispute earlier Amoraim. And what is stated in the first chapter of Eduyot (Mishnah 1:5) that if a court sees the reasoning of an individual and relies on it, that one court cannot annul the words of another court unless it is greater than it in wisdom and in number, our teacher (Rambam) interprets this as referring to when that individual and those many argued about a decree or an ordinance. Meaning, if a court ruled according to the view of the individual, another court cannot dispute and rule according to the view of the many unless it is greater, etc., as will be explained nearby. But if they argued about one expounding one of the rules of interpretation and the other another, indeed, it can annul his words even if it is not as great in wisdom and number. And if you say, if so, why do Amoraim not dispute Tannaim, for indeed in every place we challenge an Amora from a Mishnah or Baraita, and it is answered, "I say like this Tanna," and if he does not say so, it is difficult for him. And according to our teacher (Rambam), the permission is given to them to dispute the words of the Tannaim. It is possible to say that from the time of the sealing of the Mishnah, it was established and accepted that later generations would not dispute earlier ones. Similarly, they did so at the sealing of the Gemara, that from the time it was sealed, no one was given permission to dispute it.

As it is stated, "To the judge who will be in those days, etc." In Rosh Hashanah, at the end of Chapter 2 (page 25a), they said: "He should act like Samuel in his generation." And there they bring the verse, "To the priests, the Levites, and the judge who will be in those days." And if you consider that a person goes to a judge who was not in his days, well, you should only go to a judge who will be in your days.

The court that decreed a decree or enacted a regulation, etc. It seems that our teacher (Rambam) explains as follows: Regarding what we learned in the first chapter of Eduyot, that one court cannot annul the words of another court unless it is greater than it in wisdom and in number—this applies when they disagreed on a decree or regulation. If the earlier court decreed or enacted something in a certain way, and a later court saw fit to enact something else regarding a different matter, they cannot annul the words of the earlier court unless they are greater in wisdom and in number. However, regarding matters where a court saw fit to decree and prohibit actions as a protective measure, if the prohibition became widespread among all Israel, another Great Court cannot annul it, even if it were greater than the earlier court. You might ask: Didn't we say in Gittin, in the chapter of Shulchan (Gittin 36a), regarding Hillel's institution of the prozbul, that Shmuel said, "If my power is greater than Hillel's, I would abolish it"? And we also say there that if Hillel instituted the prozbul universally, we do not have the authority to annul it, implying that a court cannot annul the words of another court, etc., which implies that one greater in wisdom and in number can annul them. There are those who say that the prozbul is not a fence lest people violate the Torah's words. On the contrary, it is a Torah law to release debts, and Hillel annulled the money and instituted that it should not be released. Although we say there that he instituted the prozbul because he saw that people were refraining from lending to each other and thus violating what is written in the Torah "beware lest there be a thought of wickedness in your heart," it is not an outright prohibition. They were acting as servants when they refrained from lending, for it is a negative commandment to lend and not to borrow. The main reason for the institution of the prozbul was not as a fence for the Torah, but rather for the benefit of the poor, so that the doors would not be closed in their face, and for the benefit of the rich so that they would not incur loss. This is also explained there regarding the inquiry into what is prozbul, as Rav Chisda said: "proz buli and buti," meaning the rich and the poor. Why did Rav Chisda explain it thus? Because we read prozbul, which means the institution for the rich, so that they do not transgress the Torah. And from where do we derive that it is also an institution for the poor? It is not a fence for the Torah but a correction for the rich so that they do not incur loss and a correction for the poor so that the doors are not closed in their face, as I have written. Similarly, at the beginning of Megillah, we say that the men of the Great Assembly instituted it, and they uprooted the institution that the men of the Great Assembly had instituted. There a court cannot annul the words of another court unless it is greater, etc. There it is certainly not a fence for the Torah. Therefore, if there are those greater than them in wisdom and number, they can uproot their institution. However, it is difficult from your question in Avodah Zarah, Chapter Ein Ma'amidin (Avodah Zarah 37), where we say that Rabbi Yehudah Nesiah permitted the oil of non-Jews, how can we reconcile this with the principle that a court cannot annul the words of another court, etc.? Certainly, the decree regarding oil is due to a protective measure, as we say in Shabbat, Chapter 1 (Shabbat 17), that they decreed against their oil because of their wine. So how can we explain this according to what we learned that a court cannot annul unless it is greater, etc., which implies that if it were greater, it could annul? And behold, Rabbeinu wrote shortly thereafter that in matters that are a protective measure, even a greater court cannot annul them. Therefore, some say that the question is how could they annul the institution of the earlier authorities, meaning even if there was a court later that could annul them, such as if there was no protective measure or fence, it would not be able to annul it because a court cannot, etc. And the words of the Ra'avad, "Not even Elijah and a court," etc., will be explained later.

The explanation of his words that we say in the first chapter of Beitza (page 5) that the sages instituted that one who walks a full day's journey should not redeem fourth-year fruits (neta reva'i) but should bring them up to Jerusalem and eat them there. It explains there the reason: in order to adorn the markets of Jerusalem with fruits. And we also say there that Rabbi Yochanan ben Zakkai was included among them and permitted that the fruits should not be brought up to Jerusalem but should be redeemed and eaten in their place, because after the destruction of the Temple, why should we adorn the markets of Jerusalem for the sake of non-Jews. Nevertheless, the Ra'avad's question is difficult for me to recognize. Sh'ribaz said to him that he was not as great as the earlier authorities. And if you ask, since we say in the chapter of "Yesh Nochalim" (Baba Batra, page 134) and similarly in Sukkah (page 28) in the chapter "Talmidim," "Hillel had a great student, Jonathan ben Uziel, the least among them was R' Yochanan ben Zakkai," perhaps it means the least in wisdom of the Torah, but in other wisdoms they were greater than him. You should know that what is said there is that he did not leave out the governments of laundresses, the fox's discussions, and discussions of angels, the work of the chariot. And in those wisdoms it is possible that they were greater than him, but not in the wisdom of the Torah. And proof for this can be found in the fact that they appointed a president and head of the academy in place of Hillel. Now, if he was the smallest among the disciples, how would they appoint him, and why would they not appoint one of the greater ones? Surely, in the wisdom of Torah, he was as great as them, and it is possible that he was greater than them. Furthermore, even if we were to say that he was also smaller than them in the wisdom of Torah, it is still possible that he was greater than them in the enactment that was made. And do not be troubled in your mind about how later authorities could be greater than the earlier ones, for we find a great example in Rabba, who was greater than Rav Yehuda, as we say (Ta'anit 24a, see also Berakhot 20b): "Rav Yehuda, when he would arrive at a woman who is squeezing herbs, he would say, 'Be mindful of the perspective of Rav and Shmuel.'" Here, we learn that we had here the greatness of Rabba over Rav Yehuda. And what we say in the first chapter of Beitza (page 4a), "And now that we know the fixed calculation of the month, why do we observe two days?" It is because they sent a message from there, "Be cautious in the custom of your fathers that is in your hands, at times when the decrees of the kingdom are enacted, lest confusion arise." It is evident that the Beit Din during the time of the Amoraim was not greater than the authorities who established two days. Consequently, even though it was not greater than them, once they nullified the reason, they could annul it. Thus, it can be said that the matter there is that since they were well-versed in the established practice of the month, why did they observe two days? The Sages at that time could have established two days to fix it so that we would not do two days. Alternatively, it was established by those who were fixing it. They explicitly said that if the time comes when they will stand on the calculation and not on the sight, we will not observe two days. According to the opinion of the Ra'avad, it is clear that it is not enough for the Gemara to be questioned upon it, as we say in the first chapter of Beitza (page 4a), "The Beit Din cannot annul the words of the Beit Din of their friend, etc." To resolve this, it means in a matter where the reason was not annulled. However, where the reason was annulled, even one not as great as them could annul it.

"Even if the reason has been nullified, etc." In the first chapter of Beitza (page 5a), we say that something prohibited by a majority, even if the reason has been nullified, requires another majority to permit it. From this, it implies according to our Rabbi [likely referring to Rabbeinu Tam] that it must be a majority greater than them. Similarly, we require that the person be wiser than them, and we took one type [of person] from among them.

In what context are these matters stated regarding things that were not prohibited by them, etc.? It seems to me that Rabbeinu learned this way, as we say in Avodah Zarah, chapter Eim Ma'amidin (page 36), 'In every court, they can annul the words of another court, except for one, which is a matter that even if Elijah were to come with his court, his words would not be heeded.' According to Rabbeinu [likely referring to Rabbeinu Tam], this implies that in every enactment of a court, another court can annul its words, except for matters like these, which are prohibitions that were established as a safeguard to the Torah. For example, the prohibition of yedi'ah (knowledge) regarding produce, and similar enactments. In the first chapter of Beitza, regarding an egg laid on Rosh Hashanah, which is prohibited on the second day, there is no safeguard to prohibit on the second day of Rosh Hashanah more than the two days of other festivals. Concerning the case of 'adorning the streets of Jerusalem with fruits,' certainly there is no safeguard there either. Similarly, in the case of 'prozbul,' where Shmuel said, 'If my strength permits (it), I will annul it,' there is no safeguard to the Torah, as I have proven above....

And regarding what Rabbeinu wrote, 'If its prohibition is widespread among all of Israel,' so they said there in Avodah Zarah, chapter Eim Ma'amidin: 'In every court, they can annul the words of another court, except for one matter.' Rav Mesharshiya said, 'What is the reason? Since its prohibition has spread among the majority of Israel.' Rabbeinu wrote 'among all of Israel' based on what most agree, 'its majority is like its entirety.' And since this opinion is plausible, the Raavad has no authority to reject it due to his opinion that does not differentiate between enactments that are safeguards and those that are not safeguards. The entire reasoning depends on whether its prohibition has spread or not, and therefore, he wrote above, 'Even if Elijah and his court since its prohibition is widespread among all of Israel,' as stated in Avodah Zarah, etc. I have already clarified that point according to Rabbeinu.

And a court has the authority to uproot, etc." This is straightforward in itself and did not need to be written, except to say that the sages did not strengthen their words more than those of the Torah, even though it seems so from here, it comes to teach us that they did not....

And what is said that even the words of the Torah, every court has the authority to uproot it. So it is taught in Sanhedrin, in the chapter 'Nigmar HaDin' (Sanhedrin 46a): 'Rabbi Abba said, I heard that a court administers lashes and punishments not prescribed by law, not to transgress the Torah, meaning, to establish halacha thus, but to create a fence around the Torah, meaning, temporarily.' This has already been explained in the words of our Rabbi in Tractate Sanhedrin, Chapter 24.

A court that sees fit to enact a decree... In the tractate Avodah Zarah, page 37, our Rabbis relied on the words of Rabbi Shimon ben Gamliel and Rabbi Eliezer ben Rabbi Tzadok, who used to say: 'We do not enact a decree upon the community unless the majority of the community is capable of abiding by it.'

Behold, if a court decreed a decree and they reconsidered... It seems to me that this is learned from what we say in Avodah Zarah, page 35, where it relates that Rabbi Yishmael asked Rabbi Yehoshua: 'Why did they forbid the cheese of Gentiles?' Ulla said, 'Because when they decreed a decree in the West (Babylonia), they did not reveal its reason until thirteen years later. Perhaps there was someone who did not agree with it and came to treat it with disrespect. If it is found that the court can enforce it and it spreads, what do we care if someone treats it with disrespect? The court can compel compliance. But it implies that if they doubt it and it does not spread, they are not authorized to compel the people to follow it. Moreover, it is a fortiori argument from the law that our Rabbi wrote shortly after, 'They decreed and they reconsidered...' that if even after several years a smaller court than them can annul it, certainly they themselves cannot compel the people to follow it.

They decreed and reconsidered, and it spread..." In Avodah Zarah, page 37, we discuss Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi, how he permitted the oil of Gentiles. He was not as great as the disciples of Shammai and Hillel who forbade it. Additionally, it is a matter (issue) that even Elijah and his court cannot annul. We return [to the original discussion]: that the oil did not spread to most of Israel because Rabbi Shmuel bar Abba said in the name of Rabbi Yochanan, 'Our Rabbis sat and deliberated whether the oil should be forbidden to most of Israel.' Our Rabbis relied on the words of Rabbi Shimon ben Gamliel and Rabbi Elazar ben Rabbi Tzadok who said, 'We do not decree an edict on the community unless the majority of the community can abide by it.' According to the opinion of our Rabbi, since they found that the prohibition did not spread to most of Israel, they decided to permit it. For indeed, we find that they do not decree an edict on the community unless the majority of the community can abide by it. Therefore, even if they had decreed, it would not have been a decree, as explicitly stated by Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi who was not as great as the earlier authorities. Furthermore, it was a matter that serves as a safeguard to the Torah, as we say in Shabbat, chapter 3, where they decreed against oil due to its use for anointing purposes, yet they permitted it because its prohibition did not spread to all of Israel. One might ask, how did Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi rely on what he checked? Perhaps, in the days of the early authorities, it spread and later they questioned it. From this, it would seem logical to say that even if it initially spread, since nowadays most of Israel does not practice it, they permit it. However, I have seen that Rambam wrote that it has not yet spread, and their majority did not maintain the decree to observe it as forbidden. This is implied by his wording that Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi checked from the day the decree was enacted until today, and he found that at no time did its prohibition spread throughout all of Israel.

"And any court that permitted..." There, in Avodah Zarah, page 37, they said: "Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi permitted two things, and they told him to also permit bread, but he did not want to. If so, we have a precedent from the court that teaches us, as we learned at the end of Eduyot, page 48, that Yosei ben Yo'ezer testified regarding three matters to permit them, and they called him 'Yosei the permitter'.

"Since there is authority to decree..." The Ra'avad wrote: "All these, let the spirit carry away..." I say, it seems that the Ra'avad means that anything they decreed upon and prohibited, etc. But does Rabbeinu say this? Because regarding chicken cooked with milk, which Rabbeinu brought as an analogy, it is certainly forever prohibited. Even at the beginning of his statements, he wrote similarly in explanation, that since there is authority for the court to decree and prohibit something permissible, its prohibition will endure for generations. If he bases his reasoning on what he said and relies on it from the Scriptures, etc. However, Rabbeinu does not say it is prohibited outright, except when they say it is directly from the Torah itself. But when they say it is merely a scriptural derivation, they say it is not from the Torah itself, and that particular verse does not indicate it but rather it is a general scriptural derivation. And regarding "if he diminishes due to temporal necessity," etc., Rabbeinu already wrote in this chapter that if they see fit to annul a positive commandment or transgress a prohibition to bring the masses back to the religion, etc., they act according to the needs of the hour. And regarding "you will not find an additional prohibition," etc., it seems this is the essence of his reasoning, and I do not know the reason for his opinion. And if one says that chicken cooked with milk is prohibited from the Torah because the Torah prohibited a specific type of meat, and similarly for anything called meat, it is considered an additional prohibition, for sure it would be called additional.

Regarding what Rabbeinu said here, based on hearsay, they learned that what the Torah prohibited, etc., applies equally to the meat of domesticated animals and wild animals. This is difficult from what Rabbeinu said in Chapter 9 of the Laws of Forbidden Foods, that the prohibition of eating the meat of wild animals is only according to the opinion of Rabbi Yehudah. One can argue that there he meant the essence of the matter, ruling according to Rabbi Akiva's opinion. Nevertheless, since we see in the Talmud (Chullin 116b) that Levi came to the house of Yosef Rishba and said he heard from Rabbi Yehuda ben Beteira, and I thought perhaps he interpreted it according to the opinion of Rabbi Yehuda of Galilee. From now on, when the court will stand and say that the meat of wild animals is permitted according to the Torah, except that we prohibit it due to a fence, it is already possible that it diminishes if it is in a place where they follow the custom of Rabbi Yehuda of Galilee. To take an example that fits the case of whether it applies to diminishing or adding, he brought up this matter and did not fear that it would lead to confusion regarding the law, since in its place, he ruled according to Rabbi Akiva that the prohibition of eating wild animals is not from the Torah.