Will engage in sexual intercourse with her and take her to him - that is to say, sexual intercourse with her constitutes taking her [as opposed to their being two separate things].

But perhaps [one can say that with regard to all matters] she is like a wife - just as with a wife, money and a document [act to bethroth] just as sexual intercourse; so too with a yevama, money and a document [act to betroth] just as sexual intercourse -- since it is written "[her brother-in-law will ... take her to him] as a wife" [Deuteronomy 25:5].

"And perform levirate marriage with her" - which connotes sexual intercourse. Scripture repeats it [another word with the root YBM] to preclude [any other forms of completing the levirate marriage].

Such is the proper reading: It is needed [to teach] that he can perform levirate marriage without her consent - which is how we expound [the verse] in Tractate Yevamot [Yevamot 8b:14].

If so - if [the verse] is to teach that sexual intercourse [is the only method of acquisition], let it say "and perform levirate marriage." What [then is connoted by] "and perform levirate marriage with her"? To derive that it can also [be done] against her will. This is taught explicitly in a baraita in Tractate Yevamot in Chapter "One who had Intercourse with his Yevama": "And perform levirate marriage" -- sexual intercourse completes her [acquisition], but money and a marriage document do not complete her [acquisition]. "And consummate the levirate marriage with her” -- [he acquires her even if he acted] against her will [Yevamot 54a:5].

From where do we [derive] - that a ḥalutza is permitted to marry? Perhaps it only that the Merciful One imposes the commandment to perform ḥalitza upon her, but that nevertheless she does not become permitted [to remarry].

In Israel: The house of him who had [his shoe] removed - the implication is as follows: she is fit to be brought to [another] house in Israel once she has performed ḥalitza.

“In Israel” [is written] twice - [the second instance being:] "To establish a name for his brother in Israel” [Deuteronomy 25:7].

Who is [forbidden] by [only a mere] prohibition - to [a member of] the public [by the verse] "the wife of the deceased shall not become that of another party, outside the family" [Deuteronomy 25:5].

What [is unique] about a married woman - who becomes permitted by the death of the husband.

That the one who renders her forbidden also renders her permitted - her husband is the one who renders her forbidden -- therefore he can permit her, on the occasion of his death. But the yevama, who is forbidden [to others] by the betrothal of her [original] husband -- how can the death of the yavam permit her?

This as well - when the yavam dies, it turns out that the one who forbids her permits her, for if it were not for [the existence of] the yavam, she would have become permitted once the husband died.

"So" - "shall be done to the man who will not build up", etc. [Deuteronomy 25:9]

As it is written, "lot" - regarding the goats.

And is written "statute" - in [that same] passage. All instances of "statute" are meant [to indicate] an indispensable condition.

The lottery renders it a sin-offering - the goat upon which the lot "for God" falls is rendered a sin-offering.

A verbal designation does not - if he verbally bestowed upon it the designation "sin-offering", it is not thereby established [as a sin-offering]. He must then cast lots upon them, and if the lot falls upon its counterpart, this one will be for Azazel.

As one might have thought - that is to say, this verse is necessary for the following reason: I might have thought to say: Just as in a case where a lottery is not used to sanctify [an offering], such as with "nests", about which is written "one for a sin offering and the other for a burnt offering" (Leviticus 5:7) -- if he cast a lot upon them, they are not thereby designated, and he is able to change [their designation], as we have established in Tractate Yoma: "Nests become designated only upon either the owner’s taking of them, when he initially purchases [ and consecrates them for his offering], or upon the priest’s actual performance [of the sacrificial rite upon them]." (Yoma 41a:2)

A verbal designation does effect the consecration - if he said, at the time of taking them, "this one for a sin-offering and this one for a burnt-offering", they are considered designated, and if he alters [the designation], they are disqualified.

Here, in a case in which the use of a lottery does effect the consecration - as is written, "and Aaron will place, etc." (Leviticus 16:8), is it not logically right, etc.

The verse states - it repeats [the term "sin-offering"] to indicate that is an indispensable condition.

One would learn an a fortiori inference - to bring [a law] that is not written in the passage [namely, that verbal designation is effective], even though a term that indicats an indispensable condition [i.e., the word "statute"] is written there.

"For her" - as is written, "and write for her" (Deuteronomy 24:3).

“For her” is written twice - [the other time following] "then this latter man rejects her" etc. (Deuteronomy 24:3)

And not for her and for another - if they have the same name; because two women cannot be divorced with one bill of divorce that reads "so-and-so divorces his wives B and C."

The verse states, "shoe" - it is a superfluous [word in the] verse "The house of him who had undergone ḥalitza of the shoe" (Deuteronomy 25:10), because it ought to have written [just] "the house of him who had undergone ḥalitza."

Excluding - a large shoe that he cannot walk with.