The Mishnah's placement of tractate Avodah Zarah follows logically from the preceding tractate, Sanhedrin. Sanhedrin deals with matters of idolatry, including the case of the "Ir haNidachas", and the worship of constellations. Therefore, it is fitting that Avodah Zarah, also concerning idolatry, follows directly within Nezikin, the "Order of Salvations". However, Makkot and Shevuot, dealing with corporal punishment and oaths respectively, are also relevant to the Sanhedrin's jurisdiction, explaining their position immediately afterwards. Following these, the Mishnah returns to its logical progression, presenting Avodah Zarah and then Horayot.

The Mishnah sometimes places the number at the end of its statement, as in this case, Kiddushin 2a (concerning the three ways to acquire a wife), and Bikkurim 2:6 (regarding the three ways an etrog is like a tree). Sometimes the number is at the beginning, as in Nazir 65b (the seven ways to examine a zav), Yoma 2a (seven days before Yom Kippur), and Gittin 9a (the three ways women's divorce documents are similar).

Rashi explains that this prohibition prevents idolaters from thanking their deities due to business conducted with Jews on festival days. This seems to include even ordinary commerce. This raises a difficulty, given the common practice of trading with them on their holidays. Even if most of their festivals are for saints, they still have a weekly holy day, which, according to Rabbi Yishmael (Avodah Zarah 6a), should prohibit business entirely. The argument that idolaters outside of Israel merely follow ancestral customs (Chullin 13b) is refuted by Shmuel (Avodah Zarah 7b), who states the prohibition applies on their festival day, even in exile. Perhaps it is permitted to avoid animosity, as in the case of Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi accepting a gift (Avodah Zarah 6b). However, this isn't conclusive, as he may have been seeking advice to avoid conflict, not permission. Further, avoiding animosity explains lending, borrowing, and repaying debts upon demand, but not regular trade. A Jew could simply claim disinterest. How would the idolater know it was due to the festival? Perhaps the leniency stems from the understanding that local idolaters don't truly worship idols. This explains Rav Yehuda and Rava sending gifts (Avodah Zarah 65a), stating their certainty of this. Alternatively, the Yerushalmi on our Mishnah states the prohibition applies only to unfamiliar idolaters. Transactions with acquaintances are permitted as mere flattery, avoiding attribution to the festival. A baraita states that joining a city's celebrations is simply flattery. Rabeinu Tam explains that the prohibition applies only to items offered to idols, not ordinary purchases, which are permitted under both the "thanksgiving" and "Lifnei Iver" interpretations. It's forbidden to sell them sacrificial items. "To carry and give" means exchanging money for such items. He cites Avodah Zarah 6a, questioning whether the prohibition is due to profit, leading to thanksgiving, or "Lifnei Iver." The Gemara differentiates based on whether the idolater has another animal. If non-sacrificial items were forbidden, the Gemara would have used that example. In regular commerce, "thanksgiving" doesn't apply, as money is exchanged, and profit isn't assured. The Gemara asks: Is it forbidden because the idolater will have more animals to sacrifice, even if they already possess some? Or is it "Lifnei Iver," permitting it if they already have one? Rabeinu Tam suggests the common practice is understandable. Even if devout, they offer money, not sacrifices, negating the "increased wealth" issue. However, lending money for offerings is problematic. Rabeinu Elchanan disagrees, saying offering-money goes to priests for themselves, not idol worship.

Rabeinu Tam explains this refers only to interest-free loans. Lending with interest is permitted as it causes them hardship (Kiddushin 20a).

The Gemara (Avodah Zarah 6b) follows Rabbi Yehoshua ben Korchah: oral loans are collectible, as it saves money from idolaters. Perhaps even documented loans are collectible, as the Yerushalmi says even these can be lost. The Ri states that loans in our documents, or even those with guarantees, are collectible, even if the idolater will give thanks, as it's always considered saving it from them. Regarding Rabbi Yehoshua ben Korchah saying documented loans aren't collectible: this applies when we have power over them. Even then, oral loans are collectible to prevent future denial. The Yerushalmi says if there's collateral, the loan isn't considered lost. However, it's still considered saving money, as even with collateral, loans can be lost.

Why doesn't our Mishnah use the word "Eidihen" (their testimonies)? Similar textual discrepancies exist elsewhere in the Talmud, such as in Beitza 35b ("Meishlin" vs. "Mashchilin") and Bava Kamma 116b ("Meitzikin" vs. "Masikin"), without the Gemara questioning why each version is preferred. Perhaps this is because those variations have similar meanings, unlike our case. However, this contrasts with Sukkah 50b ("Sho'eivah" vs. "Chashuvah") and Yevamos 17a ("Rishonah" vs. "Sheniyah"), where different meanings exist without the Gemara raising similar questions. Our Gemara likely focuses on this because it considers "testimony" more logical, as it signifies evidence against idolatry, thus questioning the alternative spelling. However, this raises another question: Why does the Gemara question the version with "aleihen" if the questioner already knows "eidus" (testimony) is preferred? It seems the Gemara asks why the version with "aleihen" isn't "eidihen," as the latter is explicitly in the verse, while "eidihen" with an "aleph" isn't; only "eidam" appears. The Gemara answers that a term implying "breaking" is preferred, then questions why the other version uses "eidihen" if "breaking" is preferable.