**[Regarding the law of] a vessel, etc., because it is necessary, etc.**The Maharshal wrote (Chapter 25, end of section 86) that there was no need for this reason of spending one's money [to kasher the vessel]. This is because even without this reason, since the permitting state (היתר) does not arrive automatically by the mere passage of time, it is not considered a Davar Sheyesh Lo Matirin (an item that will eventually become permitted). Thus far are his words.

The Shakh's Counter-Argument:

However, I do not comprehend his reasoning (ולא ירדתי לסוף דעתו). For behold, even if the permitting state arrives without the passage of time, it is still considered a Davar Sheyesh Lo Matirin—such as in the case of vows (נדרים) and the like [where absolution can be requested at any time].

Alternative Views on Mixed Vessels:

The Ra'ah in Bedek HaBayit (page 128b) objects to the Rashba, arguing that there is a completely different reason here why the vessel cannot be nullified, independent of the laws of Davar Sheyesh Lo Matirin. His reasoning is that wherever a prohibition is recognizable, it cannot be nullified; and since it is possible to extract the absorbed prohibition from within the vessel via Hag'alah (purification in boiling water), it is viewed as if the prohibition is actively recognizable. Furthermore, it is impossible for these vessels not to impart a forbidden taste into the permitted food. See there where he elaborates.

The Maharil in his Responsa (Section 194) also disagrees with the Rashba. He argues that the financial expense required to perform Hag'alah is considered a minor loss (הפסד מועט). This is comparable to what we calculate in the Talmudic chapter HaZahav (Bava Metzia 53) and in the seventh chapter of Nedarim, where Second Tithe (מעשר שני) is considered to have a permitting mechanism because it can be brought up to Jerusalem [despite the travel expense]. See there. Therefore, one should take his words into account in any situation where there is no substantial financial loss (הפסד מרובה).

Waiting 24 Hours (Eino Ben Yomo):

It also appears to me that one should leave the mixed vessels until they are no longer "of their day" (Eino Ben Yomo, meaning 24 hours have passed), for at that point, the absorbed taste becomes foul and is permitted by Torah law. The author of the Responsa Mas'at Binyamin wrote similarly at the end of his work. However, he noted there that this requirement to wait applies specifically if one intends to use the vessels all together as a group; but to use a single vessel on its own is permitted immediately, because since there is nothing present but absorbed taste, it does not fall under the strictures of Davar Sheyesh Lo Matirin.

In my humble opinion, however, even using each vessel individually is forbidden until a full 24-hour cycle (מעת לעת) has passed. For the Rashba and the Tur only ruled that a vessel is not treated as a Davar Sheyesh Lo Matirin because one must incur financial expenses to permit it; but in a case like this, where a permitting mechanism naturally occurs by Torah law without any financial expense [simply by waiting 24 hours], everyone agrees it is forbidden to use immediately. Furthermore, later in subparagraph 9, I have established the halakhic conclusion that even a forbidden taste (טעמא) is not nullified when dealing with a Davar Sheyesh Lo Matirin.

Refuting a Stringency from the Bach:

In the Responsa of Ibn Lev, he ruled that if a dairy bowl becomes mixed among meat bowls, it cannot be nullified by a majority because it is a mixture Shelo Be'mino (not of its own kind), and therefore all the bowls become forbidden. The Bach has already taken issue with this ruling.

Additionally, the Bach was stringent to require removing one vessel from the mixture as a mere stringency, comparing it to the custom of the Maharam who would discard one piece of meat from a mixture. However, this comparison is incorrect. All the Halakhic authorities agree later in Section 109 that it is completely unnecessary to remove a piece. As for the Maharam who did so, the Mahara"i explained the reason: the Maharam was an extraordinarily righteous man and a preeminent Torah scholar who took a personal stringency upon himself because it felt disgraceful to him that the consumption of a prohibition should happen to come to his mouth. This reasoning does not apply to vessels.

Nevertheless, in a situation where no financial loss is involved, it is proper to be stringent in accordance with the words of the Bach. Analyze this closely.

**Regarding the rule that an item that will eventually become permitted (Davar Sheyesh Lo Matirin) is not nullified... but its taste is nullified.**And regarding the ruling (in the first section) that if they whitened/glazed food with it or stuffed a chicken with it, it is not nullified—this is because it is considered the actual physical substance of the prohibition. It is not considered dissolved and lacking visible presence, except when it is entirely unrecognizable in appearance and exists only as a taste. Thus far are the words of the Torat Chatat there (Section 2) in the name of the Mahara"i.

The Shakh's Challenge:

However, this requires further study. For in my humble opinion, it appears from the Talmud in Nedarim (98) and the Jerusalem Talmud (Chapter 6 of Nedarim), as well as Tosafot, the Rosh, and the Ran there in Nedarim, that regarding a Davar Sheyesh Lo Matirin, even its taste is not nullified when mixed with its own kind (min be'mino). See there. This is also proven from what the Maharam and the Rosh wrote in a responsum (Beginning of Principle 2) regarding beer made from new grain (Chadash), stating that the grain is nullified in sixty parts water, and when we say a Davar Sheyesh Lo Matirin is not nullified, that specifically applies when it is mixed with its own kind. This is also implied by the Rambam, the Smag, and the Author [Shulchan Arukh] later in section 216:10 regarding forbidden wine that became mixed into other wine: even a single drop in a barrel forbids the whole mixture, because he can request absolution for his vow.

Refuting the Torat Chatat's Sources:

Also, what the Torat Chatat wrote there—that this is the opinion of the Tur, Orach Chayim 513 in the name of Rabbeinu Tam—is not a compelling proof. In my humble opinion, the Tur only stated there that in a mixture not of its own kind (shelo be'mino), we do not apply the rule that a Davar Sheyesh Lo Matirin cannot be nullified, as is proven in the Beit Yosef and the Bach there, see there and analyze closely. This is precisely what the Tur wrote here in the name of Rabbeinu Tam: "The rule that a Davar Sheyesh Lo Matirin is not nullified applies specifically when it is mixed with its own kind, but when not mixed with its own kind, its taste is nullified in sixty." Consequently, in its own kind, even its taste is not nullified.

Furthermore, what the Rav [Rema] wrote in the Torat Chatat—that this is the opinion of the Issur V'Heter (Principle 25)—is incorrect. For he ruled there in Law 4 just like the Rambam regarding the wine mentioned above, and similarly regarding vessels that absorbed a prohibition, he wrote there in Law 19 like the Rashba and the Author in section 3. And regarding what he wrote there in Law 17—that an item whose forbidden substance is not visibly present and only its taste remains is nullified—that refers specifically to a mixture not of its own kind.

Here is his exact quote there: "The rule that a Davar Sheyesh Lo Matirin is not nullified applies specifically in its own kind, but in not its own kind it is properly nullified in sixty, even if he does not recognize it and the body of the prohibition remains inside it... And all the more so an item whose forbidden substance is not visibly present and there is nothing but mere taste, which is properly nullified in sixty. And so we learned in the Jerusalem Talmud that for a Davar Sheyesh Lo Matirin, the Sages did not assign a standard measure, but rather in its own kind [it forbids] in any amount, and in not its own kind [it forbids] by imparting taste." Behold, it is explicit that he is dealing specifically with a mixture not of its own kind.

A Proposed Resolution and its Rejection:

Seemingly, one could have somewhat resolved his [the Rema's] words in the gloss by saying: Wherever the actual body of the prohibition is still in the mixture, even though it is not visibly present—like wine in wine and similar cases—it is not nullified. But where a piece of forbidden food fell in and he subsequently threw it out whole—where we maintain that even so, one must nullify the exudate (as stated earlier in section 98:8) because of the taste that came out of it—in such a case it is nullified. From this, we could resolve some of the earlier proofs, as they deal with situations where the body of the item itself was mixed in, which is why it is not nullified.

However, from his words in the Torat Chatat there, it appears he makes no such distinction. He derived this from Orach Chayim section 513, which explicitly deals with the body of the item being mixed in, see there. This is also proven from the words of the Mahara"i that he brought there, which I cited at the beginning of this subparagraph, analyze closely. Furthermore, he derived this law from the Hagahot Asheri (Chapter 2 of Avodah Zarah) in the name of the Mahari"ch, and there it says explicitly: "Specifically where there is substance to the prohibition, but if there is no substance to the prohibition and it dissolved, it is nullified in sixty." This is also implied in the Darkhei Moshe.

Final Ruling:

But in truth, regarding the final Halakhah, it appears that even if he removed the forbidden piece whole, its taste is not nullified, as is seemingly implied by all the aforementioned proofs. This is also proven from what Rabbeinu Yeruham wrote (Path 14, Part 4): "One who vowed [not to benefit] from meat, and eggs were cooked with the meat—they are forbidden by imparting taste, for even though it is a Davar Sheyesh Lo Matirin, [it is nullified only] because it is not its own kind."

Regardless, it is a strained logic to differentiate between whether its taste remains there along with its physical substance or not. For ultimately, the logic stands: "Until you eat it in prohibition, eat it in permissibility."

Later, I found in the Bach that he also ruled there is no distinction, and it is never nullified, though he abbreviated the matter, see there. And see the following subparagraph.